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Management review
In 2012, Finnish nuclear power plants operated safely and caused no danger to the plant 
environment or employees. The collective radiation doses of employees were low and the 
radioactive releases into the environment were very small. Radioactive waste generated 
in operational processes at the nuclear power plants accumulated as anticipated. Its 
processing and final disposal in underground facilities took place in a controlled manner.
The number of events at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant reported to STUK was higher 
than in previous years. Events were particularly frequent during the annual maintenance 
of the plant in autumn 2012. Several of the events were related to deficiencies in the 
plant’s operating activities and procedures, resulting in deviations from the state required 
by the plant documentation. STUK discussed the issue of the increased number of events 
with the licensee’s (Fortum Power and Heat Oy) management in autumn 2012. The 
licensee began the investigation of the causes behind the increased number of events. The 
work will continue in 2013. Based on the outcome of STUK’s inspection and oversight 
activities, STUK found that the development of the Loviisa management system as well as 
the procurement operations and supplier control did not meet all the requirements set for 
them by the YVL Guides. The licensee launched measures to achieve compliance with the 
requirements.
Based on operating experience from the operating Olkiluoto plant units, Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy (TVO) will have to pay increased attention to the management of plant 
modification work. The reasons behind the events reported to STUK were related to 
deficient planning and execution of modification work, and testing carried out after the 
completion of modifications. STUK has paid additional attention to the modification 
process for a couple of years, and finds the completion of the development projects currently 
active in the area essential considering the need to ensure the safe implementation of the 
extensive modifications that are planned for the next few years.
At both Olkiluoto and Loviisa, modifications required for improving safety continued 
regarding plant systems, equipment and structures and operating practices. Engineering 
of modification to replace the emergency diesel generators was started at Olkiluoto to 
essentially improve the reliability of power supply in exceptional situations. At Loviisa, 
modifications were made to improve the reliability of safety functions. The modifications 
included changes in the primary circuit pressure control, replacement of seawater circuit 
pipes and the building up of the seawater channel dam to lower the risk of seawater flooding. 
After lessons learned from the Fukushima disaster, both nuclear power plants have prepared 
action plans to improve safety. STUK reviewed and approved the plans of both plants. 
Implementation of most of the improvements is scheduled for years 2013–2015.
Most of the detailed engineering of the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit has been approved by STUK, 
and the volumes of construction work and component manufacture are decreasing. The 
focus of STUK’s supervisory operations has therefore transferred to the on-site installation 
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and commissioning of components at Olkiluoto. For the plant’s I&C systems, STUK 
approved with remarks the I&C platforms for use at the plant. STUK also approved with 
remarks the quality management procedures of the I&C engineering work. However, 
open issues still exist with regard to the independence of I&C systems and proving the 
safety impact of the potential failure of the I&C system. TVO and the plant supplier 
have continued the assessment of the safety culture at the construction site, and strived 
to create a positive safety atmosphere. However, continuous measures and exemplary 
activities are required of the project organisation management to be able to ensure and 
maintain the focus on safety and quality.
As part of the continual improvement of safety and preparation for new NPP projects, 
STUK continued the work to revise its own YVL Guides and also participated in the 
preparatory work for reforming the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act. The reform will entail 
harmonising the requirements, as far as possible, with the national regulations of EU 
countries and the requirements of the IAEA. STUK had intended to complete the YVL 
Guides by the end of 2012. The general workload, however, prevented the achievement of 
this objective.
Processing and storing nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel proceeded in a safe manner, 
and no problems were detected at the Loviisa or Olkiluoto NPPs. Thanks to successful 
planning of operations, the plants accumulated clearly less nuclear waste than NPPs on 
average. At Loviisa, STUK supervised the commissioning of a liquid waste solidification 
facility, now delayed from the original schedule. The delay has no impact on the safety of 
nuclear waste management at the Loviisa NPP, but it is important that further delays 
are avoided as the plant’s liquid waste storage is filling up. At the Olkiluoto NPP, STUK 
continued the supervision of the expansion of the interim storage for spent nuclear 
fuel. The length of the storage building will be extended, and additional pools will be 
constructed there to also accommodate the fuel coming from the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit. 
At the same time, protection against the crash of a large airplane will be added. The 
Government issued a decision on changing the operating licence conditions of the Olkiluoto 
repository for operating waste to allow the final disposal of low and intermediate level 
operating waste from Olkiluoto 3 in the same facility. The new conditions also allow the 
main part of waste that is the responsibility of the state and managed by STUK to be 
finally disposed of in the repository. 
Posiva Oy (Posiva) continued its operations that aim at the final disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel. At the end of December, Posiva submitted to the Government a construction licence 
application for a final repository and delivered to STUK the safety documentation required 
by the Finnish Nuclear Energy Decree. The construction of an underground research 
facility was completed for the most part during 2012. STUK supervised the construction 
of the underground research facility, the operations of Posiva’s organisation and the work 
carried out by Posiva to further specify the safety case for the final disposal. STUK also 
continued its preparations for the review of the construction licence by further specifying 
the review plans and by selecting members for an international team of experts from 
various fields of science and technology, assembled to assist STUK in the review of the 
construction permit application.
The implementation of nuclear safeguards functioned without problems in Finland, 
and no cause for remarks was found in the inspections carried out by the IAEA and the 
European Commission. Development of the nuclear safeguards regarding spent nuclear 
fuel continued in cooperation with the IAEA and the European Commission.
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Introduction
This report constitutes the report on regulatory oversight in the field of nuclear energy 
which the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is required to submit once 
a year to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy pursuant to Section 121 of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree. The report is also delivered to the Ministry of Environment, the 
Finnish Environment Institute, and the regional environmental authorities of the localities 
in which a nuclear facility is located.
The regulatory oversight of nuclear safety in 2012 included the engineering, construction 
and operation of nuclear facilities, as well as nuclear waste management and nuclear 
materials. The control of nuclear facilities and nuclear waste management, as well as 
nuclear non-proliferation, concern two STUK departments: Nuclear Reactor Regulation 
and Nuclear Waste and Material Regulation.
The first parts of the report explain the basics of nuclear safety regulation included as part 
of STUK’s responsibilities, as well as the objectives of the operations, and briefly introduce 
the objects of regulation. The chapter concerning the development and implementation of 
legislation and regulations describes changes in nuclear legislation, as well as the progress 
of STUK’s YVL Guide revision work.
The section concerning the regulation of nuclear facilities contains an overall safety 
assessment of the nuclear facilities currently in operation or under construction. For the 
nuclear facilities currently in operation, the section describes plant operation, events 
during operation, annual maintenance and observations made during regulatory activities. 
Data and observations gained during regulatory activities are reviewed with a focus on 
ensuring the safety functions of nuclear facilities and the integrity of structures and 
components. The chapters describing the development of the plants and their safety also 
include summaries of the development targets established after the Fukushima accident. 
For the operating NPPs, the report describes the regulation and inspections of the interim 
storage of spent nuclear fuel, management of operating waste, and the provisions for the 
costs of nuclear waste management. The report also includes a description of the oversight 
of the operations and quality management of organisations, oversight of operational 
experience feedback activities, and the results of these oversight activities. The radiation 
safety of nuclear facilities is examined on the basis of employees’ individual doses, 
collective doses, and the results of emission and environmental radiation monitoring. For 
the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit currently under construction, the report includes descriptions of 
the regulation of engineering, construction, manufacturing, installation, and commissioning 
preparations, as well as regulation of the operations of the licensee and the organisations 
participating in the construction project. At the end of the chapter on the regulation 
of nuclear facilities there is a summary of new plant projects and the regulation of the 
research reactor.
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The chapter concerning the regulation of the final disposal project for spent nuclear 
fuel describes the preparations for the final disposal project and the related regulatory 
activities. In addition, the oversight of the design and construction of the research facilities 
(Onkalo) currently under construction in Olkiluoto, as well as the assessment and 
oversight of the research, development and design work being carried out to specify further 
the safety case for final disposal are included in the report.
The section concerning nuclear non-proliferation describes the nuclear non-proliferation 
control for Finnish nuclear facilities and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel, as well as 
measures required by the Additional Protocol of the Safeguards Agreement. In addition, it 
describes the control of the transport of nuclear materials and the oversight of the nuclear 
test ban.
The chapter describing the oversight of security arrangements in the use of nuclear energy 
discusses oversight of the security arrangements in nuclear power plants and other plants, 
institutions and functions included within the scope of STUK’s regulatory oversight. 
The chapter also discusses the national and international cooperation for developing the 
security arrangements and associated regulations.
In addition to actual safety regulation, the report describes safety research, regulatory 
indicators and the development of regulatory operations, as well as emergency 
preparedness, communication and STUK’s participation in international nuclear safety 
cooperation.
Appendix 1 presents a detailed study of the safety performance of the nuclear power 
plants by means of an indicator system. Appendix 2 includes a summary of employees’ 
doses at the nuclear power plants. Appendix 3 describes exceptional operational events at 
the nuclear power plants. Appendix 4 lists the licences granted by STUK pursuant to the 
Nuclear Energy Act in 2012. Summaries of inspections included in the periodic inspection 
programme of nuclear power plants are presented in Appendix 5, and the Olkiluoto 3 
construction inspection programme is in Appendix 6. The Onkalo construction inspection 
programme inspections are listed in a table in Appendix 7. Appendix 8 lists the most 
important assignments funded by STUK concerning the safety of nuclear power plants 
and final disposal. Appendix 9 contains definitions of terms and abbreviations used in the 
report.
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1 Fundamentals of nuclear 
safety regulation
Regulatory control by STUK is based 
on the Nuclear Energy Act.
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) is responsible for the regulatory control 
of nuclear safety in Finland. Its responsibilities 
include the control of physical protection and emer-
gency response, as well as the safeguards for nu-
clear materials necessary to prevent nuclear pro-
liferation.
STUK lays down detailed requirements 
concerning nuclear safety.
STUK contributes to the processing of applications 
for licences under the Nuclear Energy Act, con-
trols compliance with the licence conditions, and 
formulates the detailed requirements. STUK also 
lays down qualification requirements for personnel 
involved in the use of nuclear energy and controls 
compliance with these requirements. In addition, 
STUK submits proposals for legislative amend-
ments and issues general guidelines concerning 
radiation and nuclear safety. 
The aim is to ensure safety and maintain 
the confidence of the general public.
The general objective of STUK’s regulatory 
activities is to ensure the safety of nuclear 
Figure 1. Oversight of nuclear facilities; from strategy to implementation.
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facilities, so that plant operation does not cause 
radiation hazards that could endanger the safety of 
workers or the population in the vicinity or cause 
other harm to the environment or property. The 
most important objective is to prevent a reactor 
accident that would cause a release of radioactive 
substances, or the threat of a release. Another ob-
jective is to maintain public confidence in regula-
tory activities.
STUK ensures the adequacy of 
safety regulations and compliance 
with their requirements.
It is STUK’s task to ensure in its regulatory acti-
vities that safety regulations contain adequate re-
quirements for the use of nuclear energy and that 
nuclear energy is used in compliance with these 
requirements.
Regulation by STUK ensures the 
attainment of safety objectives.
STUK ensures, by means of inspections and cont-
rols, that the operational preconditions and ope-
rations of the licensee and its subcontractors and 
the systems, structures and components of nuclear 
facilities are in compliance with regulatory requi-
rements. STUK’s operations are guided by annual 
follow-up plans, presenting the key items and acti-
vities for inspection and review. STUK carries out 
inspections of plans for nuclear facilities and other 
documents that the licensee is obliged to request 
STUK to do. The compliance of activities with the 
Defence in depth
The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by 
preventing the harmful effects of reactor damage 
and radiation through successive and mutually-
redundant functional and structural levels. This 
approach is called the “defence in depth” principle. 
Safety-ensuring functions may be divided into pre-
ventive, protective and mitigating levels.
The aim of the preventive level is to prevent 
any deviations from the plant’s normal opera-
tional state. Accordingly, high quality standards 
apply to component design, manufacture, installa-
tion and maintenance, as well as plant operation.
The protective level refers to providing for oper-
ational transients and accidents through systems 
aimed at detecting disturbances and preventing 
their development into an accident.
If the first or second level functions fail to stop 
the progress of an accident, its consequences must 
be mitigated. In such a case, the main thing is to 
ensure the integrity of reactor containment and the 
operation of its associated systems.
In addition to the functional levels, the defence 
in depth approach includes the principle of mul-
tiple successive barriers to potential radioactive 
releases, and a number of good design and quality 
management principles.
Advisory Commission on Nuclear Safety
Pursuant to the Nuclear Energy Act, the prelimi-
nary preparation of matters related to the safe use 
of nuclear energy is vested with the Advisory 
Commission on Nuclear Safety. It is appointed 
by the Government and functions in conjunction 
with STUK. Its term of office is three years. The 
Commission was appointed on 1 October 2009 and 
its term of office ended on 30 September 2012. A 
new Commission was appointed on 1 October 2012 
and will remain in office until 30 September 2015.
In 2012, the Chairman of the Commission was 
Dr. Sc. (Tech.) Seppo Vuori, and the Vice-Chairman 
was senior inspector Miliza Malmelin (Ministry 
of the Environment). Members of the Commission 
were professor Riitta Kyrki-Rajamäki (LTY), cus-
tomer director Rauno Rintamaa (VTT), country 
director Timo Okkonen (Inspecta Oy), customer 
manager Ilona Lindholm (VTT) and Dr. Sc. (Tech.) 
Antero Tamminen. Professor Tero Varjoranta, 
Director General of STUK, was a permanent ex-
pert to the Commission.
The Commission has two committees, the 
Reactor Safety Committee and the Nuclear Waste 
Safety Committee. Foreign and Finnish experts 
have been invited to join the committees. English is 
the working language in the committees, and more 
extensive questions of principle will be brought 
to them for preparation. Nuclear industry ex-
perts from the UK, France, Sweden, Germany, 
Switzerland, Hungary and the United States have 
been invited to join the committees. The committees 
convene a few times each year. The members of the 
actual Commission also participate in the work of 
the committees.
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plans is verified through inspections carried out 
at the plant site or at subcontractors’ premises. In 
addition to these inspections and reviews, STUK 
has separate inspection programmes for periodic 
inspections of operating plants and inspections 
during construction. STUK also employs resident 
inspectors at the plants, who supervise and wit-
ness the construction, operation and condition of 
the plant and the operations of the organisation 
on a daily basis and report their observations. An 
overall safety assessment is conducted annually on 
each nuclear facility, dealing with the attainment 
of radiation protection objectives, the development 
of defence in depth, and the operation of organisa-
tions constructing or operating nuclear facilities 
and providing services to them.
STUK evaluates the safety of nuclear 
facilities starting from the application 
for a decision-in-principle
The construction of a nuclear power plant, inter-
mediate storage for spent fuel and a final disposal 
facility require a Government decision-in-principle 
that the project is in line with the overall good of 
society. The task of giving a statement on and pre-
paring a preliminary safety assessment of the ap-
plication for the decision-in-principle is vested with 
STUK. The safety assessment will state, in particu-
lar, whether any issues have been discovered that 
would indicate that the necessary prerequisites for 
the construction of a nuclear power plant in com-
pliance with the Nuclear Energy Act do not exist. 
In connection with the application for the decision-
in-principle, the applicant also presents a report on 
the environmental impact assessment. When an 
application for a construction or operating licence 
for a nuclear facility has been submitted to the 
Government, STUK issues a statement on it and 
includes its safety assessment. 
STUK regulates the different nuclear 
facility design and construction stages
The principles and detailed approach of STUK’s in-
spection activities are described in the YVL Guides 
issued by STUK. Guide YVL 1.1 describes the 
oversight and inspection procedures at a general 
level, while the detailed procedures are described 
in other YVL Guides. The purpose of oversight and 
inspection activities regarding plant projects is to 
allow STUK to verify that the prerequisites for 
Nuclear liability
The Nuclear Liability Act prescribes that the users 
of nuclear energy must have a liability insurance 
policy, or other financial guarantee, for a possible 
accident at a nuclear facility that would harm 
the environment, population or property. Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy and Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
(TVO) have prepared for damage from a nuclear 
accident as prescribed by law by taking out an 
insurance policy for this purpose, mainly with the 
Nordic Nuclear Insurance Pool.
International negotiations concerning the 
renewal of the Paris/Brussels nuclear liability 
agreements were completed in 2004. It was agreed 
that the funds available for compensation were 
to be increased, and plant owners were to have 
unlimited liability. However, the entry into force 
of these international agreements has been repeat-
edly postponed. Consequently, the decision was 
taken in Finland to legislate nationally regard-
ing a higher amount of insurance and impose an 
unlimited liability on licence holders. A temporary 
amendment of the Nuclear Liability Act entered 
into force at the beginning of 2012. The legislative 
amendment will be revoked once the agreements 
discussed above will become valid. 
In case of an accident, the funds available for 
compensation come from three sources: the licens-
ee, the country of location of the facility and the in-
ternational liability community. In 2012, a total of 
600,000,000 SDR was available for compensation 
from these sources. SDR refers to Special Drawing 
Right, an international reserve asset defined by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose 
value is based on a basket of key international cur-
rencies. In 2012, the value of the SDR was about 
EUR 1.2.
In Finland, the Financial Supervisory 
Authority is responsible for ascertaining the con-
tents and conditions of the licensee’s insurance ar-
rangements. The Financial Supervisory Authority 
has approved both Fortum Power and Heat Oy’s 
and Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s liability insurance, 
and STUK has verified the existence of the policies 
as required by the Nuclear Energy Act.
The Nuclear Liability Act also covers the trans-
port of nuclear materials. STUK ascertains that 
all nuclear material transport has had liabil-
ity insurance either approved by the Financial 
Supervisory Authority or by the authorities of 
the sending state in accordance with the Paris 
Convention.
14
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operations of a high standard exist, that the plans 
are acceptable before the implementation begins 
and that the implementation is compliant with 
regulations before the operating licence is granted. 
Pursuant to the Nuclear Energy Act, the licensee 
must ensure safety. Through its oversight, STUK 
ensures that the licensee meets its responsibilities. 
STUK oversees and inspects the implementation 
of the plant and the organisations participating in 
its implementation and operation. STUK does not 
monitor and inspect every detail; instead, the over-
sight and inspections are targeted on the basis of 
the safety implications of each subject. To this end, 
the plant is divided into systems, structures and 
equipment, which are further classified according to 
their importance to plant safety. The safety classifi-
cation of the plant is reviewed by STUK at the stage 
of applying for the construction licence. STUK in-
spects and monitors the design and manufacture of 
the equipment and structures that are most critical 
from the point of view of safety. Inspection organisa-
tions approved by STUK have been trusted with the 
inspection of equipment and structures with lesser 
safety implications. STUK oversees the operations 
of these inspection organisations.
In plant projects, STUK ensures with its over-
sight and inspections, the bulk of which are sched-
uled to take place in advance, that the power 
company planning to build the plant and the plant 
supplier responsible for its implementation, and its 
main sub-contractor, have the necessary capabili-
ties for a high-quality implementation. 
During the construction licence stage, the plant 
design work and quality assurance of implemen-
tation are evaluated in order to make sure that 
the plant can be implemented in compliance with 
high quality standards and Finnish safety require-
ments. During construction, inspections and over-
sight are deployed in order to ensure that the plant 
is implemented in compliance with the principles 
approved at the construction licence stage. The 
inspections are based on detailed documentation 
delivered to STUK and onsite inspections at the 
suppliers’ premises. Before the manufacture of 
equipment and structures may commence, STUK 
inspects both the respective detailed plans and the 
capabilities of the manufacturing organisations to 
produce high-quality results. During manufacture 
and building, STUK carries out inspections in 
order to verify that the equipment and structures 
are manufactured in compliance with the plans 
approved by STUK. Regarding the installation of 
equipment and structures, STUK carries out in-
spections in order to verify that the installations 
are made in compliance with the approved plans 
and that the requirements set out for installations 
are fulfilled. Approval by STUK after inspection is 
a prerequisite for trial operation of the equipment. 
After that, STUK inspects the results of the trial 
operation before the actual commissioning.
Before operating the plant, STUK must be pro-
vided with documentation proving that the plant 
was designed and implemented in compliance with 
Finnish safety requirements. In addition, STUK 
has to be provided with evidence verifying that 
the prerequisites exist for safe operation of the 
plant. These include personnel that have been 
trained and verified to be competent, the instruc-
tions required for operating the plant, safety and 
preparedness arrangements, maintenance sched-
ule and staff, as well as radiation protection staff. 
Having verified that the implementation is safe 
and the organisation has the required capabilities, 
STUK prepares the safety assessment and report 
required for the operating licence. Obtaining the 
operating licence is a prerequisite for loading the 
reactor with fuel. 
Comprehensive safety assessment 
is a prerequisite for extending 
the operating licence
In Finland, operating licences are granted for a fi-
xed term, typically 10 to 20 years. A comprehensive 
safety assessment is required to renew the ope-
rating licence. If the operating licence is granted 
for a period exceeding 10 years, an interim safety 
assessment is carried out during the licence peri-
od. The scope of the interim assessment is similar 
to that carried out in conjunction with renewing 
the operating licence. During the assessments, the 
state of the plant is investigated, paying particular 
attention to the effects of ageing on the plant and 
its equipment and structures. In addition, the ca-
pabilities of the operating personnel for continued 
safe operation of the plant are assessed. 
Regulation of operating plants includes 
continuous safety assessment.
STUK’s regulation of operating nuclear facilities 
ensures that the condition of the facilities is and 
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will be in compliance with the requirements, the 
facilities function as planned and are operated in 
compliance with the regulations. The regulatory 
activities cover the operation of the facility, its sys-
tems, components and structures, as well as the 
operations of the organisation. In this work, STUK 
employs regular and topical reports submitted by 
the licensees, on the basis of which it assesses the 
operation of the facility and the plant operator’s 
activities. In addition, STUK assesses the safety of 
nuclear power plants by carrying out inspections 
on plant sites and at component manufacturers’ 
premises, and based on operational experience 
feedback and safety research. On the basis of the 
safety assessment during operation, both the licen-
see and STUK evaluate the need and potential for 
safety improvements.
Safety analyses provide tools for assessing 
the safety of nuclear facilities
Safety analyses ensure that the nuclear facility 
is designed to be safe and that it can be operated 
safely. Deterministic and probabilistic approaches 
complement each other. 
Deterministic safety analyses 
For the purpose of STUK’s regulatory YVL Guides, 
deterministic safety analyses are analyses of 
transients and accidents required for justifying 
the technical solutions employed by nuclear po-
wer plants. The licensees update these analyses in 
connection with the renewal of operating licences, 
periodic safety reviews and any significant modifi-
cations carried out at the plant. 
Probabilistic risk analyses 
Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) refers to quanti-
tative estimates of the threats affecting the safety 
of a nuclear power plant and the probabilities of 
chains of events and any detrimental effects. PRA 
makes it possible to identify the plant’s key risk 
factors, and can contribute to the design of nuclear 
power plants and the development of plant opera-
tion and technical solutions. The licensees employ 
PRA for the maintenance and continuous impro-
vement of the technical safety of nuclear facilities.
STUK reviews the deterministic safety analyses 
and probabilistic risk analyses related to construc-
tion and operating licences and the operation of a 
nuclear power plant. When required, STUK has 
its own independent comparison analyses made in 
order to verify the reliability of results. 
STUK oversees modifications from 
planning to implementation
Various modifications are carried out at nuclear 
facilities to improve safety, replace aged systems 
or components, facilitate plant operation or main-
tenance, or improve the efficiency of energy gene-
ration. STUK inspects the plans for extensive or 
safety-significant plant modifications and oversees 
the modification work by reviewing the documents 
submitted by the licensee and carrying out inspec-
tions on site or at manufacturers’ premises. 
As a consequence of modifications implemented 
at the plant, several documents that describe 
the plant’s operation and structure – such as the 
Operating Limits and Conditions, the Final Safety 
Analysis Report and the operating and mainte-
nance procedures – have changed. STUK oversees 
the document revisions and generally follows the 
updating of plant documentation after the modifi-
cations.
Operability of the plant is overseen during 
operation and annual maintenance
The technical operability of nuclear facilities is 
overseen by assessing the operation of the facility 
in compliance with the requirements laid down in 
the operational limits and conditions, and over-
seeing annual maintenance outages, plant main-
tenance and ageing management, fire safety, ra-
diation safety, physical protection and emergency 
preparedness.
Operational limits and conditions
The operational limits and conditions (OLC)
of nuclear facilities lay down the detailed tech-
nical and administrative requirements and re-
strictions concerning the plant and its various 
systems, equipment and structures. The licensee 
is responsible for keeping the operational limits 
and conditions up-to-date and ensuring compli-
ance with them. STUK controls compliance with 
the plants’ operational conditions and limits by 
witnessing operations on site. Special attention is 
paid to the testing and fault repairs of components 
subject to the operational limits and conditions.
When annual maintenance outages end, STUK 
ascertains the plant unit’s state in compliance 
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Annual maintenance
Work that cannot be done during plant operation is 
carried out during annual maintenance of nuclear 
power plants. These include refuelling, preventive 
equipment maintenance, periodic inspections and 
tests, as well as failure repairs. These actions ensu-
re the preconditions for operating the power plant 
safely during the following operating cycles. 
STUK is responsible for controlling and ensu-
ring that the nuclear power plant is safe during the 
annual maintenance and future operating cycles, 
and that the annual maintenance does not cause a 
radiation hazard to the workers, the population or 
the environment. STUK ensures this by reviewing 
the documents required by the regulations, such as 
outage plans and modification documentation, and 
by performing on-site inspections during annual 
maintenance. 
with the operational limits and conditions prior to 
start-up. Any changes to and planned deviations 
from the operational limits and conditions must 
be submitted to STUK for approval in advance. In 
addition, the licensee is responsible for reporting to 
STUK without delay all situations deviating from 
the requirements under the operational limits and 
conditions. In the report, the power company pre-
sents its corrective action for approval by STUK. 
STUK oversees the implementation of corrective 
action. 
Oversight of operation, incidents 
during operation and reporting 
the operation to STUK
STUK oversees the safe operation of plants 
through regular inspections and reports submitted 
by the power companies. In addition, STUK’s local 
inspectors working on plant sites oversee the ope-
ration on a daily basis. The local inspectors assess 
faults and oversee their repairs, as well as tests 
of safety-critical equipment. The inspections of 
the periodic inspection programme focus on major 
faults, incidents and progress made in corrective 
actions, as well as on operating procedures. The 
inspections are based on the regular reports sub-
mitted by power companies and inspections and 
walkdown inspections conducted on site.
The power companies are obliged to report any 
operational transients and any matters that may 
compromise safety. STUK assesses the safety imp-
lications of the incidents and the power company’s 
ability to detect safety deficiencies, take action and 
carry out corrective actions.
The licensees submit event reports to STUK on 
operational events at nuclear facilities, comprising 
special reports, operational transient reports and 
scram reports. In addition to event reports, the fa-
cilities submit daily reports, quarterly reports, an-
nual reports, outage reports, annual environmental 
safety reports, monthly individual radiation dose 
reports, annual experience operational feedback 
reports and safeguard reports to STUK.
Internal processing and reporting is also required 
for events or near-misses not subject to a special 
or operational transient report. Reports on such 
events are submitted to STUK for information if 
the event is or may be relevant to nuclear or ra-
diation safety or STUK’s communication activities.
The majority of radioactive substances cre-
ated during the operation of a nuclear re-
actor are contained in the nuclear fuel. In addi-
tion, radioactive substances are contained in the 
reactor cooling system, as well as in the related 
purification and waste systems. The liquid and 
atmospheric effluents from the plant are purified 
and delayed so that their radiation impact on the 
environment is very low compared with the im-
pact of radioactive substances normally existing 
in nature. The emissions are carefully measured 
to ensure that they remain clearly below the pre-
scribed limits.
Radioactive emissions from a nuclear 
power plant into the air and sea are veri-
fied through comprehensive radiation monitoring. 
Radiation monitoring in the environment of a 
power plant comprises radiation measurements 
and determination of radioactive substances, con-
ducted to analyse the radioactive substances ex-
isting in the environment. In case of potential 
accident situations, continuously-operating radia-
tion measurement stations monitoring the external 
radiation dose rate are installed in the vicinity of 
nuclear power plants at distances of a few kilome-
tres. The measurement data from these stations 
are transferred to the power plant and to the na-
tional radiation-monitoring network.
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Plant maintenance and ageing management
In its regulatory activities concerning the ageing 
management of operating nuclear facilities, STUK 
controls the plants’ ageing management strategy 
and its implementation ensures the maintenance 
of sufficient safety margins for safety-significant 
systems, components and structures throughout 
their lifetime. The organisation of the licensee’s 
operations, the prerequisites for the organisation 
to carry out the necessary actions, and the conditi-
on of components and structures important to safe-
ty are subject to inspection and review. Regulatory 
control and inspections ensure that the power com-
panies have the lifetime management programmes 
in place that enable them to detect potential prob-
lems in time. In addition, corrective action must be 
carried out in a way that ensures the integrity and 
operability of safety-significant components and 
structures so that safety functions can be activated 
at any time.
STUK monitors ageing management through 
the inspections of the periodic inspection program-
me and inspections related to modifications and 
annual maintenance. The key issue in operation 
licence renewal and periodic safety assessments is 
the management of plant ageing.
Every year, the power companies provide STUK 
with reports on the ageing of electrical and I&C 
equipment, mechanical structures and equipment, 
as well as buildings. These reports describe the 
most salient ageing phenomena to be monitored, 
observations related to the ageing process and 
actions required for extending the service life of 
equipment and structures.
The licensee must carry out periodic inspec-
tions of safety-critical equipment and structures 
(such as the reactor pressure vessel and reactor 
coolant system). STUK approves the inspection 
programmes prior to the inspections and monitors 
the inspections and their results on site. The final 
result reports will be submitted to STUK for ap-
proval after the annual maintenance. 
Radiation safety
STUK oversees occupational radiation safety by 
inspecting and reviewing dosimetry, radiation 
measurements, radiation protection procedures, 
radiation conditions and radiation protection ar-
rangements for work processes at each facility. The 
dosimeters used for measuring the occupational ra-
diation doses undergo annual tests carried out by 
STUK. The test comprises irradiating a sample of 
dosimeters at STUK’s measurement standard lab-
oratory and reading the doses at the power plant. 
In addition, STUK oversees the meteorological dis-
persion measurements of radioactive substances, 
release measurements and environmental radia-
tion monitoring, and also reviews the relevant re-
sult reports.
Emergency preparedness
Besides the periodic inspections of other opera-
tions, STUK controls the readiness of the organi-
sations operating nuclear power plants to act in 
abnormal situations. The inspection focuses on 
training in emergency response organisation, ar-
rangement of rooms, securing the connections used 
for the transfer of meteorological measurement 
data during an emergency situation and radia-
tion monitoring of the surrounding environment, 
as well as the development of internal alarm proce-
dures at the power plant. Emergency exercises test 
the operation of the emergency response organisa-
tion, the functionality of the emergency response 
guidelines and the usability of the alert areas in 
practice, which are developed on the basis of the 
feedback received for the exercises. STUK moni-
tors the actions of power companies during these 
emergency drills.
Oversight of the operation of organisations 
is part of the process of ensuring plant safety
STUK oversees the operation of organisations by 
reviewing safety management, the management 
and quality systems, the competence and training 
of the staff of nuclear facilities and operational 
experience feedback activities. The aim is to ensure 
that the organisations of the power company as a 
whole and its key suppliers operate in a manner 
that ensures the safety of the plant at all levels 
and in connection with safety-related actions.
Training and qualifications of personnel
STUK monitors the training and qualifications of 
personnel through inspections included in the peri-
odic inspection programme, by assessing the suit-
ability and approving the appointment of certain 
key personnel and by assessing the ability of the 
power company to ensure safety in conjunction 
with incidents and annual maintenance opera-
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tions. The key persons whose appointment must be 
approved by STUK are the director in charge of 
the construction and safe operation of the nuclear 
facility, the operators working in the plant control 
rooms and the persons in charge of materials re-
lated to preparedness, safety and nuclear technol-
ogy. In addition, STUK’s approval is required for 
personnel carrying out certain integrity checks on 
materials. In case events reveal flaws in the op-
eration of the organisation, number of personnel 
or their competence, STUK will require the power 
company to take rectifying action as required.
Operational experience feedback
According to Government Decision VNA 733/2008, 
the advancement of science and technology and 
operating experience must be taken into account 
for the further enhancement of the safety of 
nuclear power plants. This principle is not limited 
to operational experience from Finnish nuclear po-
wer plants, but feedback from abroad must also 
be analysed systematically, and action must be ta-
ken to improve safety as necessary. STUK controls 
and ensures that the power companies’ operational 
experience feedback activities effectively prevent 
the reoccurrence of problematic events. STUK pays 
particular attention to the power companies’ abi-
lity to detect and identify the causes of the events 
and to remedy the underlying operational weak-
nesses. In addition, STUK analyses Finnish and 
foreign operational experience data and, as neces-
sary, lays down requirements to enhance safety.
STUK controls the operational experience feed-
back activities by reviewing the event reports sub-
mitted by the licensee and the annual summary of 
operational feedback activities. During inspections 
included in the periodic inspection programme, the 
operational experience feedback activities of the 
plant and utilisation of international experience 
are monitored.
Event investigations
An event investigation team is appointed when the 
licensee’s own organisation has not operated as plan-
ned during an event or when it is estimated that the 
event will lead to significant modifications to the 
plant’s technical layout or procedures. A STUK in-
vestigation team is also set up if the licensee has not 
adequately clarified the root causes of an event. 
Pressure equipment critical to nuclear 
safety is monitored by STUK
In addition to regulating the design and manufac-
turing of pressure equipment, STUK oversees the 
operational safety of pressure equipment included 
in the most important safety classes and performs 
periodic inspections of such equipment. Pressure 
equipment in other safety classes is inspected by 
inspection organisations authorised by STUK. 
STUK oversees the operation of the manufacturers 
and testing and inspection organisations autho-
rised by it in connection with its own inspection 
activities, and by reviewing documents and making 
follow-up visits.
Regulatory oversight of nuclear non-
proliferation is a basic requirement 
for using nuclear energy
Oversight of nuclear non-proliferation ensures that 
nuclear materials and other nuclear commodities 
remain in peaceful use in compliance with the rel-
evant licences and notifications, and that nuclear 
facilities and the related technologies are only uti-
lised for peaceful purposes. Another objective of 
the oversight of non-proliferation is to ensure that 
appropriate security arrangements are in place for 
nuclear items.
The operator is responsible for managing the 
nuclear items in its possession, accounting for 
them and reporting on plant sites and its activi-
ties relating to the nuclear fuel cycle to STUK and 
submitting their reports on nuclear materials to 
the European Commission. STUK maintains a 
national control system the purpose of which is 
to carry out the safeguards for the use of nuclear 
energy that are necessary for the non-prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons. In compliance with the 
Safeguards Agreement and its additional protocol, 
STUK forwards data on activities relating to the 
nuclear fuel cycle in Finland to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). STUK verifies the 
correctness of the notifications, accounting and 
reporting through on-site inspections and par-
ticipates in all inspections carried out by the IAEA 
and the European Commission. 
The National Data Centre (NDC), which is 
based on the CTBT, contributed to the work of the 
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in 
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establishing a cost-effective NDC organisation that 
is functional from the Finnish perspective.
Oversight of nuclear waste management 
extends from planning to final disposal
The aim of the regulation of nuclear waste manage-
ment is to ensure that nuclear waste is processed, 
stored and disposed of safely. The control of nuclear 
waste processed at plant sites is part of the regulatory 
control of operating plants mentioned above. STUK 
oversees the nuclear waste management of nuclear 
power plants through document reviews and inspec-
tions within the periodic inspection programme. In ad-
dition, STUK approves the clearing of waste from con-
trol and reviews plants’ nuclear waste management 
and decommissioning plans, on the basis of which the 
licensees’ nuclear waste management fees are deter-
mined. 
The final disposal project for spent fuel requires 
special attention. STUK inspects and reviews 
Posiva Oy’s plans and research work for project im-
plementation and is overseeing the construction of 
an underground research tunnel called Onkalo at 
Olkiluoto. Onkalo is also being used to test suitable 
working methods for the final disposal facility and 
mapping the underground premises. The plan is to 
later convert the research tunnel into an entrance 
for the repository.
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2 Objects of regulation
Loviisa NPP
Plant Start-up National Nominal electric power, Type,
unit  grid (gross/net, MW) supplier
Loviisa 1 8 Feb1977 9 May 1977 520/496 PWR, 
    Atom ener goex port
Loviisa 2 4 Nov 1980 5 Jan 1 981 520/496 PWR, 
    Atom ener goex port
Fortum Power and Heat Oy owns the Loviisa 1 and 2 plant units located in Loviisa.
Olkiluoto NPP
Plant Start-up National Nominal electric power, Type,
unit  grid (gross/net, MW) supplier
Olkiluoto 1 2 Sep 1978 10 Oct 1979 910/880 BWR,
    Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 2 18 Feb 1980 1 Jul 1982 910/880 BWR,
    Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 3 Construction license granted about 1,600 (net) PWR,
 17.2.2005   Areva NP
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj owns the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units located in Olkiluoto, Eurajoki, and the  
Olkiluoto 3 plant unit under construction.
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Onkalo
Posiva Oy is constructing an 
underground research facility 
(Onkalo) in Olkiluoto, where 
bedrock volumes suitable for 
final disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel can be investigated in 
more detail. Bedrock research 
at the planned final disposal 
depth is a requirement for 
granting a construction licence 
for the final disposal facility. 
Posiva has designed Onkalo to 
function as one of the entrance 
routes to the planned final 
disposal facility, so STUK is 
applying the same regulatory 
procedures to the construction 
of Onkalo as those of a nuclear 
facility. 
The underground research facility consists of a 
drive tunnel, three shafts and a research gallery 
quarried to a depth of 437 m. Posiva started con-
structing Onkalo in 2004. By the end of 2011, the 
excavation of the drive tunnel had reached a depth 
of 455 m, and the length of the tunnel was 4913 m. 
In addition, intake air and personnel shafts had 
been quarried using raise boring techniques to a 
depth of 290 m and exhaust air shaft to a depth of 
437 m.
Figure 3. FiR 1 research reactor and the BNCT station.
•	 TRIGA	Mark	II	research	reactor 
Thermal power 250 kW
•	 Fuel	of	the	core: 
80 fuel rods with 15 kg uranium 
TRIGA	reactors	have	a	unique	fuel	type;	 
uranium–zirconium hybrid combination 
8% uranium 
91% zirconium 
1% hydrogen
FiR 1 research reactor
In addition to nuclear power plants, STUK regu-
lates the FiR 1 research reactor operated by VTT 
Technical Research Centre of Finland. The reac-
tor is located in Otaniemi, Espoo, and its maxi-
mum thermal power is 250 kW. It began operations 
in March 1962, and its current operating licence 
will expire at the end of 2023. The reactor is used 
for the fabrication of radioactive tracers, activa-
tion analysis, student training and Boron Neutron 
Capture Therapy (BNCT) treatment of tumours, as 
well as the development of therapeutic methods.
Figure 2. Diagram of the encapsulation and disposal facility in Olkiluoto 
(Posiva Oy).
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3 Development of regulations
The reform of the Nuclear Energy Act, prepared in 
cooperation with the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy, entered into force. The reform includ-
ed a specification of STUK’s regulatory rights for 
the time preceding the granting of a construction 
licence, and an extension of the use of inspection 
organisations for public administration duties with 
regard to inspections of nuclear facilities.
STUK prepared the reform of the Nuclear 
Energy Act and the Nuclear Energy Decree to-
gether with the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy. The reforms include the changes neces-
sary due to the EU directive for the responsible 
and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive 
waste (2011/70/Euratom).
STUK prepared drafts for the Ministry on 
changes to the Government Decree 733/2008 on the 
safety of nuclear power plants and the Government 
Decree 735/2008 on emergency response arrange-
ments at nuclear power plants. These changes 
take into account the assesments of the causes of 
the Fukushima Dai-ichi disaster and the lessons 
learned from it, as well as the new safety tar-
gets and requirements of the IAEA and WENRA 
(Western European Regulators’ Association).
STUK continued its long-term project of revis-
ing the YVL Guides. The objective was to complete 
the new guides during the year under review, 
but the work will continue in 2013. Delays in the 
schedule were caused by the discussion of the new 
safety requirements resulting from the Fukushima 
disaster, the new safety targets of WENRA, EU 
stress tests, the international nuclear waste con-
ference and an extraordinary meeting concerning 
the IAEA’s Convention on Nuclear Safety. These 
all required a considerable amount of work from 
STUK’s experts.
The current YVL Guide set containing over 70 
separate guides will be replaced by approximately 
40 new guides. In addition to the comprehensive 
and demanding nature of the content, attention 
will be paid in the reform work to presenting the 
information in a uniform and user-friendly man-
ner. By the end of the year, 29 final guide drafts 
had been completed.
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B  Plant and system design 
B.1  Design of the safety systems of a nuclear facility 
B.2  Classification of systems, structures and 
equipment of a nuclear facility 
B.3  Safety assessment a NPP 
B.4  Nuclear fuel and reactor 
B.5  Reactor coolant circuit of a NPP 
B.6  Containment of a NPP 
B.7  Preparing for the internal and external 
threats to a nuclear facility 
B.8  Fire protection of a nuclear facility  
Structure of the new YVL guides
A  Safety management of a nuclear facility 
A.1  Regulatory control of the safe use of nuclear energy 
A.2  Siting of a nuclear facility 
A.3  Management systems of a nuclear facility 
A.4  Organisation and personnel of a nuclear facility 
A.5  Construction of a NPP 
A.6  Operation and accident management of a NPP 
A.7  Risk management of a NPP 
A.8  Ageing management of a nuclear facility 
A.9  Reporting on the operation of a nuclear facility 
A.10  Operating experience feedback of a nuclear facility 
A.11  Security arrangements of a nuclear facility
A.12 Control of information security on a nuclear facility
E  Structures and equipment of a nuclear facility
  
E.1  Inspection, testing and certifying organisations 
E.2  Manufacture and use of nuclear fuel 
E.3  Pressure vessels and pipings of a nuclear facility 
E.4  Verification of strength of pressure equipment of 
a nuclear facility 
E.5  In-service inspections of pressure equipment of 
a nuclear facility
D  Nuclear materials and waste 
D.1  Regulatory control of nuclear non-proliferation 
D.2  Transport of nuclear materials and nuclear waste 
D.3  Handling and storage of nuclear fuel 
D.4  Handling of low- and intermediate-level waste and 
decommissioning of a nuclear facility 
D.5  Final disposal of nuclear waste 
D.6  Production of uranium and torium 
C  Radiation safety of a nuclear facility and environment 
C.1  Structural radiation safety and radiation monitoring 
of a nuclear facility 
C.2  Radiation protection and dose control of the personnel 
of a nuclear facility 
C.3  Control and measuring of radioactive releases 
to the environment of a nuclear facility 
C.4  Radiological control of the environment of a nuclear facility
C.5  Emergency preparedness arrangements of a NPP
E.6  Buildings and structures of a nuclear facility 
E.7  Electrical and I&C equipment of a nuclear facility 
E.8  Valve units of a nuclear facility 
E.9  Pump units of a nuclear facility 
E.10  Emergency power supply of a nuclear facility 
E.11  Hoisting and transfer equipment of a nuclear facility
E.12 Testing organisations in nuclear facilities
Figure 4. The structure of the new YVL guides at the end of 2012.
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4 Regulatory oversight of nuclear 
facilities and its results in 2012
A fuel leak was detected at Loviisa 2 late in 
2012. Follow-up indicates that the leak has re-
mained minor. The detected leakage is insignifi-
cant for the radiation safety of the environment, 
because the radioactivity is contained in the reac-
tor coolant system and inside the containment. In 
recent years, problems with the pool inspection 
equipment have prevented Fortum from carrying 
out the inspections of spent fuel, control rods and 
protection elements to the planned extent (see sec-
tion 4.1.4). Fortum has taken measures to rectify 
the situation.
Plant operation has been, for the most part, 
systematic and safe. Three events of INES class 1 
were reported from the plant. In addition, seven 
other events were reported and rated as INES 
class 0. The number of events is significantly high-
er than in the previous years, which indicates de-
ficiencies in the power company’s procedures. The 
events included deficiencies in the periodic testing 
of components subject to operational limits and 
conditions (2 events), faulty isolations and repairs 
(4 events), excess fire load inside the containment, 
uncertainty of the operability of replaced valves of 
the pressure control system during start-up, erro-
neous settings of the thermal relays in the motors 
of pumps that are important to safety, and deficien-
cies of the scheduling of periodic preventive main-
tenance. The events had no impact on the safety 
of employees or the plant surroundings. Most of 
the events took place during annual maintenance. 
Some of the events have only received a superficial 
investigation by the power company. STUK has 
discussed the increased number and background 
of the events with the management of the licensee, 
and the management has begun measures to as-
sess and remove any common causes behind the 
events. Loviisa power plant also had eight events 
classified as operational transients, two of which 
led to a reactor trip. System and equipment fail-
4.1 Loviisa nuclear power plant
4.1.1 Overall safety assessment of 
the Loviisa power plant
STUK oversaw the safety of the Loviisa power 
plant and assessed its organisation and person-
nel’s competence in different areas by means of 
reviewing documents provided by the licensee, 
carrying out inspections in line with the periodic 
inspection programme, and by overseeing opera-
tions at the plant. On the basis of this regulatory 
oversight, STUK can state that plant operations 
did not cause a radiation hazard to the employees, 
population or the environment. The occupational 
radiation doses and radioactive releases into the 
environment were low and below the prescribed 
limits. The licensee has operated the Loviisa power 
plant in a safe manner and, for the most part, 
in compliance with YVL Guides. Emergency pre-
paredness at the Loviisa power plant complies 
with the requirements. The processing, storage and 
final disposal of low and intermediate level waste 
(operating waste) at the power plant were carried 
out as planned.
According to the tests and inspections carried 
out, the condition of the containment and the reac-
tor coolant system, which prevent the release of 
radioactive material into the environment, are in 
compliance with requirements. A leak was detected 
in the vent line of a protective pipe of the control 
rod mechanism in connection with a reactor cool-
ant system pressure test carried out at Loviisa 1. 
Due to the damage, the corresponding welds of 
all the protective pipe vent lines of control rod 
mechanisms were welded again for both Loviisa 1 
and Loviisa 2. STUK approved the application for 
renewing the operating permit of the Loviisa 1 
reactor pressure vessel. The new permit is valid 
until the plant unit’s operating licence expires on 
31 December 2027.
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4.1 Loviisa NPP
ures had a minor safety implication for the plant. 
Annual maintenance was carried out as planned in 
terms of nuclear and radiation safety. The events 
are described in more detail in Appendix 3.
During the year, the power company imple-
mented several modifications for improving radia-
tion and nuclear safety. At Loviisa 1, some of the 
spraying and blowdown lines of the reactor coolant 
system’s pressure equalisation system as well as 
their valves were replaced, the failure tolerance 
of the air cooling systems in the safety injection 
pump rooms was improved, service water system’s 
discharge side pipes were modernised, modernisa-
tion of the dams in the discharge side of the sea-
water circuit was launched, and a mechanical seal 
containing resin instead of antimony was installed 
for one reactor coolant pump. Modernisation of 
the dams in the seawater circuit will improve the 
plant’s flood protection during outages. The work 
will continue in the following annual maintenance 
outages. Replacement of the sealing material of 
the reactor coolant pumps will also continue in the 
following annual outages. The purpose is to reduce 
the radioactivity of the reactor coolant system and 
the resulting radiation doses. At Loviisa 2, switch-
es of the 6 kV electrical system were replaced, and 
the replacement of the cooling units in the room of 
one of the emergency diesel generators was com-
pleted. The changes have been, for the most part, 
successful, except for the challenges met in the 
design and implementation of the reactor coolant 
system pressure control’s modernisation project 
(see section 4.1.5).
In 2007, STUK issued a statement to the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (now the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy) regarding the 
renewal of the Loviisa power plant’s operating 
licence and the plant’s periodic safety review. The 
actions for improving plant safety in compliance 
with the action plan produced by Fortum Power 
and Heat Oy at that time have, on the whole, pro-
gressed according to plans. After the Fukushima 
nuclear accident in 2011, STUK sent a decision to 
the Loviisa power plant concerning the provisions 
against natural phenomena and disturbances in 
the power supply. The measures proposed by the 
power company have proceeded. STUK reviewed 
and approved the power company’s plans for im-
proving the plant safety with regard to extreme 
Table 1. Events	at	the	Loviisa	plant	units	subject	to	special	reports	or	a	root	cause	analysis	and/or	classified	INES	
Level	1	or	higher.	All	events	subject	to	reporting	are	discussed	in	Appendix	1	(indicator	A.II.1).	Events	with	a	
special report are described in more detail in Appendix 3.
Event Non-complianc-
es with the OLC
Special report and/
or root cause report
INES rating
Suction valve of the boron injection system erroneously closed at Loviisa 2 • • 0
Deficiencies in the testing of radiation monitors at Loviisa 2 • • 1
Deficient testing of recombiners at Loviisa 2 • • 0
Stopping of cooling system pumps during Loviisa 1 annual outage • • 0
Excess fire load at Loviisa 1 • 1
Uncertainties in the operationality of replaced pressure equalisation system 
valves at Loviisa 1
• • 0
Two serious accident management measurements unavailable at Loviisa 1 • • 0
A residual heat removal subsystem briefly unavailable at Loviisa 2 • • 0
Erroneous settings of protective relays of motors at Loviisa 2 • 1
Inconsistencies in testing procedures observed at the Loviisa power plant • 0
Figure 5. INES	classified	events	at	the	Loviisa	plant	
(INES	Level	1	or	higher).
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external hazards. The plans include a conceptual 
design plan for cooling towers designed for secur-
ing the removal of residual heat of spent fuel, and 
an action plan to improve flood protection.
Implementation of the second phase of the 
Loviisa I&C renewal (LARA) has been postponed 
to 2015, as the qualification of the I&C equipment 
platform components is still in progress. The sys-
tems to be upgraded in the second phase include 
the nuclear island’s I&C systems that have the 
greatest safety significance, as well as the I&C sys-
tems of most important safety functions, such as 
the emergency power supply. As the upgrade will 
be delayed and the plant components and systems 
Operation and operational events
The load factor of Loviisa 1 was 83.8%, while that 
of Loviisa 2 was 90.9%. The load factor is affected 
by the duration of the unit’s annual maintenance 
outage. The outage lasted 54 days for Loviisa 1 
and 20 days for Loviisa 2. The load factor is also 
affected by the losses in gross energy output due 
to operational transients and component failures. 
The losses in gross energy output were 0.004% 
at Loviisa 1 and 2.08% at Loviisa 2. Loviisa 2’s 
production losses from component failures were 
higher than in the previous years. Most of the 
losses were due to a leaking seal water line in a 
reactor coolant pump. The plant was run down to 
a cold shutdown state for repairing this fault.
A reactor trip occurred at Loviisa 2 on 29 
August 2012 as a result of annual maintenance 
work carried out at Loviisa 1. Switchboard 
maintenance was carried out in the annual 
outage, and the switchboard was cut off for the 
purpose. This resulted in the power supply also 
being cut off from the control cubicle of the back-
up excitation system of turbine generators. This 
caused faulty protection signals in the back-up 
excitation system, and resulted in the isolation of 
Loviisa 2 turbine generators from the power grid. 
The reactor operator of Loviisa 2 then shut down 
the reactor by initiating a reactor trip. During the 
event, the plant protections functioned as planned, 
and the event had no impact on the safety of the 
plant or its environment.
Loviisa 2 was shut down for repair on 20 Oc-
tober 2012 to fix a leaking seal water line of a re-
actor coolant pump. A minor leak in the seal wa-
ter system of a reactor coolant pump was detected 
at the plant unit in October. In order to repair the 
leak, the plant had to be shut down and cooled 
down to a repair outage. The leak did not put the 
safety of people or the surrounding environment 
at risk.
A reactor trip occurred at Loviisa 1 during 
the start-up after annual outage on 24 September 
2012, when the steam generator feed water pump 
stopped, and the feed water system could not be 
restarted despite the efforts due to a low input 
pressure. As a result, a reactor trip was performed 
while the reactor power was still at a low level. 
The event caused no risk to the plant, people or 
the environment. The plant’s safety back-up sys-
tems functioned as planned.
The events are described in more detail in 
Appendix 3.
Figure 7. Daily average gross electrical power of the 
Loviisa plant in 2012.
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cannot be replaced with new ones as planned, the 
licensee is required to take measures to ensure the 
adequacy of the maintenance measures and spare 
part management of the existing I&C systems and 
components.
Fortum Power and Heat Oy and its Loviisa 
power plant organisation have operated mainly 
in a systematic and development-oriented way to 
ensure the safety of the plant. The Loviisa plant 
process development project has not proceeded ac-
Annual outage at Loviisa 1 
The annual outage at Loviisa 1 comprised an ex-
tensive maintenance outage carried out every eight 
years. The outage began on 5 August and ended 
on 29 September. The length of the outage was 54 
days, which was approximately 15 days longer than 
planned. The delay was caused by work such as the 
repair of leaking position transmitters observed dur-
ing reactor assembly, and the testing of the reactor 
coolant system’s pressure equalisation system, which 
took longer than expected.
In addition to refuelling, the annual outage in-
cluded extensive inspection, repair and modification 
work. Periodic inspections were carried out for the 
pressure vessel and pipes. All fuel was removed from 
the reactor for the inspection of the pressure vessel 
and the reactor internals.
Eight-year pressure tests were carried out for the 
reactor coolant system and the secondary circuit. 
During the test, the strength and tightness of the 
structures is tested with 1.3 times the design pressure, 
178 bar(abs) for the reactor coolant system and 73 
bar(abs) for the secondary circuit. A four-year tight-
ness test was carried out for the containment steel 
lining with acceptable results.
A leak was detected in the vent line of the protec-
tive tube of the control rod mechanism during the re-
actor coolant system pressure test. Due to the leak, all 
the similar welded joints in the vent lines of control 
rod mechanisms’ protective tubes were renewed.
The secondary circuit pressure test had to be in-
terrupted when a leak was detected in one of the six 
steam generators. The steam generator was isolated 
and the pressure test was completed. The isolated 
steam generator was subjected to a new pressure test 
during the plant start-up, after the leak had been re-
paired, and the scope of the original pressure testing 
plans for the secondary circuit was covered.
The major work carried out during the annual 
outage was the modification of the reactor coolant 
system’s pressure equalisation system. The pressure 
equalisation system maintains the pressure of the 
reactor coolant system at setpoint during power opera-
tion, and limits or lowers the pressure during tran-
sients and accidents using the pressurizer spray and 
blowdown functions. The modification involved work 
such as replacement of spray and blowdown lines and 
their valves. During the modification, faults were de-
tected in its planning and implementation as well as 
in the test operation of the system. In the commission-
ing tests carried out at the end of the annual outage, 
deficiencies were observed in the initial arrangement 
of the tests, and it was considered necessary to clarify 
the administrative decision-making process related to 
test operations.
Other modifications completed during the an-
nual outage included the improvement of the fault 
tolerance of the air cooling systems of safety injection 
pump rooms, replacement of the discharge pipes of the 
service water system, and the modernisation of the 
system. In addition, a mechanical seal with a pack-
ing of resin instead of antimony was installed to one 
reactor coolant pump. Fortum has found that a large 
share of the dose rate from the reactor coolant system 
originates in antimony. The purpose of the packing 
material change is to lower the radioactivity of the 
reactor coolant system and the resulting radiation 
doses. The seals of other reactor coolant pumps will 
be replaced in future annual outages in accordance 
with plans.
The modernisation of the partition dams in the 
seawater circuit’s discharge side began with the 
replacement of one of the two partition gates of 
Loviisa  1. The purpose of the dam is to prevent the 
access of the seawater into the plant facilities during 
outage, when the seawater circuit hatches are open for 
maintenance. The modernisation will include the im-
provement of outage flood protection by raising the top 
of the dam from +2.10 m to +2.45 m. Based on current 
investigations due to the Fukushima accident, it will 
be estimated whether the outage flood protection can 
be further improved by raising the top of the dam to 
ground level +3.0 m. The work will continue in future 
annual outages.
cording to the implementation of YVL Guide 1.4, 
and STUK required that the development work 
be continued with no delay. Due to the repeated 
deficiencies observed in the supplier control and 
procurement operations, STUK required that the 
licensee of the Loviisa power plant makes an inde-
pendent evaluation of the power plant’s procure-
ment operations and supplier control. The observa-
tions made by STUK in the course of its oversight 
indicate that the organisation produces an abun-
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modifications and analyses carried out at the plant 
as well as in connection with on-site oversight.
In 2012, Fortum submitted to STUK for ap-
proval ten amendment proposals for the opera-
tional limits and conditions. Amendments of the 
OLC were due to modifications carried out at the 
plant, such as the replacement of the reactor cool-
ant system’s pressure equalisation system, im-
provement of the fault tolerance of the air cooling 
system in the safety injection pump rooms, renewal 
of the service water system’s discharge side, and 
the introduction of new fuel and changes to water 
chemistry conditions. One of the changes involved 
the addition of conditions related to the safety of 
the fuel transport cask. STUK approved nine of 
the applications on the grounds that the deviations 
had no significant implications for the safety of the 
plant or the environment. The conditions related 
to the fuel transport cask are still being processed 
by STUK.
In 2012, the power company applied for permis-
sions from STUK for five planned deviations from 
the operational limits and conditions. Two of the 
applications were related to fault repair that ex-
ceeded the repair time allowed by the OLC, one to 
a change of the plant’s operating condition while 
one of the emergency diesel generators was isolat-
ed, and one to a modification carried out at the 110 
kV switchyard. The I&C upgrade (the LARA proj-
ect) caused one planned deviation from the OLC. 
The application concerned a modification which 
involved the isolation of one of the two pumps of 
the fuel pool cooling system while work was be-
ing carried out. STUK approved the applications 
because the assessments carried out indicated that 
the deviations had no significant implications for 
the safety of the plant or the environment.
In 2012, seven events occurred at the plant in 
addition to the approved deviations during which 
the plant was non-compliant with the operational 
limits and conditions. The number of events is 
clearly higher than the average for the ten preced-
ing years, which is two events per year. The situa-
tions were related to neglected periodic testing of 
components subject to OLC (2 events), faulty isola-
tions and repairs (4 events) and uncertainty of the 
operability of replaced valves in the pressure con-
trol system during start-up. Most of the events took 
place during annual maintenance. The events had 
no significant implications for the plant’s nuclear 
dance of information regarding its operations, but 
this information is not fully and systematically uti-
lised for developing the management system and 
for improving operations. The work for improving 
the operational processes of the organisation must 
be continued in order to ensure the safe operation 
of the plant, particularly with regard to developing 
the management system, ensuring the quality of 
procurement operations and developing the safety 
culture assessment methods.
4.1.2 Plant operation, events during operation 
and prerequisites of safe operation
Compliance with the operational 
limits and conditions (OLC)
The operational limits and conditions list the val-
ues within which nuclear power plant units must 
remain during operation. The Loviisa power plant 
has kept the power plant’s operational limits and 
conditions document up to date. STUK has as-
sessed the operational limits and conditions and 
their validity in connection with inspecting the 
Annual outage at Loviisa 2 
The Loviisa 2 annual outage was a short mainte-
nance outage started on 22 September 2012 and 
ended on 13 October 2012. The annual outage 
lasted 20 days. The outage was carried out in ac-
cordance with the planned schedule.
In addition to refuelling, the outage included 
inspections, repairs and modifications as planned 
by the power company. Periodic inspections were 
carried out for the pressure vessel and pipes.
The operations important for safety included 
replacement of the plant unit’s 6 kV electrical sys-
tem switches and the 17-year maintenance of one 
of the emergency diesel generators, which involved 
replacing the engine with a completely overhauled 
unit. At the same time, the generator of the same 
emergency diesel generator was overhauled. The 
replacement of the cooling units in the room for 
the same emergency diesel generator, started in 
2011, was completed with the replacement of the 
third fan bank. Due to a leak in the vent lines of 
control rod mechanisms’ protective tubes at Lovi-
isa 1, all the welded joints of the vent lines were 
also renewed at Loviisa 2.
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or radiation safety, but they indicate deficiencies in 
the power company’s procedures. The power com-
pany has prepared special reports on the events 
containing a proposal for corrective measures to 
prevent similar events in the future. The events 
are described in more detail in Appendix 3.
Operation and operational events
In addition to the events for which special reports 
were filed, there were eight events that were clas-
sified as operational transients. Two of these led to 
a reactor trip. A leak in the reactor coolant pump 
seal water line at Loviisa 2 was a significant opera-
tional event. The plant unit was consequently shut 
down for a short repair outage.
In 2012, the risks caused by component mal-
functions, preventive maintenance and other 
events causing unavailability of equipment were 
3.8% (Loviisa 1) and 1.8% (Loviisa 2) of the ex-
pected value of the annual accident risk calculated 
using the plant’s risk model. The results are in line 
with long-term averages.
Annual maintenance outages
Annual maintenance at the Loviisa power plant 
was carried out safely, and all maintenance work 
was completed in the planned scope. The power 
company paid particular attention to cleanliness 
and order during the outage, as well as to cleaning 
the reactor pit and level. As stated above, the 
number of officially reported events during annual 
maintenance was higher than in the previous years. 
STUK oversaw the annual outage in accordance 
with the oversight and inspection duties defined in 
YVL Guides, and performed an outage inspection 
according to the inspection programme.
STUK’s inspection of outage operations, per-
formed in accordance with the inspection pro-
gramme, was targeted at the power plant opera-
tions that maintain safety and lead and manage 
actions during the annual outage. The inspection 
observations of various significance levels were 
mostly related to the work of the Loviisa power 
plant organisation. Among other things, STUK 
required that the Loviisa power plant update 
certain maintenance and radiation protection pro-
cedures and estimate whether current procedures 
are adequate to prevent the access of loose parts 
and impurities in opened reactor hall drains. The 
Loviisa power plant must also further develop its 
procedures in order to prevent items that contain 
activating substances from unnecessarily access-
ing the controlled area and to prevent such items 
and other loose parts from accessing the process 
systems of the reactor coolant system.
STUK used a total of 343 man-days on on-site 
oversight during the annual maintenance outages; 
these days were made up of equipment and system 
inspections and oversight work in various areas 
of expertise. In addition, two resident inspectors 
worked regularly on site.
4.1.3 Ensuring plant safety functions
Deterministic safety analyses
An extensive evaluation of the transient and ac-
cident analyses (deterministic safety analyses) car-
ried out to verify the safety functions of the Loviisa 
power plant has been performed in connection with 
the renewal of the plant’s operating licence. The 
licensee has later supplemented the deterministic 
safety analyses with an extension of postulated ac-
cidents and in connection with plant modifications. 
The licensee did not submit updated analyses to 
STUK in 2012.
Probabilistic risk analyses
The risk of a severe nuclear accident is evaluated 
on the basis of a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). 
As a rule, PRA calculations use regularly updated 
information of the occurrences of initiating events 
and the unavailability of equipment together with 
a logical model of the plant’s systems and their 
interdependencies.
According to preliminary information, the an-
nual probability of a severe reactor accident cal-
culated for the Loviisa plant units was 3.6 · 10-5/
year at the end of 2012, which is 28% lower than in 
2011 (4.3 · 10-5/year). The change was due to plant 
modifications, further specification of the model 
and updates to the reliability information.
The following is a list of some measures that 
were carried out in 2012 to lower the probability 
of risk:
•	 The	 dam	 used	 in	 the	 seawater	 channel	 dis-
charge side was built up to lower the risk of 
seawater flooding during outage.
•	Modifications	to	the	seawater	system	that	cools	
down safety systems improved the reliability of 
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residual heat removal and cooling of the reactor 
coolant pump sealing water.
•	Modifications	 to	 the	 pressurizer	 spraying	 sys-
tem used for reactor coolant system pressure 
control improved the reliability of the reactor 
coolant system pressure control.
•	 Qualification	 of	 the	 small	 relief	 valves	 in	 the	
reactor coolant system improved the reliability 
of the reactor coolant system pressure control.
The following changes in the modelling and the ini-
tial data also contributed to the reduction of risk:
•	Modelling	of	 the	 falling	of	heavy	 loads	 in	 con-
nection with lifting work was further specified.
•	 Heavy	 load	 falling	 frequency	was	 updated	 ac-
cording to the accumulated operating experi-
ence.
•	 Pipe	break	frequencies	were	updated.
•	 Common	 cause	 failure	 frequencies	 of	 compo-
nents were updated.
The addition of fuel pools into the model slightly 
increased the probability of risk.
The accident risk at the Loviisa power plant 
and its changes are discussed in greater detail 
in Section A.II.4 of Appendix 1, “Accident risk of 
nuclear facilities”.
4.1.4 Integrity of structures and equipment
STUK confirmed the integrity of structures and 
equipment using periodic inspection programmes 
as well as oversight and inspections of the major 
repairs and modifications especially during the an-
nual maintenance of autumn 2012. No deviations 
affecting the use of the inspection targets were 
observed in the monitoring and inspections of the 
primary circuit or other equipment and structures 
important to safety.
Reactor coolant system
The condition of the main components and other 
components of the reactor coolant system remains 
good at both Loviisa plant units. The power com-
pany monitors the condition of the reactor coolant 
system with procedures such as periodic inspec-
tions and by keeping records of the reactor coolant 
system load. STUK reviews the records within the 
inspection programme.
STUK approved the application for renewing 
the operating licence of the Loviisa 1 reactor pres-
sure vessel. The new licence will be valid until the 
expiry of the plant unit’s operating licence. Reactor 
safety must, however, be evaluated in two periodic 
safety evaluations taking place in 2015 and 2023. 
The operating licence of the Loviisa 2 reactor pres-
sure vessel was similarly approved in 2011.
The main flange faces and sealing grooves of 
the Loviisa 2 reactor pressure vessel were refur-
bished in the 2012 annual outage. Build-up weld-
ing and machining were used in accordance with 
the repair plan approved by STUK. STUK oversaw 
the execution of the repair work and performed a 
construction inspection on the repaired flange face. 
Corresponding refurbishment had been carried out 
for the Loviisa 1 reactor pressure vessel in 2010.
A primary circuit pressure test was performed 
in accordance with the periodic testing programme 
at the beginning of the Loviisa 1 annual outage. 
At the beginning of the pressure test, a leak was 
detected in the weld joint between the collector and 
a vent line included in the control rod protective 
pipe structure. Based on non-destructive testing, 
similar weld repair needs were observed in a total 
of 36 joints. The licensee decided to repair all these 
weld joints. STUK approved the repair plans and 
carried out the appropriate construction inspec-
tions after the completion of the welding.
In the annual outage of 2012, fault indications 
were detected in the cover and shaft of one reactor 
coolant pump. These were repaired by grinding in 
accordance with a repair plan approved by STUK. 
A dent detected at the end of the shaft keyway 
was removed by grinding, and the surfaces were 
inspected using a liquid penetrant examination. 
Three indications were found at the interface be-
tween the inner sealing surface of the cover and 
the casting. These were repaired by grinding. It 
was concluded that the indications were old irregu-
larities of the casting surface. All indications could 
not be entirely removed by grinding, but they were 
considered to remain unchanged during operation 
and to have no impact on the leak-tightness of the 
reactor coolant pump.
Fuel
During the past operating cycle, a fuel leak was 
observed at Loviisa 2 late in the year. As Fortum 
has been unable to return the functionality of the 
Loviisa power plant’s pool inspection equipment, 
the plant has experienced problems in the execu-
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tion of fuel, control rod and protection element 
inspections for several years.
Some of the Loviisa 1 protection element in-
spections planned for the 2012 annual outage were 
not executed. One of the protection elements was 
left out of the reactor to allow the completion of the 
measurements after the annual outage. Visual in-
spections of protection element spring packs were 
also carried out. Some wear was still observed in 
them, but no jamming or other major problems.
To assess the further use of control rods, me-
chanical wear of the six control rods subjected to 
long-term monitoring was examined. The surveys 
were carried out less extensively as was originally 
planned and revealed no indications that would 
have prevented the use of the control rods in the 
next fuel cycle of Loviisa 1.
The measurements to assess the mechanical 
strength of the test fuel assembly equipped with 
a new type of mixing spacer were also carried out 
less extensively as was originally planned. Based 
on the good mechanical behaviour of the test as-
sembly that contained no fuel, 12 test assemblies 
with mixing spacers, complete with fuel, were load-
ed into the Loviisa 1 reactor in the annual outage.
The impact of a change in the water chemistry 
OLC on the oxidation of fuel components was as-
sessed during the operating cycle in 2012. On the 
basis of a visual inspection carried out without re-
moving the protective casing it was concluded that 
the change of water chemistry had no impact on 
the corrosion of the protective casing and thus also 
could not have an impact on the corrosion of the 
fuel rods. Another inspection, originally planned 
for 2010, aimed to reveal the cause behind the 
damage to a fuel assembly removed in 2009 due to 
a leak. The inspection was planned to be carried 
out after the annual outage, but was not possible 
due to the current condition of the pool inspection 
equipment. STUK has required immediate mea-
sures from Fortum to rectify the inspection situa-
tion. As an immediate corrective measure, a new 
information collection system will be temporarily 
installed to the existing pool inspection equipment. 
This will allow the execution of the necessary in-
spections required during the 2013 annual outage 
and operating cycles. At the same time, Fortum 
will allocate additional resources to the modernisa-
tion of the pool inspection equipment.
Maintenance, ageing management, 
spare parts management
Periodic inspections
Periodic in-service inspections must be carried out 
on pressure equipment and pipes important to nu-
clear safety as required by the YVL Guides. The 
inspection targets are selected in accordance with 
an annual periodic inspection programme defined 
by the power company and approved by STUK. 
In 2012, Loviisa 1 had a long annual outage and 
Loviisa 2 a short refuelling outage. Both included 
non-destructive periodic inspections in accordance 
with the plans. At Loviisa 1, inspections were car-
ried out for the reactor pressure vessel, steam gen-
erators, reactor coolant pipes, and other pipes and 
equipment. At Loviisa 2, the same targets were 
inspected with the exception of the reactor pres-
sure vessel that only received visual inspections of 
the internals following a limited inspection plan. 
No faults with nuclear safety implications were 
observed in the inspections. Other periodic inspec-
tions of registered pressure equipment were car-
ried out during the annual maintenance outages 
according to plans for both plant units. A total of 
66 inspections were carried out at Loviisa 1, and 24 
at Loviisa 2. No observations restricting the use of 
pressure equipment were made in the inspections.
Emergency diesel generator
Several nuclear power plants in other countries 
have reported that the bearings at the bottom end 
of the connecting rod of diesel engines of the type 
also used at the Loviisa power plant wear faster 
than expected. Wear has been observed in one bear-
ing type that is no longer used at the Loviisa power 
plant. The engine manufacturer has tested the new 
bearing and approved it for use. Bearings of this 
type were installed in 2012 to an overhauled diesel 
engine. STUK required that the new bearings are 
monitored and the results reported to STUK.
In the overhaul of the emergency diesel genera-
tor carried out in the 2012 annual outage an ultra-
sonic examination revealed looseness of the white 
metal coating of one slide bearing in relation to the 
bearing shell. According to the report submitted to 
STUK, the situation has existed since the genera-
tor was put into use, as a similar defect was detect-
ed in an unused spare part bearing examined for 
comparison. Previously, the bearings have received 
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a visual inspection at annual outages and have 
been found to meet the requirements. The devia-
tion was observed now that ultrasonic inspections 
have begun. The Loviisa power plant submitted to 
STUK a report on the significance of the deviation 
and a plan for measures to ensure the compliance 
of the slide bearings in the plant units’ emergency 
diesel generators. To secure the functionality of 
the bearings, they will be subjected to vibration 
and temperature measurements during test runs. 
Lubricant oil will also be analysed. The bearings 
will be inspected again in the 2013 annual outage 
and replaced if necessary.
Ageing management
Procurement operations are considered a part of 
ageing management, as securing the safety of a 
nuclear power plant requires continuous renewal 
of systems, structures and equipment as these age 
and become technologically obsolete. During in-
spections, STUK paid attention to the procurement 
procedures of equipment and services important 
to safety. The main focus was on the purchases re-
lated to demanding modifications and spare parts 
deliveries. Based on the inspections, STUK re-
quired that the power company submit an account 
of whether adequate attention is paid to tested or 
otherwise carefully researched design solutions in 
the procurement of functional equipment impor-
tant to safety.
STUK evaluated the organisation and technical 
execution of the Loviisa maintenance and ageing 
management programmes by reviewing the steam 
generator operating and inspection history and 
the structural modifications carried out for the 
steam generators during their operational life. 
Trends significant for operational life, such as the 
increasing number of heat transfer tube pluggings, 
received detailed consideration. STUK required 
that Fortum establishes the necessary measures 
to allow the prevention and early detection of the 
potential fracturing of the weld between the steam 
generator shell and the primary collector’s connec-
tor. Fractures have been detected in the bi-metal 
weld at other VVER-440 plants.
STUK approved the installation and commis-
sioning plans of the two high-pressure safety injec-
tion pumps acquired from Slovakia. The pumps 
were installed and commissioned in the annual 
outage of 2012. The installation work required 
small structural changes to the fixing bolts and 
pipes to allow the connection of the components. 
Due to the vibration of electrical motors observed 
in the commissioning tests of the pump units, 
STUK required that Fortum carry out additional 
investigations by the end of 2012. In addition, 
STUK required that the power company regularly 
monitor the vibration levels of motors in connec-
tion with periodic testing and report observations 
made in 2013 to STUK.
4.1.5 Development of the plant and its safety
In 2007, STUK issued a statement to the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry (currently the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy) regarding the re-
newal of the Loviisa power plant’s operating li-
cence and the plant’s periodic safety review. In 
connection with a periodic safety review, Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy presented an action plan to 
reduce the plant’s accident and release risks. The 
actions have, on the whole, progressed in line with 
the action plan. However, the intention is to imple-
ment certain safety improvements in connection 
with the I&C upgrade of the Loviisa power plant. 
The risk associated with lifting heavy loads will 
be reduced by modifications implemented in con-
nection with the modernisation of the fuel transfer 
machine. The purpose of the modifications is to al-
low the use of safer lifting routes. Since the above 
projects have been delayed from their original 
schedule, the implementation of associated safety 
improvements has likewise been postponed.
Targets for development based 
on the Fukushima disaster
After the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011, 
STUK sent a decision to the licensees concerning 
provisions to be made for natural phenomena and 
disturbances in the power supply. STUK reviewed 
Pressure equipment manufacturers and 
inspection and testing organisations 
STUK approved, on application by Fortum Power 
and Heat Oy and pursuant to the Nuclear Energy 
Act, testing operators from three testing organisa-
tions for carrying out periodic tests of mechanical 
equipment and structures of the Loviisa power 
plant in accordance with YVL Guide 3.8.
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and approved Fortum’s action plan with additional 
requirements. In 2012, Fortum submitted to STUK 
for approval the cooling tower design basis re-
quired in the decision; the purpose of the cooling 
towers was to secure the residual heat removal of 
the fuel present in the reactors and the fuel pools. 
STUK approved Fortum’s action plan to improve 
flood protection, but required that the power com-
pany add further details to the plan. Fortum must 
submit an implementation plan for improving the 
fuel pool cooling to STUK for approval in 2013. 
Fortum must prepare a plan to extend the battery 
capacity of the special uninterrupted power supply 
with the aim of securing two hours of battery op-
eration. The plan must pay particular attention to 
extending the operating time of the reactor coolant 
pump seal injection system. Fortum has delivered 
to STUK a report on the availability of raw water 
in accident situations. The report also covers situ-
ations in which both plant units as well as the fuel 
pools in the containments and in the interim stor-
age for spent nuclear fuel need to be cooled down at 
the same time.
I&C upgrade at the Loviisa power plant
The LARA I&C upgrade of the Loviisa power plant 
was launched in 2005. The LARA project will mod-
ernise almost the entire I&C system of the plant 
to a digital equipment platform. At the same time, 
the plant’s control room will be modernised. The 
original intention was to carry out the upgrade in 
four phases, but according to the current plan, all 
safety-classified modifications will be implemented 
during phase 2 of the implementation and phases 
3 and 4, involving modernisation of the non-classi-
fied I&C, are to be combined. No new installation 
work was carried out for the LARA project in 2012. 
Instead, the work focused on basic engineering of 
the I&C systems and architecture and, for certain 
parts of the system, starting the manufacture of 
the I&C cubicles. STUK’s oversight and inspec-
tion activities focused on the quality management 
methods and instructions related to the engineer-
ing processes mentioned above. The configuration 
management of the I&C system supplier was in-
spected in Offenbach in June. As the qualification 
of the selected I&C platform’s components has not 
been completed, the second phase of the I&C up-
grade has been postponed to 2015. The delay re-
quires the licensee to take measures to ensure the 
adequacy of the maintenance measures and spare 
part management of the existing I&C systems and 
components that cannot be replaced with new ones 
as planned.
Modernisation of the reactor 
coolant system pressure control
Modernisation of the Loviisa 1 reactor coolant sys-
tem pressure control was carried out according 
to plans during the annual outage. The modifica-
tion comprised the replacement of the open-close 
spray valves and shut-off valves of the pressurizer 
spray system as well as their heating, by-pass and 
shutdown lines with two adjustable spray valves. 
The modification also involved the changes to the 
I&C, electrical systems and pipes required by the 
new pressure control system. STUK inspected the 
modification plans, oversaw the manufacture of the 
mechanical components, and carried out construc-
tion inspection of the components. After the com-
pletion of the installation work, STUK performed 
construction inspections of the mechanical instal-
lation as well as the commissioning inspection of 
the electrical and I&C systems. The plant start-
up was delayed due to tightness problems that 
emerged during the commissioning tests of the sys-
tem, and the plant had to be returned to the hot 
shutdown state (see the description of the event 
in Appendix 3). The preparation and implementa-
tion of the modification as well as the engineering, 
testing and commissioning of the I&C system were 
found to be challenging. Fortum has prepared a 
special report on the event and is currently in the 
process of preparing a root cause analysis. The 
acquired experience must be taken into account 
when the corresponding modification is carried out 
for Loviisa 2 in 2014.
Other safety improvements
In 2012, STUK approved changes to the wiring of 
the Loviisa 1 safety injection pump rooms’ cooling 
system that cools down the rooms under accident 
conditions. After the modification completed in the 
2012 annual outage, the system removes the heat 
load of the safety injection pump room under all 
conditions so that the temperature of the room re-
mains below 50°C. Test runs have shown that the 
modified system functions as planned.
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4.1.6 Spent nuclear fuel storage 
and operating waste
The processing, storage and final disposal of low 
and intermediate level waste (operating waste) 
at the Loviisa power plant were carried out as 
planned. The volume and activity of low and in-
termediate level waste in relation to generated 
electrical power remained low compared with most 
other countries. Contributing factors include the 
high quality requirements for nuclear waste man-
agement and nuclear fuel, the planning of main-
tenance and repair operations, decontamination, 
component and process modifications, as well as 
waste monitoring and sorting, which enable some 
of the waste with a very low radioactive substance 
content to be exempted from control. Waste below 
the set activity limits was exempted from control 
at the power plant with STUK’s approval in 2012 
to be processed elsewhere. Waste exempted from 
control included maintenance waste, scrap metal 
and hazardous waste to be processed further, such 
as waste oil. In addition, the power plant employs 
efficient procedures for reducing the volume of 
waste destined for final disposal.
STUK inspected, in accordance with the in-
spection programme, the management and final 
disposal of operating waste at the Loviisa power 
plant. The 2012 review focused on issues such as 
the organisation and resources, communications at 
the plant and with STUK, and the status of waste 
management projects. No significant deficiencies 
or needs for development were detected in the re-
view. During the review, STUK requested that an 
account of the operating strategy of the operating 
waste repository currently being built be attached 
to the operating licence application for the mainte-
nance waste tunnel 3 of Loviisa power plant’s VLJ 
repository.
Construction and commissioning of a liquid 
waste solidification facility (LOKIT)
A solidification facility for liquid radioactive waste 
(LOKIT) has been constructed on the Loviisa plant 
site. The solidification facility processes the radio-
active evaporation residues generated at the power 
plant and the radioactive ion exchange resins from 
the purification filters. Prior to commissioning the 
solidification facility, a test programme will be car-
ried out and approved to ensure that the solidifica-
tion facility systems function as planned. The tests 
are to ensure, among other things, the functioning 
of the I&C system, the correctness and adequacy of 
the information transmitted by the process mea-
surement devices, and the correct determination of 
the radioactivity of waste packages. In 2012, STUK 
has approved test run programmes for the solidifi-
cation facility as well as some plans for changes re-
quired for plant systems. The Loviisa power plant 
aims to complete the test runs and commission 
the facility in 2013. In 2012, STUK stated that the 
LOKIT project has not proceeded in accordance 
with the project and licensing plan. Work has not 
been carried out within the planned schedule, 
and equipment needed for modification work has 
not been available. Recruitment of the operating 
personnel is also still in progress. The construc-
tion and commissioning of the solidification facil-
ity should be completed as soon as possible and 
the licence obtained, because the liquid radioactive 
waste storage of the Loviisa power plant is filling 
up. Therefore, STUK will pay particular attention 
to the completion of the project according to plans 
in 2013.
The HARVALA sub-project of the LOKIT proj-
ect, intended for increasing the resin storage ca-
pacity, has advanced in the liquid waste storage 
facility. In the sub-project, the storage capacity 
of intermediate level resin has been expanded by 
modifying one low level ion exchange resin stor-
age tank for intermediate level resin. Radiation 
protection of the tank room has been built up. 
Installation of tank pipelines continues. In 2012, 
STUK approved the construction plans for the 
pipelines and the modification plans for the radia-
tion protection constructions.
Expansion of the operating waste 
repository (VLJ repository)
An expansion of the VLJ repository was initiated 
at the Loviisa power plant in 2010. The expansion 
will comprise Operation waste tunnel 3 and a con-
necting tunnel. The new facility will be used for 
the sorting and temporary storage of maintenance 
waste.
According to the statement issued by the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy, the 
expansion can be implemented subject to STUK’s 
approval and oversight. The commissioning of 
Maintenance Waste Facility 3 will take place in the 
first quarter of 2013. The Loviisa power plant sub-
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mitted the operating licence application to STUK 
for approval in 2012. STUK will issue a decision on 
the application at the beginning of 2013. A commis-
sioning inspection by STUK will also be necessary 
before commissioning can take place.
Provisions for the costs of 
nuclear waste management
In compliance with section 88, subsection 2 of 
the Nuclear Energy Decree, Fortum provided the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy with 
the revised and supplemented waste management 
schemes and information on the costs and prices of 
nuclear waste management measures. The update 
of the waste management scheme includes an in-
dex adjustment to the cost and price information 
as well as an estimate of the amount of nuclear 
waste at the end of 2012.
STUK reviewed the documents submitted in 
compliance with the Nuclear Energy Decree and 
submitted a statement regarding them to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy. In its 
statements, STUK assessed the technical plans 
and cost estimates on which the financial provision 
is based and considered them to be appropriately 
updated. Fortum’s extent of liability was €996.2 
million at the end of 2012.
According to the Nuclear Energy Decree, sup-
plemented waste management schemes for the 
technical and financial plans, as well as the related 
calculations, must be prepared every three years. 
The next revision will take place in 2013.
4.1.7 Organisational operations 
and quality management
Based on STUK’s oversight and the results of oper-
ating activities, it can be stated that, with a view to 
ensuring safety, the organisation of Fortum Power 
and Heat Oy has operated in a systematic and 
development-oriented way. During the year, STUK 
has focused its oversight activities on the develop-
ment of the management system, procurement op-
erations, human resources planning, and the qual-
ity management competence of the procurement 
personnel.
No major organisational changes took place 
within Fortum’s nuclear power operations in 2012. 
Fortum updated the licensee’s quality manage-
ment system description and supplemented it with 
the licensee’s management review procedures. In 
summer 2012, STUK stated that the process de-
velopment project for Fortum’s Loviisa power plant 
has not proceeded according to the schedule that 
the licensee had committed to in connection with 
the implementation of YVL Guide 1.4 in 2008 and 
2009. STUK required that the Loviisa power plant 
provides an account of how the plant’s manage-
ment system will achieve compliance with the 
management system’s process requirements, and 
that the Loviisa power plant continues the process 
development with no delay.
During a review of the implementation of the 
management system, STUK stated that despite 
corrective measures already implemented, the sup-
plier supervision and procurement procedures of 
the Loviisa power plant need to be developed fur-
ther. STUK ordered an assessment of the Loviisa 
power plant’s procurement operations and supplier 
evaluation procedures from a third party quality 
management specialist. The assessment confirmed 
the necessity of the requirements and measures 
already required by STUK, namely that the plant 
must further specify the instructions and proce-
dures concerning the procurement operations and 
supplier evaluation, and ensure the adequacy of 
competencies and the development of procedures. 
Due to these results, STUK considered that the 
corrective measures have not had an adequate 
impact, and required that Fortum order an inde-
pendent assessment of the procurement operations 
and supplier evaluation of the Loviisa power plant, 
and determine the causes behind the repeated de-
ficiencies. The required account of these issues was 
completed at the beginning of 2013.
STUK also found that the information pro-
duced while processing deviations occurring at the 
Loviisa power plant was not being systematically 
utilised in the management of the plant and the 
related decision-making, as had been required. 
STUK required development measures to ensure 
the development of the deviation management and 
the management system.
Concerning the oversight of human resources 
and competence management, STUK required that 
the Loviisa power plant update the competence 
management procedures and define and maintain 
the personnel’s competence requirements in more 
detail. Based on observations made in the course of 
the oversight, STUK particularly required that the 
Loviisa power plant increase its quality manage-
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ment	 and	 auditing	 expertise	 (QA	 personnel,	 the	
persons responsible for the quality management 
of projects and modifications). STUK stated that 
the Loviisa power plant has increased its human 
resources in the areas of operating experience feed-
back and safety culture. However, STUK required 
that the division of responsibilities in the area of 
safety culture evaluation and development shall be 
further clarified, and that the related procedures 
shall be updated to reflect the changes. The HR 
planning tool used at the Loviisa power plant takes 
into account changes to the number of personnel 
due to retirement, for example. The project man-
agement model adopted at the Loviisa power plant 
also aims to improve resource management. STUK 
also required that the deputy system of the persons 
responsible for physical protection and emergency 
preparedness arrangements at the Loviisa power 
plant shall be corrected to meet the requirements 
in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act.
STUK oversaw the oral examinations of shift 
personnel where the shift managers, operators and 
trainee operators prove that they are conversant 
with all salient matters related to plant operation 
and safety. In 2012, STUK granted 26 licences to 
shift managers and operators on application by 
the power company and following a successful oral 
examination, five of them to new operators. All par-
ticipants passed their examinations in 2012. The 
new operators achieved good results in the exami-
nation, which indicates that the basic training pro-
gramme is effective. The operators renewing their 
licences also achieved good results in the exami-
nation, which indicates that the power company’s 
refresher and supplementary training is effective.
4.1.8 Fire safety
In 2012, STUK reviewed reports, carried out on-
site inspections, implemented a periodic inspection 
programme, and sent resident inspectors to their 
rounds to oversee the maintenance of the fire pro-
tection systems and arrangements that ensure fire 
safety at the Loviisa power plant.
During the oversight of the Loviisa 1 annual 
outage, STUK’s inspectors observed that the vol-
ume of flammable liquids kept in the reactor cool-
ant pump room within the containment exceeded 
the volume allowed by the plant’s fire safety in-
structions. Other tools meant for the cleaning of 
the reactor pit, including cleaning cloths, were also 
stored at the same location. STUK also observed a 
similar situation at Loviisa 1 in the 2010 annual 
outage. Although the event had no direct impact 
on the safety of people, the plant or the environ-
ment, the increased risk of ignition increased the 
risk of potential fire. Due to the repeated nature of 
the event, STUK rated it a category 1 event on the 
seven-step radiation and nuclear safety scale. The 
power plant has further specified its annual out-
age procedures with the aim of preventing similar 
events in the future. STUK believes that the per-
sons responsible for fire safety at the Loviisa power 
plant are well acquainted with fire safety require-
ments, but the knowledge is too focused. Increased 
attention must be paid to continuous improvement 
of fire safety at the plant through measures such 
as ensuring that information is passed on within 
the organisation.
4.1.9 Operating experience feedback
STUK assessed the operating experience feedback 
activities and corrective measures on the basis of 
reports, inspection visits and inspections within 
the periodic inspection programme. Three INES 
1 events took place during the year: deficiencies 
observed in the testing of radiation monitors at 
Loviisa 2, the excess fire load at Loviisa 1, and the 
erroneous configuration of the thermal relays of 
the 0.4 kV pump motors at Loviisa 2.
One root cause analysis was performed at the 
Loviisa power plant in 2012. The analysis con-
cerned an event that occurred in 2011, when a 
safety classified valve was replaced by a non-clas-
sified valve without the required official approval.
The Loviisa power plant delivered ten special 
reports to STUK on events that occurred in 2012. 
The number of events discussed in special reports 
was clearly higher than in the previous years. 
The number of events constituting non-compliance 
with operational limits and conditions (OLC) was 
considerably higher in 2012 than in the previous 
years. Other events warranting a special report 
included the excess fire load at Loviisa 1, the erro-
neous configuration of the thermal relays of the 0.4 
kV pump motors at Loviisa 2, and the differences 
in the intervals of periodic preventive maintenance 
found between procedures and the OLC. For a 
more detailed description of the events discussed 
in special reports, see Appendix 3.
The special reports were prepared and delivered 
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to STUK in accordance with the requirements, but 
the power company’s investigation of some of the 
events remained superficial and incomplete.
A total of 72 unexpected operation-related 
events were recorded at the Loviisa power plant, 
and 19 event reports were delivered to STUK. The 
most significant events had been processed at the 
Loviisa power plant. The reports related, for exam-
ple, to water and other leaks, component isolation 
problems, modification work, component failures, 
methods of operation, and erroneous requirements 
included in procedures.
In the operating experience feedback inspec-
tion, STUK verified instructions, procedures and 
practices related to the feedback operations. A new 
operating experience and safety culture team has 
been established at the safety unit of the Loviisa 
power plant, responsible for the maintenance and 
development of the power plant’s operating experi-
ence feedback process. The new team has increased 
the resources available for operating experience 
feedback operations, and they were found to be 
well organised and instructed and to have ad-
equate resources.
The inspection included verification of the im-
plementation of corrective measures at Loviisa and 
in other power plants on the basis of example cas-
es. STUK found that there was scope for improve-
ment in the follow-up of corrective actions decided 
on the basis of operational events at the plant as 
well as in the assessment of the effectiveness of 
corrective actions.
The procedures for evaluating and utilising 
international operating experience feedback func-
tion well at the Loviisa power plant. International 
event reports are comprehensively analysed, and 
the corrective actions decided on their basis are 
justified and traceable. Fortum itself conducts 
pre-screening of the reports coming from various 
sources, mainly via the IRS system maintained by 
WANO and IAEA/NEA. The selection criterion for 
events to be taken to the International operating 
experience team is their safety significance for the 
Loviisa power plant.
The fire that took place during a containment 
leak test carried out at the 2011 annual outage 
of Ringhals 2, as well as the obstructions in the 
containment spray systems of Ringhals 2 and 4 ob-
served during the cleaning and inspections carried 
out after the fire, were identified as issues relevant 
to the Loviisa power plant. A presentation of the 
event has been included in the induction training 
materials for self-study. It was observed at Loviisa 
that various electrical tools often remain in the 
electrical network during breaks in the work. The 
pressure test procedure has been supplemented 
with the requirement for removing superfluous 
electrical tools from the containment or cutting 
off their power. Fortum estimated the amount of 
plastic materials in the reactor hall and the neces-
sity of replacement of the glass-fibre booth used as 
a social facility in the reactor hall during revision. 
The procurement surveys of pressure-resistant fire 
detectors are also unfinished. Loviisa has consid-
ered the possibilities of inspecting pipes with x-ray 
or endoscope procedures and decided to propose 
the inspection of a few pipes using an endoscope, 
which allows the visual inspection of several me-
tres of pipe.
The IAEA report Highlights from the Inter-
national Reporting System for Operating Experi-
ence (IRS) for Events 2010–2011 mentioned the 
IRS report of an event at the Loviisa power plant 
in which liquid resin escaped into a ventilation 
channel from a mixing tank of the liquid waste so-
lidification plant. This event constituted one of the 
five reports that were found to include important 
lessons on the management of a project covering 
the field of several technologies.
4.1.10 Radiation safety of the plant, 
personnel and the environment
Occupational radiation safety
STUK carried out a radiation protection inspection 
according to the periodic inspection programme at 
the Loviisa plant, focusing on occupational dosi-
metric surveillance and radiation measurements. 
Based on the inspection, STUK required an ac-
count of the procedures used to take care of dosim-
etry in certain emergencies which prevent mea-
surements at the plant. STUK required that the 
power company update the administrative proce-
dures of radiation protection and further specify 
the criteria related to the basic calibration of the 
dosimetric reader equipment. STUK also remarked 
that the measurement periods of the dose informa-
tion submitted for the dose register must corre-
spond to actual measurement periods.
The dosimeters used for measuring the occupa-
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tional radiation doses underwent the annual tests. 
The tests comprised irradiating a sample of dosim-
eters at STUK’s measurement standard laboratory 
and reading the doses at the power plant. The test 
results were acceptable.
STUK carried out targeted radiation protection 
inspections during the annual maintenance out-
ages. In the inspections, STUK assessed the radia-
tion protection personnel’s work and resources. At 
the same time, the activities of employees in radia-
tion work within the controlled area were assessed. 
Radiation protection during the annual outage 
of the Loviisa power plant was found to be work-
ing well, and no significant deficiencies were ob-
served. Based on the inspections, it was found that 
the plant’s radiation protection unit has further 
improved the radiation protection reporting and 
management tools. Individual targets for develop-
ment were revealed in the inspections concerning 
the arrangements of the protective equipment 
boundaries of the controlled area, and the use of 
the protective equipment.
The Loviisa power plant intends to reduce the 
releases of antimony (Sb-122 and Sb-124) to the 
reactor coolant system and to reduce the activity of 
the reactor coolant system and the resulting radia-
tion exposure. The power company replaced one of 
the reactor coolant pump seals at Loviisa 1 with a 
seal that contains no antimony.
Radiation doses
The collective occupational radiation dose was 1.35 
manSv at Loviisa 1 and 0.33 manSv at Loviisa 1. 
According to the YVL Guide issued by STUK, the 
threshold for one plant unit’s collective dose aver-
aged over two successive years is 2.5  manSv per 
gigawatt of net electrical power. This means a col-
lective dose value of 1.22 manSv per Loviisa plant 
unit. This threshold was not exceeded at either 
plant unit.
The total duration of the annual maintenance 
outages in Loviisa was long, and the number of op-
erations with significance for radiation protection 
was higher than on average, which resulted in the 
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Figure 9. Annual radiation doses to the most exposed person of the public since the start of operation of the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant. Over the recent years, the doses calculated based on the radioactive discharges 
have remained below one percent of the set limit, 0.1 milliSv.
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Figure 8. Collective occupational doses since the start of operation of the Loviisa nuclear power plant.
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total collective dose being higher than that of the 
previous years. Compared to the collective doses at 
plants with pressurised water reactors (VVER) in 
OECD countries, the collective occupational dose 
at the Loviisa power plant was average even with 
the long annual outage of Loviisa 1.
The occupational radiation doses of nuclear 
power plant workers mostly accumulated in work 
carried out during annual maintenance outages. 
The collective occupational radiation dose caused 
by work carried out during the annual mainte-
nance outages was 1.31 manSv at Loviisa 1 and 
0.29 manSv at Loviisa 2. The highest individual 
radiation dose incurred amounted to 14.3 mSv at 
Loviisa 1 and to 5.5 mSv at Loviisa 2. The highest 
individual dose incurred at either plant unit dur-
ing the entire year was 14.3  mSv. The radiation 
doses for nuclear power plant workers were below 
the individual dose limits. The effective dose for a 
worker from radiation work must not exceed the 
20  manSv/year average over any period of five 
years, or 50 manSv in any one year.
The individual radiation dose distribution of 
workers at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plants in 2012 is given in Appendix 2.
Radioactive releases and environmental 
radiation monitoring
The radioactive releases into the environment from 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant were well below 
the authorised annual limits in 2012. The releases 
of radioactive noble gases into the air were ap-
proximately 5.6  TBq (as Kr-87-equivalent activ-
ity), which is approximately 0.04% of the autho-
rised limit. The releases of radioactive noble gases 
were dominated by argon-41, i.e. the activation 
product of argon-40 present in the air space be-
tween the reactor pressure vessel and the main 
radiation shield. The releases of radioactive iodine 
Table 2. Radioactive nuclides originating from the Loviisa NPP, found in the environmental samples.
Types of samples containing radionuclides originating from the NPP in 2012. Figures in the table indicate the number of samples of a certain 
sample type in which each radionuclide was detected. Several different nuclides may be found in the same sample.
Type of sample / 
radionuclide
H-3 Mn-54 Co-58 Co-60 Nb-95 Zr-95 Ag-110m Te-123m Sb-124 Sb-125 Ce-144 Total
Air – – – 2 – – – – – – – 2
Fallout – 1 – 2 – – 1 – – – – 4
Aquatic plants – 2 2 5 1 1 5 1 3 1 – 22
Perifyton – 2 2 3 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 15
Sedimenting materials – – – 8 – – 5 – – – – 13
Sediment – – – 3 – – – – – – – 3
Seawater 4 – – - – – – – – – – 4
Sludge – 2 1 3 – 1 3 1 2 1 – 14
Total 4 7 5 26 2 3 16 3 7 3 1 77
New limits for releases of radioactive 
substances adopted at the Loviisa 
power plant at the beginning of 2012
The limits for releases of radioactive substances 
from the Loviisa power plant are specified in 
the operational limits and conditions (OLC) ap-
proved by STUK. The limits have been defined at 
a level where the annual radiation dose incurred 
to a person living in the vicinity does not exceed 
0.1 mSv, the limit specified in Government Decree 
733/2008. The limits apply to releases of noble 
gases and iodine into the atmosphere during a 
calendar year, and releases of tritium and other 
substances into the sea during a calendar year. No 
release limits have been set for some released sub-
stances, as their volume remains low and steady 
during normal operation of the power plant, and 
their releases can be controlled based on the radia-
tion dose limit mentioned above.
Loviisa power plant’s noble gas release limit 
was lowered by approximately 40%. Other limits 
remained unchanged. The change was based on 
the observation by Fortum that according to the 
calculation method currently in use, some noble 
gas releases within the limit could in some cases 
have resulted in the radiation dose limit being 
slightly exceeded. The change has no great practi-
cal significance, as the noble gas releases from the 
plant have been considerably lower than the limit 
during the entire operating history of the plant.
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isotopes into the air were about 0.2 MBq (as I-131-
equivalent activity), i.e. approximately 0.0001% of 
the authorised limit. The emissions through the 
vent stack also included radioactive particulate 
matter amounting to 0.1 GBq, tritium amounting 
to 0.2  TBq and carbon-14 amounting to approxi-
mately 0.3 TBq.
The tritium content of liquid effluents released 
into the sea was 15 TBq, which is approximately 
10% of the release limit. The total activity of other 
nuclides released into the sea was about 0.3 GBq, 
which is 0.03% of the plant location-specific release 
limit.
The calculated radiation dose of the most ex-
posed individual in the vicinity of the plant was 
about 0.07 µSv per annum, i.e. less than 0.1% of 
the set limit (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.5c). An 
average person living in Finland receives the 
equivalent radiation dose from radiation sources in 
nature and in space in about 30 minutes.
STUK approved the environmental radiation 
monitoring programmes of the Loviisa power plant 
for 2012–2016.
A total of 300 samples were collected and 
analysed from the land and marine environment 
surrounding the Loviisa power plant during 2012. 
External background radiation and the exposure 
to radioactivity of people in the surroundings were 
also measured regularly. Extremely small amounts 
of radioactive substances originating from the 
nuclear power plant were observed in some of the 
analysed environmental samples. The amounts 
were so small that they are insignificant in terms 
of the radiation exposure of the environment or 
people.
4.1.11 Emergency preparedness
STUK oversees the capability of the emergency 
response organisations of nuclear power plants to 
act in abnormal situations. No situations requir-
ing emergency response actions occurred at the 
Loviisa power plant in 2012.
Emergency preparedness at the Loviisa power 
plant complies with the main requirements set for 
emergency response. The emergency response or-
ganisation of the power plant consists of the organ-
isation of the Loviisa power plant and of Fortum’s 
technical support organisation in Keilaniemi. 
STUK’s inspection of the emergency preparedness 
arrangements of the Loviisa power plant, included 
in the periodic inspection programme, included 
the inspection of preparedness training, drills, 
equipment and facilities, alarm arrangements, en-
vironmental radiation measurements and weather 
observations at the plant site. On the basis of the 
inspection, STUK required that emergency proce-
dures be further developed and the Final Safety 
Analysis Report be updated for certain on-site 
radiation measurements required during emergen-
cies. At the time of the inspection, the investiga-
tions that began following the Fukushima nuclear 
power plant accident were still in progress, and 
they had no immediate impact on the emergency 
preparedness activities during 2012.
The functions of the emergency information 
system were revised. The system is used to trans-
fer key information on events at the plant to 
the emergency response centres at STUK and in 
Keilaniemi. The revision was necessary due to the 
discontinuation of the 2V network, used for data 
transfer, in September. The project proceeded at 
the equipment level and with tests carried out at 
supplier facilities, with the aim of commission-
ing the system at the end of September or the 
beginning of October. Data transfer to emergency 
response centres did, however, already begin in 
January 2013.
An internal emergency response drill was or-
ganised at the Loviisa power plant control centre 
in spring 2012. Planning of the extensive Loviisa 
13 preparedness and rescue drill to be organised 
in 2013 began in a team of experts including rep-
resentatives of authorities and from the power 
company.
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4.2 Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant units 1 and 2
4.2.1 Overall safety assessment of 
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2
STUK oversaw the safety of the Olkiluoto power 
plant and assessed its organisation and personnel’s 
competence in various areas by means of reviewing 
documents provided by the licensee, carrying out 
inspections in line with the periodic inspection pro-
gramme and by overseeing operations at the plant. 
On the basis of this regulatory oversight, STUK 
can state that plant operations did not cause a 
radiation hazard to the employees, population or 
the environment. Occupational radiation doses and 
radioactive releases into the environment were low 
and clearly below the prescribed limits. The licens-
ee has operated the Olkiluoto power plant in a safe 
manner and in compliance with the YVL Guides. 
Emergency preparedness at the Olkiluoto power 
plant is in compliance with requirements. The pro-
cessing, storage and final disposal of low and inter-
mediate level waste (operating waste) at the power 
plant were carried out as planned.
According to the tests and inspections carried 
out, the condition of the containment and the reac-
tor coolant system, which prevent the release of 
radioactive material into the environment, are in 
compliance with requirements. A small fuel leak 
was detected at Olkiluoto 2 in 2011. The leak was 
located during the 2012 annual outage, and the 
leaking fuel assembly was removed from the reac-
tor. The leak had no significance for the radiation 
safety of the plant environment.
Plant operation has been systematic and safe. 
Two events of INES class 1 were reported from 
the plant. Both events were related to the de-
ficiencies observed in the main steam isolation 
valves at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. The defi-
ciencies were corrected immediately after detec-
tion, but TVO launched extensive investigation 
at both plant units to assess the comprehensive-
ness of the testing of systems important to safety. 
Three events occurred at the plant during which 
the plant was non-compliant with the operational 
limits and conditions (OLC). The events had no 
impact on the safety of employees or the plant 
surroundings. System and equipment failures 
had a minor safety implication for the plant. The 
annual maintenance outages of plant units were 
implemented as planned in terms of nuclear and 
radiation safety.
During the year, modifications were implement-
ed for improving plant safety. The plant is in the 
middle of a modernisation project spanning many 
years, aimed at extending the service life of the 
plant and improving its availability. A generator 
and low-voltage switchgear were replaced in one 
subsystem at Olkiluoto 1 in 2012. At Olkiluoto 
2, three devices that measure radiation levels of 
main steam lines during operation were replaced. 
TVO is also in the process of expanding the spent 
fuel storage at Olkiluoto. At the same time, the 
structures of the storage facility will be modified 
to comply with the current safety requirements. In 
2012, STUK approved the conceptual design plan 
submitted by TVO concerning the renewal of emer-
gency diesel generators.
In 2009, STUK approved the periodic safety 
review regarding Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2, as 
well as TVO’s action plan for developing plant 
safety. The agreed actions have mainly progressed 
in line with the plans. In 2012, STUK approved 
an action plan submitted by the power company 
concerning the improved application of the diver-
sity principle in the plant units’ safety systems, as 
well as an updated conceptual design plan to build 
an emergency control room. After the Fukushima 
nuclear accident in 2011, STUK sent a decision to 
the Olkiluoto power plant concerning the provi-
sions against natural phenomena and disturbances 
in the power supply. The measures proposed by 
the power company have proceeded. STUK re-
viewed and approved the power company’s plans 
for improving plant safety with regard to extreme 
external hazards. The plans include an action plan 
to improve the independence of the auxiliary feed 
water system from the sea-water cooling system.
In 2012, STUK provided the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy with a favour-
able statement on TVO’s application concerning 
a change of the operating licence conditions of the 
operating waste repository (VLJ repository). After 
the decision by the Government, the repository will 
be able to accept radioactive sources created by the 
use of radiation, and later, the low and intermedi-
ate level waste created during the operation of 
Olkiluoto 3.
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TVO’s organisation has acted in a system-
atic and development-oriented way to improve 
the plant’s safety. In 2012, STUK’s oversight was 
particularly focused on TVO’s preparations for 
the commissioning of Olkiluoto 3, as well as the 
integration of the project organisation and project 
management system with the procedures used 
at the operating plant units. STUK’s inspections 
paid attention to TVO’s HR planning and alloca-
tion of resources, which have ongoing procedure 
development that needs to be finished. TVO is still 
improving the description of the modification work 
process. The modification work procedures will 
be developed in particular with respect to quality 
management and procurement. TVO has developed 
its project management procedures and had its 
project operations evaluated by a third party in au-
tumn 2012. TVO has continued the preparation of 
management system process descriptions in 2012.
4.2.2 Plant operation, events during operation 
and prerequisites of safe operation
Compliance with the operational 
limits and conditions (OLC)
The operational limits and conditions (OLC) list 
the values within which nuclear power plant units 
must remain during operation. STUK is respon-
sible for verifying that TVO keeps the operational 
limits and conditions up to date and does not devi-
ate from them without STUK’s permission. TVO 
looks after the up-to-dateness of the OLC of the 
Olkiluoto plant, among other things, by assessing 
the need to update them in regular reviews and 
during the planning stages of modifications.
In 2012, TVO reported three events during 
which the plant was non-compliant with the OLC 
without an advance safety analysis and STUK’s 
permission. All of these non-compliances were un-
intentional. In one of the cases, non-compliance 
with the OLC was due to a human error in the 
planning stage of a modification, and, in another 
case, a human error in the implementation stage 
of a modification. In the third case, an error in the 
calculation method used to assess the efficiency of 
control rods during plant start-up led to non-com-
pliance with the OLC. The individual events did 
not put the plant or its surrounding environment 
at risk. There were, however, three events in total, 
which makes it important to ensure that there are 
no deficiencies in the knowledge of the OLC or the 
procedures to follow the OLC that would lead to 
unintentional non-compliance. TVO analysed all 
events and defined corrective measures to prevent 
similar events from occurring in the future. A more 
detailed description of these events is included in 
the section Operation and operational events below 
and in Appendix 3. STUK oversees the licensee’s 
operations at the plant site and carries out random 
inspections to ensure compliance with the require-
ments and limits of the OLC. No non-compliances 
were observed in the 2012 inspections.
During the year, TVO submitted to STUK for 
approval 17 amendment proposals for the op-
erational limits and conditions. The amendments 
were mainly due to modifications and equipment 
replacements carried out at the plant, as well as an 
OLC development project (see section 4.2.5). STUK 
approved 14 of the amendments as such or with 
minor modifications. Needs for further surveys or 
corrections were found during the processing of 
two applications, and STUK returned the applica-
tions to TVO for completion. One application was 
not approved, as there was no justification for the 
Table 3. Events at the Olkiluoto plant units subject to special reports or a root cause analysis and/or classified 
INES	Level	1	or	higher.	All	events	subject	to	reporting	are	discussed	in	Appendix	1	(indicator	A.II.1).
Event
Non-compliances 
with the OLC
Special report and/
or root cause report
INES rating
Error in the calculation of control rod efficiency at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 • • 0
Deficiencies found in the operation of main steam isolation valves at 
Olkiluoto 1
• 1
Deficiencies found in the operation of main steam isolation valves at 
Olkiluoto  2
• 1
Human error in a job related to the Olkiluoto 1 reactor protection system • • 0
A failed control room emergency ventilation fan at Olkiluoto 2 • • 0
Deficiencies in the testing of protection system at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 •
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changes proposed by TVO. STUK observed in con-
nection with two applications that changes to peri-
odic testing, required by the replacement of equip-
ment, could not be updated into the OLC when the 
replacement of the equipment was completed, be-
cause the processing was not yet completed at the 
time. It followed that the OLC was not up to date 
concerning these matters. STUK required that 
TVO process the non-compliance in accordance 
with its own procedures and define corrective mea-
sures to prevent similar occurrences.
TVO applied for permission from STUK for ten 
planned deviations from the operational limits 
and conditions (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.2). Six of 
the applications were related to modifications (for 
example, in five cases a single radiation measure-
ment was disabled for a few days to allow the re-
placement of equipment or changing the structure 
at the equipment location), one to the replacement 
of equipment, two to a defect detected in the calcu-
lation method used for the assessment of control 
rod efficiency, and one to a periodic test. As the 
planned deviations had no significant safety impli-
cations, STUK approved the applications.
Operation and operational events
STUK oversaw the operation on a daily basis at 
the plant site, by inspecting the regular reports on 
operating activities as well as the event reports, 
and by making two inspections as part of the pe-
riodic inspection programme; one of these inspec-
tions was performed without prior notice. The re-
sults of the inspections are described in Appendix 
5 of this report.
No events leading to a reactor trip occurred at 
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. The most sig-
nificant events are described briefly in the follow-
ing, and in more detail in Appendix 3. Two of these 
events revealed deficiencies in the planning and 
implementation of I&C modifications carried out 
in previous years. Both of these events are related 
to main steam isolation valves. A missing control 
logic wire would have prevented the valves from 
closing should that have been necessary. The defi-
ciencies were not revealed when the modifications 
were first put into use, or in the periodic testing 
during the plant’s operating cycles. The observa-
Figure 12. Daily average gross power of the Olkiluoto plant in 2012.
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Figure 11. Load factors of the Olkiluoto plant units.
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Figure 10. INES	classified	events	at	the	Olkiluoto	plant	
(INES	Level	1	or	higher).
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tion launched extensive investigations at both 
plant units to assess the comprehensiveness of the 
testing of systems important to safety. In this case, 
STUK required that TVO reveal the root causes 
that led to the deficiencies before the 2013 annual 
outage, and define corrective measures on the basis 
of the causes. The purpose of the investigations is 
to identify the causes that led to the deficiencies, to 
reveal any other similar deficiencies, and to devel-
op the procedures so that the occurrence of similar 
deficiencies can be prevented in the future.
In 2012, the risks caused by component mal-
functions, preventive maintenance and other 
events causing unavailability of equipment were 
5.9% and 29.0% of the expected value of the an-
nual accident risk calculated using the plant’s risk 
model for Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2, respectively. 
The result was in line with those of previous years.
Annual maintenance outages
The Olkiluoto 1 annual maintenance outage 
took place from 24 April to 25 May 2012, and 
the Olkiluoto 2 refuelling outage from 27 May to 
6 June 2012. At annual outage, equipment and 
structures important to plant safety are inspected, 
serviced, replaced or modified. These measures 
ensure the preconditions for operating the power 
plant safely during the following operating cycles. 
In addition, some of the nuclear fuel is replaced 
with fresh fuel during the annual outages. STUK 
oversees that the licensee ensures the safe comple-
tion of the annual maintenance work and prevents 
radiation hazards to the plant employees and the 
environment.
STUK used a total of 230 man-days on on-
site oversight during the annual maintenance 
outages; these days were made up of inspections 
Operation and operational events
The load factor of Olkiluoto  1 was 90.4%, while 
that of Olkiluoto  2 was 96.9%. The annual out-
ages have a major effect on the load factors. The 
outage at Olkiluoto  1 lasted for 31 days, while that 
of Olkiluoto  2 lasted for 9 days. The losses in gross 
energy output due to operational transients and com-
ponent malfunctions were 2.5% at Olkiluoto  1 and 
0.003% at Olkiluoto 2.
TVO observed an error in the calculation 
method used to assess the efficiency of control 
rods during plant start-up. Analyses show, how-
ever, that the error did not cause any risk to fuel integ-
rity or plant safety.
During the 2012 annual outage of Olkiluoto  1, 
TVO found that one of the reactor’s main steam 
isolation valves would not have closed as 
planned when required. A missing valve control 
conductor was revealed as the cause of the deficiency. 
The conductor had been removed when four inner 
main steam isolation valves had been replaced in 
the 2010 annual outage. The conductor had not been 
replaced due to a modification design error. The fault 
was repaired immediately after detection.
TVO carried out additional checks and tests at 
both plant units after the observation, and found the 
same deficiency also at Olkiluoto 2. In a turbine 
automation renewal carried out in 2005, a conductor 
had been unnecessarily removed. As a result, the same 
isolation valve as at Olkiluoto 1, and another isola-
tion valve beside it, would not have closed automati-
cally when required. The fault was repaired.
During the annual outage of Olkiluoto 1, reactor 
protection system pushbuttons were replaced in the 
control room. Due to a human error, the work was 
started in the wrong order. The necessary prepara-
tions had not yet been completed for the pushbuttons 
in question, and the work triggered a plant pro-
tection function. With the protection function acti-
vated, two pumps contributing to the cooling of the 
reactor core would not have started up when required.
TVO modified the Olkiluoto  2 control room ven-
tilation system in September. The preparation for the 
work included electrical isolation of equipment to 
ensure safety of the workers and the plant. During the 
planning of the work, it was not noted that a change 
in the position of one circuit breaker also affects the 
control room emergency ventilation fan, preventing it 
from starting when required. The error was detected 
in a test two weeks later when one of the two fans 
feeding overpressure into the control room in 
accident conditions failed to launch.
The events are described in more detail in 
Appendix 3.
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Annual outage at Olkiluoto 2 
The refuelling outage of Olkiluoto 2 lasted for nine 
days, which was more than a day longer than ex-
pected. The delay was caused by events such as a 
fault detected in a cable of the refuelling machine, 
and the repair of the fault.
Almost 25 per cent of the nuclear fuel in 
the reactor was replaced during the annual out-
age. Three measurement devices that monitor the 
radiation levels in the main steam pipes were 
also replaced. No major modifications are car-
ried out during a refuelling outage; instead, the 
work mainly consists of inspections, maintenance, 
repairs and tests of systems, equipment and struc-
tures, such as fuel inspections and leak tests of 
containment isolation valves.
A fuel leak was detected at the plant unit in 
August 2011. TVO monitored the development of 
the leak during the operating cycle. During the 
annual outage, the leaking fuel assembly was 
identified and removed from the reactor. The fuel 
leak had no significance to the radiation safety of 
the environment, as the released radioactivity was 
contained within the plant.
TVO observed similar main steam isola-
tion valve control problems as those detected at 
Olkiluoto 1. The event is described in greater detail 
in Appendix 3.
Annual outage at Olkiluoto 1
The annual outage of Olkiluoto  1 took 31 days. 
TVO decided to launch the outage approximately 
one month earlier than planned due to a water 
leak observed in the generator. As this constituted 
an essential change to the original planning and 
execution of the annual outage, STUK required 
that TVO produces a safety assessment of mov-
ing the annual outage forward. The outage lasted 
more than 13 days longer than planned. TVO was 
able to carry out the annual outage in a controlled 
manner, and it has not reported any deviations 
that would have affected the safety of the plant or 
the personnel as a result of moving the annual out-
age forward.
During the annual outage, one fifth of the 
nuclear fuel was replaced. Major modifications 
included the replacement of the generator and the 
replacement of low voltage switchgear in one sub-
system. In addition to the modifications, a consid-
erable number of inspections, maintenance work, 
repairs and tests were carried out for systems, 
equipment and structures. Due to the annual out-
age being moved forward, some work planned for 
the annual outage could not be completed or their 
scope had to be changed. Most important of these 
included the replacement of the low voltage switch-
gear, mentioned above, in one subsystem instead 
of two, and the postponement of two battery bank 
replacements to power operation.
Olkiluoto 1 had a repair outage from 26 to 27 
May 2012 immediately after the annual outage to 
repair a leaking valve in the steam extraction sys-
tem of the turbine island.
and other oversight work on various areas of 
expertise, such as equipment and system inspec-
tions at the plant site, and inspection rounds. 
In addition, resident inspectors worked regularly 
on site, primarily responsible for overseeing the 
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 plant units. For a more 
detailed account of the annual outage inspection, 
see Appendix 5.
4.2.3 Ensuring plant safety functions
Deterministic safety analyses
An extensive evaluation of the transient and ac-
cident analyses (deterministic safety analyses) car-
ried out to verify the safety functions of the plant 
has been performed in connection with the periodic 
safety review of 2009. Since then, TVO has fur-
ther supplemented the sections of the transient 
and accident analyses that concern an extension of 
postulated accidents and loss of coolant accidents. 
In 2012, no updated deterministic safety analyses 
were delivered to STUK.
Probabilistic risk analyses
The risk of a severe nuclear accident is evaluated 
on the basis of a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). 
As a rule, PRA calculations use regularly updated 
information of the occurrences of initiating events 
and the unavailability of equipment together with 
a logical model of the plant’s systems and their in-
terdependencies.
The annual probability of a severe reactor acci-
dent calculated for the Olkiluoto plant was 1.35·10-
5, which is approximately the same as that of 2011 
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and replaced during the annual outages in accor-
dance with the approved plan. The control rods 
removed from the reactor were inspected after the 
annual outage, during the operating cycle.
Visual inspection in accordance with TVO’s fuel 
inspection plan was carried out at Olkiluoto 1 dur-
ing the 2012 operating cycle for six fuel assemblies 
and channels removed from the reactor after being 
exposed to radiation for four cycles. Visual inspec-
tions were also carried out for the channels of three 
fuel types, and fuel assemblies were inspected in 
accordance with the spent fuel condition monitor-
ing programme. No deviations were detected in the 
inspection of the fuel assemblies currently being 
used or removed from use.
TVO has delivered the licensing materials for 
new fuel assembly types to STUK for approval. 
According to TVO’s plans, the test assemblies will 
be loaded at Olkiluoto  1 and Olkiluoto  2 in the 
2014 annual outage.
Reactor coolant system
The power company monitors the condition of the 
reactor coolant system with periodic inspections 
and reactor coolant system load monitoring, which 
STUK inspects in connection with the periodic in-
spection programme. The condition of the reactor 
coolant system remains good at both plant units.
An indication detected in a weld joint of a 
nozzle in the Olkiluoto 2 feed water system in 2003 
has been monitored with periodic inspections. The 
size of the indication has remained the same from 
2003 to 2012 based on the qualified inspection 
procedure used. The weld in question was also in-
spected using a new phased ultrasonic method in 
the 2011 annual outage. This unqualified method 
yielded a result based on which the indication was 
analysed to be 15.3 mm deep at the same place and 
orientation. This is approximately 5 mm deeper 
than the measurement yielded by the inspection 
methods previously used. The indication was in-
spected again in the 2012 annual outage using a 
qualified and phased method. The results were 
practically identical with the results of the 2011 
inspection.	Qualification	 of	 the	 phased	method	 is	
currently in progress.
During the year under review, TVO surveyed 
the significance of the chloride content of the 
graphite gaskets used in the control rod actua-
tors at Olkiluoto  1 and Olkiluoto  2. The chloride 
(1.33·10-5/year). The increase of approximately 
1.5% compared to 2011 was due to an update of 
the common cause failure information of the equip-
ment, changes to some testing intervals, and small 
changes in modelling.
The accident risk at the Olkiluoto power plant 
and its changes are discussed in greater detail in 
Section A.II.4 of Appendix 1 entitled “Accident risk 
of nuclear facilities”.
Operating condition of safety systems
STUK has approved TVO’s action plan to improve 
the application of the diversity principle in the 
safety systems of Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. In 
connection with the periodic safety review, STUK 
presented the requirement to evaluate the ade-
quacy of diversity and to develop a plan to improve 
the diversity. In its report, TVO has discussed the 
adequacy of the diversity at the levels of main safe-
ty functions, systems and equipment of the plant 
units, and found that the reactor level measure-
ment and neutron flux measurement do not comply 
with the diversity principle. TVO has delivered to 
STUK plans for the diversification of the low and 
high reactor level trips and is looking into the im-
provement of the independence of the reactor trip 
conditions of neutron flux measurements.
4.2.4 Integrity of structures and equipment
STUK monitored the integrity of structures and 
equipment on the basis of periodic inspections and 
in connection with repairs and modifications. No 
observations restricting the use of pressure equip-
ment or pipelines were made during the periodic 
inspections.
In 2012, leak tests of the containments and 
containment levels were completed during the 
annual outages of Olkiluoto  1 and Olkiluoto  2 in 
accordance with the testing programme. The tests 
included any openings and isolation valves. The 
results of the tests were acceptable.
Fuel and control rods
In August 2011, a fuel leak was detected at 
Olkiluoto 2, and the leaking fuel assembly was re-
moved from the reactor in the 2012 annual outage. 
As the cause of the damage could not be revealed 
by inspections, TVO carried out additional inspec-
tions when repairing the fuel assembly after the 
annual outage. Control rods were also inspected 
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content of the new guide sleeve gaskets installed 
during the annual outage has been found to exceed 
the allowed value. The significance of this for the 
integrity of the reactor coolant system was studied. 
No increase of chloride content has been detected 
in the reactor coolant system’s water chemistry. 
The results of the reactor trip tests carried out in 
recent years have also been acceptable. Risk of cor-
rosion is considered to be low due to the structure 
of the control rod mechanisms. TVO will deliver the 
results of the surveys to STUK and inspect some 
guide sleeves and their gaskets again in the 2013 
annual outage.
Periodic inspection programmes
Periodic in-service inspections must be carried out 
on pressure equipment and pipes important to nu-
clear safety as required by the YVL Guides. The 
inspection targets are selected in accordance with 
an annual periodic inspection programme defined 
by the power company and approved by STUK. 
In 2012, inspection of the reactor pressure vessel 
nozzles, cover, bolts, nuts and washers, as well as a 
visual inspection of the internals, was carried out 
at Olkiluoto  1. Some pipes and equipment were 
also inspected. At Olkiluoto  2, follow-up inspec-
tions of the reactor pressure vessel’s feed water 
nozzle took place, together with a visual inspection 
of the internals. Pipes and equipment were also 
inspected. The Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 faults 
being monitored have remained unchanged, and 
the inspections did not reveal any new faults with 
nuclear safety implications.
A leak test was carried out for the Olkiluoto 1 
containment during the annual outage. The leak 
test met the design requirements.
Maintenance, ageing management
STUK oversaw and inspected the use, maintenance 
and ageing management of valve and lifting equip-
ment units as well as the organisation, HR re-
sources and competence verification of these opera-
tions. The inspection revealed that the licensee was 
not able to give an adequate account of the periodic 
inspection practices for safety classified lifting aids 
at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. Therefore, 
STUK required that TVO deliver a separate ac-
count of the matter to STUK by the end of 2012.
As a part of ageing management, STUK also 
assessed TVO’s procurement procedures for de-
manding spare part deliveries and modifications of 
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. The inspection proved 
that TVO’s operations are at an acceptable level. 
The technical and quality management require-
ment specifications for purchases comply with 
the YVL Guides that concern the procurement of 
equipment, and adequate resources and expertise 
are available for the preparation of purchases. 
However, STUK observed that the presentation 
of the failure trends of the plant units is not de-
tailed enough where fault messages and opera-
tion restrictions are concerned. Therefore, STUK 
required that TVO develop its annual reporting so 
that safety system fault trends caused by actual 
inoperability would be easier to recognise. STUK 
has also required better prediction and traceability 
of various fault types in the ageing management 
programme.
The ageing management inspection of con-
structions and buildings was targeted at steel 
structures, HR planning, monitoring processes and 
inspection operations. At the inspection, require-
ments were issued on the further specification of 
procedures concerning the condensing pool equip-
ment responsibilities. STUK also required that 
the fuel pool inspection and reporting practices be 
updated to the pool inspection procedures. STUK 
also required an account of safety inspections of 
the KPA storage.
Emergency diesel generators
Due to the bearing damage detected in the emer-
gency diesel generators of the Loviisa power plant, 
STUK requested from TVO information on the 
bearing types used in the Olkiluoto diesel genera-
tors. The bearings of the Olkiluoto diesel genera-
tors were found to be of a different type from those 
used in Loviisa, but TVO was planning to use a 
new bearing type by the same manufacturer that 
supplied the bearings used in Loviisa. STUK re-
quired that TVO ensure that the new bearings do 
not have problems similar to those experienced at 
the Loviisa power plant.
Operation and condition 
monitoring of valves
A warranty inspection of an inner isolation valve 
of a main steam line installed in 2010, carried 
out during the 2012 annual outage of Olkiluoto 1, 
revealed small liquid penetrant indications that 
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refer to pitting on the hard faced sealing surfaces 
of the slides.
 STUK required that the power company also 
open and inspect three other valves and determine 
their operability. The three opened valves were in 
the same condition as the valve subjected to war-
ranty inspection, and they had been found to be 
tight in the leak test performed before opening. 
One valve was inspected at Olkiluoto 2, and simi-
lar indications were observed on the slide. STUK 
granted test operation permission for the valve 
on the basis of TVO’s reports. STUK required that 
TVO submit for approval a root cause analysis of 
the deviation report related to the observation, 
as well as a plan for measures that can be used 
to avoid corrosion of the sealing surfaces in the 
future.
The reactor overpressure protection system’s 
control valves were opened for inspection, because 
their opening times exceeded the allowed limits. A 
new indication was observed on the sealing surface 
of one poppet seat. The indication was stated to 
have no significance for valve operation, and STUK 
granted test operation permission for it.
Repairs and modifications
TVO had a reactor coolant pump’s stator core re-
paired without an approved plan contrary to the 
requirement of Guide YVL 5.7. A repair plan was 
submitted to STUK for approval after the comple-
tion of the work. STUK required that TVO deliver 
an account of the decision-making process related 
to the repair as well as the chain of events follow-
ing it, and specify the corrective measures that 
will prevent similar situations in the future. TVO’s 
account of the events states that the deputy who 
processed the repair plan was not familiar with the 
scope of the approval process, which is why permis-
sion was given to carry out the work. As a correc-
tive measure, the power company has prepared a 
separate repair work procedure for electrical and 
I&C equipment, and the persons in question will 
be given training on the preparation and approval 
of repair plans.
4.2.5 Development of the plant and its safety
In 2009, STUK approved the periodic safety as-
sessment regarding Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 as 
well as TVO’s action plan for decreasing the risk 
of accidents and releases. The power company is 
assessing and developing the application of the 
diversity principle at the plant (see section 4.2.3), 
the operational limits and conditions, as well as 
abnormal and emergency operating procedures.
Targets for development based 
on the Fukushima accident
After the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011, 
STUK sent a decision to the licensees concerning 
provisions to be made for natural phenomena and 
disturbances in the power supply. STUK reviewed 
and approved TVO’s action plan with additional re-
quirements. TVO is planning a separate water sup-
ply system independent of existing plant systems 
to cool the reactors of Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. 
STUK required addition of further details to the 
plan concerning situations such as loss of power 
supply. TVO is also planning measures to improve 
the independence of the auxiliary feed water sys-
tem from the sea-water cooling system. TVO deliv-
ered to STUK an account of the adequate volume 
and availability of water for the simultaneous cool-
ing of all reactors, fuel pools and spent fuel storage 
during long-lasting accidents which involve loss of 
the normal heat sink. TVO also delivered a status 
report on the need for portable generators, pumps 
and other equipment, and the measures to ensure 
their fast availability. Portable generators are to be 
used for purposes such as recharging the uninter-
ruptible power supply batteries during long-lasting 
accidents.
Pressure equipment manufacturers and 
inspection and testing organisations
A total of 25 nuclear pressure equipment manu-
facturers were approved for the Olkiluoto plant 
(plant units Olkiluoto 1, 2 and 3). STUK approved 
20 testing organisations to carry out tests related 
to the manufacture of mechanical equipment and 
structures, plus one inspection organisation to re-
view the construction plans of mechanical compo-
nents and structures and to carry out their struc-
tural and commissioning inspections. Two testing 
organisations were approved to carry out periodic 
tests of mechanical equipment and structures pur-
suant to YVL 3.8.
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Construction of an emergency 
control room at Olkiluoto
Pursuant to a Government Decree, a nuclear power 
plant shall have an emergency control room inde-
pendent of the control room, and the necessary lo-
cal control systems for shutting down and cooling 
the nuclear reactor, and for removing residual heat 
from the nuclear reactor and spent fuel stored at 
the plant in a situation where operations in the 
main control room are not possible.
TVO is in the process of constructing emergency 
control rooms for the operating Olkiluoto plant 
units in compliance with the requirements set 
out in STUK’s implementation decision regarding 
Guide YVL 5.5 and in the periodic safety assess-
ment of Olkiluoto. STUK reviewed and approved 
the updated conceptual design plan for the emer-
gency control rooms in 2012. The update was based 
on STUK’s earlier decision that required a more 
thorough assessment of the consequences of a loss 
of main control room as well as the adequacy and 
comprehensiveness of the measurement informa-
tion and controls to be used at the emergency con-
trol room. Final design materials are expected to 
be completed in 2013.
Replacement of diesel generators
TVO submitted a conceptual design plan concern-
ing the replacement of Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 
emergency diesel generators to STUK for approval 
in late 2011. According to the plan, the EGDs will 
be replaced to meet the changed power need, in-
cluding potential need for increased electrical pow-
er due to future plant modifications. The change 
will also improve the reliability of the emergen-
cy generators. Both operating plant units of the 
Olkiluoto power plant have four subsystems, and 
each subsystem has its own standby diesel genera-
tor.
The most significant difference in the operating 
principles of the new emergency diesel generators 
compared to the current ones is their cooling sys-
tem. The new diesel motors are to have air cooling 
in addition to the sea-water cooling. The cooling 
arrangement will have two heat exchangers in the 
cooling circuit of each diesel generator, one for sea-
water cooling and one for air cooling. The operating 
principle of the sea-water cooling will remain the 
same, and sea-water cooling will continue to be the 
primary cooling method. Cooling radiators will be 
installed for the air cooling on top of the diesel gen-
erator buildings. This cooling solution will provide 
two independent heat sinks, which is a significant 
improvement for nuclear safety.
TVO submitted an updated conceptual design 
plan for the diesel generator replacement to STUK 
for approval in late 2012. It has been estimated 
that the installation and commissioning of all the 
new diesel generators will be completed by 2020.
Low-voltage switchgear replacement project
TVO has initiated a project (the SIMO project) for 
replacing the switchgears of the low-voltage distri-
bution systems at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. The 
primary reason for replacing the switchgears is the 
increase in maintenance costs due to the ageing of 
original equipment, as well as the need to moder-
nise the switchgear to correspond to the current re-
quirements regarding plant and personnel safety. 
The replacement mainly concerns the switchgears 
and associated transformers of electrical systems 
important to safety. TVO has already replaced the 
medium-voltage switchgear (6.6 kV) in 2005 and 
2006. The voltages in the low-voltage networks of 
the units vary from 24 V DC to 660 V AC. The 
switchgears are used to supply the required elec-
trical power to the plant units’ I&C systems and 
components that are important to safety.
According to the current plan for execution, the 
low-voltage switchgears will be replaced during 
plant units’ annual outages of 2010–2016. TVO 
made the first switchgear installations of the proj-
ect in the 2010 annual outage. They concerned an 
electrical system less important to safety. During 
the 2011 annual outage of Olkiluoto 2, TVO imple-
mented the first switchgear replacement to sys-
tems important to safety so that the low-voltage 
switchgear and associated transformers in one of 
the plant unit’s four subsystems was replaced. TVO 
continued the work in the 2012 annual outage of 
Olkiluoto 2 by replacing the switchgear of another 
subsystem. STUK reviewed the documents for the 
switchgear project and oversaw the execution of 
the work at the plant. TVO intends to continue the 
project at Olkiluoto 2 during the 2013 annual out-
age by replacing the switchgear of two subsystems.
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Development of the operational 
limits and conditions (OLC)
The OLC development plan states that TVO im-
proves the justification for requirements and clar-
ifies the requirements when necessary. In 2011, 
TVO conducted internal discussions regarding the 
needs to amend the OLC and produced amend-
ment proposals. TVO submitted the first four pro-
posals to STUK for approval in 2012. The develop-
ment project will continue at least for the years 
2013 and 2014.
Further development of abnormal and 
emergency operating procedures
The periodic safety assessment required that TVO 
assess the development needs of all the abnormal 
and emergency operating procedures, and prepare 
background and justification materials for the pro-
cedures. STUK required that the strategy and jus-
tification documents and validation of the emer-
gency operating procedures and outage procedures 
be completed during 2012.
During the year, TVO prepared the outage pro-
cedures together with their background and justi-
fication materials. The procedures cover the loss 
of reactor cooling systems necessary during the 
outage, as well as leaks through the bottom of the 
reactor. Some needs for changes were found at the 
review of the procedures, but changes were not yet 
made in 2012. All emergency operating procedures 
were updated and validated using a simulator. The 
work concerning the background materials is not 
yet complete. STUK has overseen the procedure 
development work and advised that TVO should 
pay particular attention to the comprehensiveness 
of the validation of the procedures.
4.2.6 Spent nuclear fuel storage 
and operating waste
STUK inspected, in accordance with the inspection 
programme, the management and final disposal of 
operating waste at the Olkiluoto power plant. The 
2012 review focused on issues such as the organ-
isation and resources, communications at the plant 
and to STUK, and the status of waste manage-
ment projects. No significant deficiencies or needs 
for development were detected in the review. The 
processing, storage and final disposal of low and 
intermediate level waste (operating waste) at the 
Olkiluoto power plant were carried out as planned 
and no significant events in terms of plant or en-
vironmental safety were evident. The volume and 
activity of operating waste in relation to generated 
electrical power remained low compared with most 
other countries. Contributing factors include the 
high quality requirements for nuclear waste man-
agement and nuclear fuel, the planning of main-
tenance and repair operations, decontamination, 
component and process modifications, as well as 
waste monitoring and sorting, which enable some 
of the waste with a very low radioactive substance 
content to be exempted from control. Waste below 
the set activity limits was exempted from control 
at the power plant with STUK’s approval in 2012 
to be processed elsewhere. Waste exempted from 
control included maintenance waste, scrap metal 
and hazardous waste to be processed further, such 
as waste oil. In addition, the power plant employs 
efficient procedures for reducing the volume of 
waste destined for final disposal.
The review concerning the waste repositories 
covered the organisation, communications, proce-
dures and ongoing research status of the operat-
ing waste repository (VLJ repository) as well as 
the maintenance procedures of the concrete and 
rock structures of the repository. An inspection 
visit to the VLJ repository was also included. No 
significant deficiencies were detected in the review. 
STUK presented suggestions for developing the 
content of the VLJ repository’s bedrock monitoring 
research reports.
Expansion of the spent fuel storage
TVO is currently adding three pools to the spent 
fuel storage (KPA storage) at Olkiluoto. At the 
same time, the structures of the storage facility 
will be modified to comply with the current safety 
requirements. The current KPA storage capacity 
in Olkiluoto will be sufficient until 2014, and the 
expansion will increase the capacity for the spent 
fuel coming from the Olkiluoto plant units 1, 2 and 
3.
TVO submitted the documentation regarding 
expansion of the storage to STUK for approval at 
the end of 2009. The extension of the storage is de-
signed to fulfil the current safety requirements, the 
most significant of which are its seismic resistance 
and its ability to withstand the crash of a large air-
craft. At the same time, the structures of the exist-
ing part of the storage will be modified with a view 
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to the current requirements. In conjunction with 
assessing the safety of the expansion, STUK re-
viewed the needs to update the earlier design basis 
and safety analyses, the resources and operational 
methods of TVO’s project organisation, the struc-
tural design basis of the storage, as well as the 
methods with which TVO will ensure the safety of 
the existing storage facilities. Following its reviews, 
STUK found that the storage expansion meets the 
safety requirements. During the construction work, 
STUK will assess, among other things, the design 
basis with regard to aircraft crash resistance and 
the plans regarding annexation of the expansion to 
the storage currently in use.
In 2012, the construction work of the new pools 
continued at the KPA storage expansion site. The 
outer walls and roof of the expansion are com-
plete, and the lining of the pools has begun. STUK 
reviewed the dismantling plans for the end wall 
between the existing facility and the expansion 
as well as the plans for the protective structures 
to be used during the work. STUK has reviewed 
the design basis and implementation plans for air-
plane crash shield constructions. The design and 
construction of structures that fall into the scope 
of construction engineering are overseen by an 
inspection organisation approved by STUK. STUK 
has participated in the oversight and steering of 
the inspection organisation’s work.
Amendment of the operating licence 
conditions for TVO’s operating waste 
repository (VLJ repository)
On 21 September 2011, TVO submitted an applica-
tion to the Government for a amendment of the 
operating licence of the VLJ repository to allow 
the final disposal of the low and intermediate level 
nuclear waste from the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit cur-
rently under construction, and that the repository 
could also be the final destination of radioactive 
sources created by the use of radiation, current-
ly stored in underground facilities. These sources 
have been removed from use as radioactive waste. 
According to the Radiation Act and the Radiation 
Decree, such waste is under the responsibility of 
the state and the management of STUK. At STUK, 
operative responsibility for waste management 
and the regulatory operations concerning waste 
are clearly separated to different units of the or-
ganisation. The licence conditions were also re-
vised with respect to nuclear materials.
STUK prepared a safety assessment for the 
modification of the operating licence of the VLJ 
repository and used the assessment as the basis of 
a favourable statement issued to the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy on 28 June 2012 on 
the modification of the operating licence conditions 
of the Olkiluoto VLJ repository. In its statement, 
STUK stated that the prerequisites for a modifica-
tion of the operating licence of the VLJ repository 
are met and that STUK will specify more detailed 
requirements concerning the management of the 
waste produced at Olkiluoto 3 and the final dispos-
al of the radioactive waste under the responsibility 
of the state in separate decisions.
The Government made a decision on the modi-
fication of the operating licence conditions of the 
Olkiluoto VLJ repository on 22 November 2012.
Provisions for the costs of 
nuclear waste management
In compliance with section 88, subsection 2 of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree, TVO provided the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy with the revised 
and supplemented waste management schemes 
and information on the costs and prices of nuclear 
waste management measures by the end of June. 
The update of the waste management scheme in-
cludes an index adjustment to the cost and price 
information as well as an estimate of the amount 
of nuclear waste at the end of 2012.
STUK reviewed the documents submitted in 
compliance with the Nuclear Energy Decree and 
submitted a statement regarding them to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy. In its 
statements, STUK assessed the technical plans 
and cost estimates on which the financial provision 
is based and considered them to be appropriately 
updated. TVO’s extent of liability is €1,242.3 mil-
lion at the end of 2012.
According to the Nuclear Energy Decree, sup-
plemented waste management schemes for the 
technical and financial plans, as well as the related 
calculations, must be prepared every three years. 
The next revision will take place in 2013.
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4.2.7 Organisational operations 
and quality management
Based on STUK’s oversight and the results of oper-
ating activities, it can be stated that, with a view to 
ensuring safety, TVO’s organisation has operated in 
a systematic and development-oriented way. During 
the year, STUK has focused its oversight activities 
on TVO’s human resources planning, development 
of the modification work process, and the quality 
management competence of the procurement per-
sonnel. One of the particular areas of focus has 
been TVO’s preparations for the commissioning of 
Olkiluoto 3, including the integration of the project 
organisation and management system to the or-
ganisation and management system of the operat-
ing plant units.
TVO did not make any changes relevant to 
safety in its organisation during 2012. TVO has 
prepared office-specific HR plans that take the 
needs of Olkiluoto 3 and Olkiluoto 4 into account. 
Resource plans are based on estimates by supervi-
sors and the plant supplier as well as on TVO’s 
previous experience. STUK observed during the 
review that HR planning is the duty of the supervi-
sors, but the organisation has no unified tools or 
methods for it. Some sections of the organisation 
have limited resources, and the work load of some 
individual employees is large. For example, there 
has been a temporary lack of resources due to per-
sonnel	 changes	 in	 the	 Quality	 and	 Environment	
Office in 2012. STUK required that the develop-
ment of TVO’s HR planning and resource allocation 
procedures be completed by the end of 2012. STUK 
will review the development of the procedures 
in 2013. The Nuclear Energy Act was changed in 
August 2012 with respect to the back-up person-
nel requirements, among other things. STUK re-
quired that TVO take immediate measures to meet 
the requirements of the reformed Nuclear Energy 
Act concerning the back-up personnel for persons 
responsible for emergency and security arrange-
ments.
A functional, reliable and smooth modification 
work process has critical importance for nuclear 
safety. In 2011, STUK required TVO to define how 
the modification work process is measured and to 
particularly develop the quality management and 
procurement procedures as well as the human re-
sourcing. TVO’s development work has seen some 
progress during 2012, but is still incomplete. In 
autumn 2012, TVO had a third party evaluate its 
project operations. The modification work process 
has been described by a working group and in a 
student thesis. Modification work process measure-
ments are being developed.
TVO has continued the preparation of manage-
ment system process descriptions in 2012. STUK 
approved the general part of TVO’s management 
system which contained a written definition and 
description of TVO’s main processes. In spring 
2012, TVO has established a business planning 
section with the purpose of supporting the descrip-
tion and development of TVO’s operating processes, 
among other things. The objective is to unify the 
group’s internal operating methods through the 
group-level development of enterprise resource 
planning.
In 2012, STUK ordered from a third party qual-
ity management specialist an assessment of TVO’s 
procurement operations and supplier evaluation 
procedures. The evaluation results confirmed the 
necessity of the measures required from TVO by 
STUK in 2011, including the improvement and 
further specification of the assessment of suppliers’ 
and subcontractors’ compliance, the definition of 
requirements for the products being procured, com-
munication of the requirements to suppliers, and 
the exchange of information between suppliers and 
their subcontractors. TVO must be able to make 
sure that TVO, the supplier of the product, and 
the subcontractors have an identical view of the 
product requirements and the necessary product 
quality management. STUK also required further 
specifications for the competence management of 
the personnel that conduct supplier audits.
STUK oversaw the oral examinations of shift 
personnel where the shift managers, operators and 
trainee operators prove that they are conversant 
with all salient matters related to plant operation 
and safety. In 2012, STUK granted 22 licences to 
shift managers and operators on application by 
the power company and following a successful 
oral examination, five of them to new operators. 
STUK granted a trainee licence to six trainees in 
the basic operator training programme. The licence 
entitles the holder to supervised practical training 
in the main control room. All participants passed 
their examinations in 2012. The new operators had 
good results in the examination, which is an indi-
rect indication that the basic training programme 
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is effective. The operators renewing their licences 
also had good results in the examination, which, 
for its part, indicates that the power company’s 
refresher and supplementary training is effective.
4.2.8 Fire safety
In 2012, STUK reviewed reports, carried out on-
site inspections, implemented a periodic inspection 
programme, and sent resident inspectors to their 
rounds to oversee the maintenance of the fire pro-
tection systems and arrangements that ensure fire 
safety at the Olkiluoto power plant.
STUK carried out an inspection of the 
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 fire protection systems 
in line with the periodic inspection programme and 
required that the type of cable penetrations in the 
intermediate floor of the relay room and cable com-
partments be confirmed against the requirements 
of the plant’s original fire compartment concept. 
TVO delivered to STUK a report that shows that 
the original requirements set for the penetrations 
are met. TVO has, however, launched the replace-
ment of penetrations of this type in accordance 
with its continuous plant unit safety improvement 
programme. STUK also required that the observa-
tions made at TVO’s own internal fire inspections 
and by third parties (inspection organisations and 
insurance companies) be recorded in a unified 
manner. This requires supplementing the plant 
procedures.
4.2.9 Operating experience feedback
STUK assessed the operating experience feedback 
activities and corrective measures on the basis of 
reports, inspection visits and inspections within 
the periodic inspection programme. There are de-
velopment actions in progress in both the internal 
and external operating experience activities at the 
Olkiluoto power plant.
During the year under review, two INES 1 clas-
sified events took place at the Olkiluoto plant units 
as deficiencies were detected in the functionality 
of main steam isolation valves at both Olkiluoto 1 
and Olkiluoto  2 during the 2012 annual outage. 
For a more detailed description of the events, see 
Appendix 3. During the year, the power company 
prepared one root cause analysis concerning the 
events related to isolations during the annual out-
age. The root cause analysis discusses seven events 
that took place during annual outages 2008–2011. 
The analysis systematically presents the causes 
and corrective measures for individual events, con-
siders potential root causes and defines additional 
measures based on them. The root cause analysis 
has been proven useful. The analysis presents 
several causes that had not been identified in the 
original event reports but had a role in the events. 
The analysis is based on repeated isolation-related 
events, and the effectiveness of the proposed cor-
rective measures will be followed up in future an-
nual outages.
TVO produced five special reports regarding 
the unexpected operational events that occurred in 
2012. For a more detailed description of the events 
discussed in special reports, see Appendix 3. In ad-
dition, TVO produced 13 event reports and three 
operational transient reports, of which eight and 
three were submitted to STUK, respectively.
In the operating experience feedback review, 
STUK verified instructions, procedures and new 
practices related to the feedback operations. 
Despite personnel changes, operations were found 
to be well organised and instructed, and had ad-
equate resources. The operating experience feed-
back team gathers every two weeks. The team 
discusses experience feedback from Finland and 
from abroad as well as the utilisation of the feed-
back in the improvement of operations. Twice a 
year, the team meets together with the represen-
tatives of the management. Expertise has been 
added to the team by including a simulator trainer 
from Olkiluoto 3 and the project’s safety engineer. 
A new procedure has been issued in 2012 on the 
reporting of Olkiluoto 3 events to STUK. Operating 
experience feedback utilises several information 
systems, such as the quality management sys-
tem KELPO and the operating experience system 
OPEX. Operating experience feedback personnel 
have been trained and appointed for the various 
organisational units. They are responsible for mak-
ing sure that the operating experience feedback 
received by the office or unit from the operating 
experience feedback team is processed and that 
measures are taken forward and reported.
The fire that took place during a containment 
leak test carried out at the 2011 annual outage 
of Ringhals 2, as well as the obstructions in the 
containment spray systems of Ringhals 2 and 4 ob-
served during the cleaning and inspections carried 
out after the fire, were identified as issues relevant 
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to Olkiluoto power plant. Five suggestions for 
measures have been recorded in KELPO concern-
ing the fire, two of which have been implemented. 
The implemented measures are an update to the 
tightness test procedure (inspection of the removal 
of flammable materials) and the installation of por-
table fire detectors during annual outages. Work in 
progress includes an update to the hot work plan, 
further specification of the hot work instructions, 
and the measures aimed at the reduction of fire 
load. Instructions to remove flammable materials 
and sources during pressure tests have been added 
to the pressure test procedure for Olkiluoto 3. 
Guarding and records of materials taken into the 
containment will also be organised. Inspections of 
the containment spray systems of Olkiluoto 1 and 
2 have been completed, and no debris was found 
in the pipelines or spray nozzles that could have 
caused potential failure of the spray system when 
needed.
Concerning the events at Olkiluoto plant units, 
STUK saved one new report, one supplement to an 
earlier report and one follow-up report into the op-
erating experience feedback database maintained 
by the IAEA. The new report concerned the frac-
tures found in the valves of the overpressure pro-
tection and residual heat removal system of the re-
actor coolant systems of Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 
2. The supplementing report was prepared on the 
outer steam line isolation valves’ disturbances 
detected at Olkiluoto 1 in 2009, and the follow-up 
report on the repairs and modifications carried out 
for the pipe penetrations of the emergency cooling 
system pump rooms of the Olkiluoto plant units to 
repair the deficiencies reported in 2009.
The IAEA report ‘Highlights from the Inter-
national Reporting System for Operating Experience 
(IRS) for Events 2010–2011’ summarises the IRS re-
port produced for the faults in the control valves of 
the Olkiluoto 314 valves as an example of the chal-
lenges of modification management.
4.2.10 Radiation safety of the plant, 
personnel and the environment
Occupational radiation safety
STUK carried out a radiation protection inspection 
according to the periodic inspection programme at 
the Olkiluoto power plant, focusing on occupation-
al dosimetric surveillance and radiation measure-
ments. Based on the inspection, STUK required 
an account of the procedures used to take care of 
dosimetry in certain emergencies which prevent 
measurements at the plant and required updates 
to the power company’s administrative procedures 
related to personal dosimetry. STUK also required 
that the power company deliver in 2014 to STUK 
for approval a conceptual design plan that discuss-
es the corrective measures to improve the spare 
part situation of the fixed radiation monitors of the 
interim storage for spent fuel.
The dosimeters used for measuring the occupa-
tional radiation doses underwent the annual tests. 
The tests comprised irradiating a sample of dosim-
eters at STUK’s measurement standard laboratory 
and reading the doses at the power plant. The test 
results were acceptable.
STUK carried out targeted radiation protection 
inspections during the annual maintenance at the 
Olkiluoto plant units. In the inspections, STUK 
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Figure 13. Collective occupational doses since the start of operation of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2.
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assessed the radiation protection personnel’s work 
and resources. At the same time, the activities of 
employees in radiation work within the controlled 
area were assessed. Based on the inspections, ra-
diation protection at the plant was found to be at a 
good overall level, and to have adequate resources. 
No significant deficiencies in the employees’ work 
and use of protective equipment were observed 
during the annual outages. The inspections only 
revealed a few deficiencies related to unnecessary 
presence of employees in a radiation work environ-
ment.
Radiation doses
In 2012, the collective occupational radiation dose 
was 0.53 manSv at Olkiluoto 1 and 0.19 manSv 
at Olkiluoto 2. According to the YVL Guide issued 
by STUK, the threshold for one plant unit’s col-
lective dose averaged over two successive years 
is 2.5  manSv per gigawatt of net electrical pow-
er. This means a dose value of 2.20  manSv per 
Olkiluoto plant unit. This threshold was not ex-
ceeded at either plant unit.
The collective occupational radiation dose at 
Olkiluoto was the lowest of any annual outage 
since the first years after the commissioning of the 
plant units. The collective occupational radiation 
doses of employees at the Olkiluoto power plant 
were smaller than the average doses of employees 
working in boiling water reactors in the OECD 
countries.
The occupational radiation doses of nuclear 
power plant workers mostly accumulate in work 
carried out during annual maintenance outages. 
The collective radiation dose of employees due to 
operations during the outage at Olkiluoto 1 was 
0.43 manSv, and the collective radiation dose due 
to operations during the outage at Olkiluoto 2 
was 0.14 manSv. The annual outage of Olkiluoto 1 
was brought forward, but this caused no radiation 
protection problems or higher radiation doses. The 
radiation levels at the turbine plants continued to 
decrease thanks to the new steam dryers that were 
installed in 2005 and 2006.
The highest individual radiation dose accumu-
lated was 6.3 mSv at Olkiluoto 1 and 3.9 mSv at 
Olkiluoto 2. The highest individual dose incurred 
during the annual maintenance outages of both 
plant units was 7.9  mSv. The highest individual 
dose incurred during the year was 9.0  mSv. The 
highest individual radiation doses have been less 
than 10  mSv during the last six years. The ra-
diation doses for nuclear power plant workers were 
below the individual dose limits. The effective dose 
for a worker from radiation work must not exceed 
the 20 manSv/year average over any period of five 
years, or 50 manSv in any one year.
The individual radiation dose distribution of 
workers at the Olkiluoto and Loviisa nuclear pow-
er plants in 2012 is given in Appendix 2.
Radioactive releases and environmental 
radiation monitoring
Radioactive releases into the environment from the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant were well below au-
thorised annual limits in 2012. The releases of no-
ble gases into the air were approximately 1.2 TBq 
(as Kr-87-equivalent activity), which is approxi-
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Figure 14. Annual radiation doses to the most exposed person of the public since the start of operation of 
the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2. Over the recent years, the doses calculated based on the radioactive discharges 
has remained below one percent of the set limit, 0.1 milliSv.
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mately 0.01% of the authorised limit. The releases 
of iodine into the air were approximately 17 MBq 
(as I-131-equivalent activity), which is approxi-
mately 0.02% of the authorised limit. The emis-
sions through the vent stack also included radioac-
tive particulate matter amounting to 16 MBq, tri-
tium amounting to 0.4 TBq and carbon-14 amount-
ing to approximately 0.9 TBq. The tritium content 
of liquid effluents released into the sea, 1.3 TBq, is 
approximately 7% of the annual release limit. The 
total activity of other radionuclides released into 
the sea was 0.2 GBq, which is approximately 0.07% 
of the plant location-specific release limit.
The calculated radiation dose of the most ex-
posed individual in the vicinity of the plant was 
about 0.03 microSv, i.e. less than 0.03% of the set 
limit (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.5c). An average 
person living in Finland receives the equivalent ra-
diation dose from radiation sources in nature and 
in space in about 10 minutes.
STUK approved the environmental radiation 
monitoring programmes of the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant for 2012–2016.
A total of 300 samples were collected and anal-
ysed from the terrestrial and aquatic environment 
surrounding the Olkiluoto power plant during 
2012. External background radiation and the expo-
sure to radioactivity of people in the surroundings 
were also measured regularly. Extremely small 
amounts of radioactive substances originating 
from the nuclear power plant were observed in 
some of the analysed environmental samples. The 
amounts were so small that they are insignificant 
in terms of people’s radiation exposure.
4.2.11 Emergency preparedness
STUK oversees the capability of the emergency 
response organisations of nuclear power plants, 
formed of their operating personnel, to act in ab-
normal situations. No situations requiring emer-
gency response actions occurred at the Olkiluoto 
power plant in 2012.
The preparedness arrangements at the 
Olkiluoto power plant meet the essential require-
ments set for emergency preparedness, but the 
efficiency of the arrangements must be improved 
Table 4. Radioactive nuclides originating from the 
Olkiluoto power plant, found in the environmental 
samples.
Number of environmental samples containing radionuclides 
originating from the NPP in 2012. Figures indicate the number of 
positive samples in a sample group. Several different nuclides may 
be found in the same sample.
Type of sample H-3 Mn-54 Co-60 Total
Air – 2 2 4
Fallout – – 1 1
Seawater 1 – – 1
Aquatic plants – 2 7 9
Perifyton – 2 5 7
Sedimenting materials – 2 15 17
Sediment – – 3 3
Clams – – 1 1
Rainwater 1 – – 1
Dumping ground ditch 
water 
– – 1 1
Total 2 8 35 45
New limits for releases of radioactive 
substances adopted at the Olkiluoto 
power plant at the beginning of 2012
The limits for releases of radioactive substances 
from the Olkiluoto power plant are specified in 
the operational limits and conditions (OLC) ap-
proved by STUK. The limits have been defined at 
a level where the annual radiation dose incurred 
to a person living in the vicinity does not exceed 
0.1 mSv, the limit specified in Government Decree 
733/2008. The limits apply to releases of noble 
gases and iodine into the atmosphere during a 
calendar year, and releases of tritium and other 
substances into the sea during a calendar year. No 
release limits have been set for some released sub-
stances, as their volume remains low and steady 
during normal operation of the power plants, and 
their releases can be controlled based on the radia-
tion dose limit mentioned above.
Provisions were made for the commissioning 
of the new Olkiluoto 3 (OL3) plant unit by lower-
ing the release limits of the operating OL1 and 
OL2 plant units by approximately 50% for noble 
gases and 10% for iodine. Due to the calculation 
method currently in use, the noble gas limit had to 
be lowered more than the iodine limit. The limits 
for releases into the sea from OL1 and OL2 could 
be kept unchanged. Lowering of the limits created 
no difficulty since the noble gas and iodine emis-
sions from the plant have been considerably lower 
than the limits for the entire operating history of 
the plant.
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in the future. STUK’s inspection of the emer-
gency preparedness arrangements of the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant included the inspection of 
preparedness training, drills, equipment and fa-
cilities, alarm arrangements, environmental radia-
tion measurements, weather observations at the 
plant site, and the status of emergency prepared-
ness procedures. Based on the inspection, STUK 
presented requirements concerning the planning 
of the preparedness training, availability of the 
personnel who participate in repairs, resources 
of TVO’s preparedness arrangement organisation, 
development and maintenance of preparedness 
procedures, and the development of the emergency 
log. At the time of the inspection, the investiga-
tions that began following the Fukushima nuclear 
power plant accident were still in progress, and 
they had no immediate impact on the emergency 
preparedness activities during 2012. The prepared-
ness operations required during the operation of 
Olkiluoto 3 will essentially increase the work load 
related to the planning and development of pre-
paredness activities.
The communications between the power plant 
and STUK have been reorganised; the new system 
was tested alongside the old one for a considerable 
time, and taken into use in April. The old system 
was dismantled at the same time. The communica-
tion system was used for contact tests and during 
drills, for example.
An emergency preparedness exercise to test the 
forming of the preparedness organisation, launch 
of operations, and assessment of situations was 
organised at the Olkiluoto power plant in October 
2012. STUK oversaw the exercise at the control 
centre and in the support group. Observations 
were made on matters such as the communica-
tion of these groups and the recording of status 
information, and the communication between the 
leaders of the emergency operations, the leaders 
of rescue operations, and STUK’s emergency per-
sonnel. TVO develops its preparedness plan on 
the basis of feedback from the participants of the 
Olkiluoto exercise.
The power plant’s fire brigade conducts fire 
training in cooperation with the Regional Rescue 
Service of Satakunta. An evacuation drill of the 
entire Olkiluoto 3 construction site was organised 
in January 2012. The drill also involved the rescue 
service and the police. STUK participated in the 
drill as an observer.
The preparedness plan for the power plant was 
updated in the autumn, and the plant delivered it 
to STUK for approval.
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4.3 Regulatory oversight of the 
construction of Olkiluoto 3
4.3.1 Overall safety assessment of Olkiluoto 3
The overall safety assessment of Olkiluoto 3 dis-
cusses the observations made by STUK on the 
basis of a review of plans, the oversight of manu-
facturing, construction and installation operations, 
results of the construction inspection programme 
during construction, oversight of the plant supplier 
and its subcontractors, and experience acquired as 
a result of interactions between STUK, TVO and 
the plant supplier.
Detailed design of the plant systems continued 
in 2012. The licensee delivered to STUK for ap-
proval the nuclear island process system plans 
which need to be approved again after modifica-
tions. Some of the modifications have been made 
as a result of the requirements STUK has imposed 
on systems design, but the majority of modifica-
tions have arisen from the licensee’s and the plant 
supplier’s own change requests. Several updates 
and additions have also been submitted for the 
equipment plans. The quality level of the plans 
has improved from the early years, but some of the 
plans delivered to STUK still lack the necessary 
finishing touches and revisions by the licensee or 
the plant supplier. This conclusion is supported 
by the observations made in connection with the 
inspections carried out as part of the inspection 
programme during construction that unfinished 
plans had been submitted to STUK for approval.
There are open questions regarding the overall 
architecture of I&C design, such as implementa-
tion of the defence-in-depth principle throughout 
the I&C system, the independence of different I&C 
systems from each other, and compliance with the 
failure tolerance criteria. STUK has emphasised to 
the licensee and the plant supplier how important 
it is to settle the open principal questions before 
starting the review of the detailed system design of 
the I&C system.
Construction work at the plant site, excepting 
finalisation work, was already completed in 2011. 
This allowed the launch of extensive equipment 
installation work at the nuclear island, and the 
installation of the reactor coolant system with re-
lated equipment was completed during the same 
year. Grinding of the butt welds of the reactor cool-
ant system did not meet the appropriate quality 
requirements, and the plant supplier has to de-
velop the method used in the periodic inspection of 
welds. The installation of components and pipes of 
the nuclear island did not proceed as expected due 
to challenges such as the surface indications found 
in the formed parts of small bore pipes. All fittings 
not yet installed were inspected, and indications 
removed. The plant supplier is launching a pro-
gramme to replace similar parts that have already 
been installed. STUK oversaw the installation of 
components and pipes and performed inspections. 
STUK made a remark to the plant supplier on 
the scarcity of welding supervision resources and 
required that a detailed welding supervision plan 
be produced for the replacement of the fittings of 
small bore pipes. Based on the experience received 
from construction inspections, STUK has also em-
phasised to the licensee that it must ensure in-
spectability and acceptability of the objects before 
STUK performs an inspection at the plant site or 
at a component manufacturer’s premises.
Most of the electrical equipment and cable 
installations of the nuclear island are completed. 
As plant engineering has proceeded, the number 
of electrical and I&C cables has increased consid-
erably, and the cable trays are extremely full in 
many locations. TVO’s report on the acceptability 
of multi-layer installation of cables is currently be-
ing reviewed by STUK.
Test operation of the components and systems 
of the turbine island began in 2012. The absence 
of operational I&C at the nuclear island prevented 
test operation except for the commissioning of in-
dividual equipment independent of the plant I&C. 
Installation of equipment and pipes of the nuclear 
island is also incomplete, which also prevents the 
commissioning of process systems. Test runs of 
electrical systems, on the other hand, began with 
the help of temporary control automation. STUK 
reviewed the ability of AREVA and TVO to launch 
the commissioning of the nuclear island, and found 
it adequate from an organisational point of view. 
Besides technical trial runs, commissioning also 
includes verification of the organisational capabili-
ties to operate the plant in a safe manner. Safe op-
eration requires, for example, the availability of a 
sufficient number of licensed operators and main-
tenance personnel familiar with the plant. The 
required operating manuals must also be available 
for the plant. The unfinished state of system design 
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has prevented the training simulator at the plant 
from being finalised and the simulator training of 
operators from being started. The production and 
validation of operating manuals has also been de-
layed due to the unfinished state of system design.
At TVO’s request, STUK began the preliminary 
processing of the operating licence application 
documents before the delivery of the actual ap-
plication. The documents submitted for review 
must form a unified whole, and be descriptions 
of the final plant design. The adopted procedure 
balances the work load of the various parties to 
the process as completed thematic sections are 
processed in advance. All the documents that are 
delivered to STUK in connection with an operating 
licence application will be processed by STUK at 
the operating licence stage as a whole, and STUK 
will approve their essential parts before deliver-
ing a safety assessment and a statement on the 
operating licence application to the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy.
Based on the construction-time inspection pro-
gramme and other oversight activities by STUK, 
the methods, operations and adequacy of TVO’s 
organisation has been found to be at a good overall 
level where the commissioning of the plant, for 
example, is concerned. STUK required that TVO 
further specify how it manages the issues that still 
remain open in the various stages of the project, 
and how the causes behind the deviations could 
be analysed in more depth to prevent repeated oc-
currences. STUK also required that TVO establish 
how the efficiency of the processing of functional 
deviations could be improved within the project, 
and which criteria are used to open deviations in 
the audits of the suppliers.
STUK also participated in subcontractor audits 
carried out by the plant supplier and TVO. At the 
beginning of 2012, these auditing operations of the 
contractors active at the plant site was nearly halt-
ed due to the plant supplier’s inadequate resources, 
and TVO had not steered the plant supplier’s op-
erations in this respect. To investigate the matter, 
STUK targeted an additional construction-time in-
spection at the plant supplier’s auditing resources, 
and required on the basis of the inspection that 
corrective measures be taken to restore the on-site 
auditing of contractors back to the appropriate 
level. TVO and the plant supplier immediately 
prepared a comprehensive subcontractor auditing 
plan for 2012 and began audits.
During construction, TVO and the plant sup-
plier have taken into account modification needs 
which have emerged as design of the various areas 
of technology has become more detailed. Defects 
detected in manufacturing and installation have 
either been corrected so that the original quality 
requirements are fulfilled, or it has been demon-
strated by means of additional inspections or anal-
yses that the requirements are fulfilled. The flaws 
in the work of various parties and in product qual-
ity have resulted in additional work to assess and 
rectify the problems. This has had an impact on 
the progress of the project but not on the fulfilment 
of its quality requirements. In summary, based on 
the results of regulatory oversight, STUK is able to 
state that the original safety targets of the plant 
can be achieved.
4.3.2 Design
Plant and system design
STUK continued to review the detailed design of 
process, support and electrical systems. The system 
descriptions of the final process and ventilation 
systems were reviewed during the year. Most of the 
system descriptions were approved, but some must 
still be updated in accordance with the require-
ments of STUK’s decisions before moving on to the 
operating licence stage. TVO also announced that 
the plant supplier is in the process of making addi-
tional plant system modifications that will require 
STUK’s approval.
STUK continued to review the overall architec-
ture of I&C systems. STUK has required that TVO 
and the plant vendor specify unambiguous require-
ments for the design of the overall architecture 
of I&C systems, and that the I&C architecture 
created on the basis of the requirements is de-
scribed. The descriptions of architecture presented 
to STUK will still need to be supplemented with 
respect to the presentation regarding the defence-
in-depth principle as well as with respect to the 
presentation and analysis of connections between 
the I&C systems. In terms of safety, it is important 
to specify unambiguous requirements for the in-
dependence of the various I&C systems involved 
in the architecture, because the I&C systems back 
each other up.
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The qualification of the I&C system platforms 
proceeded during the year. During 2011, STUK 
reviewed the documentation regarding the system 
platform intended for self standing systems. The 
processing of the preliminary materials of the 
system platform intended for safety class 2 I&C 
systems began in 2011 and was completed in 2012. 
The materials that prove the final suitability will 
be delivered during the commissioning stage. The 
materials regarding the system platform intended 
for operational I&C and certain safety class 3 I&C 
systems was reviewed in 2012. With regard to the 
latter system platform, STUK worked together 
with the IRSN (Institut de radioprotection et de 
sûreté nucléaire), which had performed similar in-
spection work for the French authorities.
In 2012, STUK has continued to review the 
design processes of I&C architecture and systems 
and required further specifications and changes 
to these, particularly with regard to the test field 
and commissioning stages and the documents to be 
delivered to STUK.
Failure analyses of the plant 
and system design
In 2011, STUK reviewed the updated common 
mode failure analysis concerning the mutual in-
dependence of the plant’s systems and equipment. 
In its decision, STUK required that the analysis be 
further specified so that implementation of the di-
versity principle in the plant’s safety functions can 
be verified. Updated analyses were not delivered to 
STUK for review in 2012.
In 2011, STUK required TVO to investigate 
further and account for the impacts of the failures 
and malfunctions of I&C systems of lower safety 
classes on the electrical systems and other func-
tions of higher safety classes. These accounts were 
not submitted to STUK by the end of 2012.
The definition of I&C system failure criteria, 
particularly for software failures, has constituted 
a third safety-critical matter concerning failure 
analyses. STUK has required that the realisation 
of the requirements for independence and failure 
criteria be demonstrated by means of analyses. 
Accounts of the analysis methods or actual analy-
ses were not delivered to STUK in 2012.
In 2012, STUK received the failure mode and ef-
fect analyses of the process and electrical systems 
for processing. Several deficiencies were found in 
the process system analysis reports; as a result, 
only a few of them were reviewed, and the process-
ing of the rest was interrupted until updated ver-
sions are received.
Transient and accident analyses
The review of the methodology reports of the tran-
sient and accident analyses for the Olkiluoto 3 fi-
nal safety analysis report began in autumn 2012. 
Preliminary findings were processed together with 
TVO and AREVA in work meetings at the end of 
the year. The actual analyses have also been deliv-
ered to STUK unofficially.
In 2011, documents submitted for review in-
cluded an updated analysis of overpressure protec-
tion during power operation and an updated analy-
sis of the behaviour of the plant unit in the case of 
an interruption of the regular power supply from 
the national grid, with power supplied through an 
external emergency connection. The review was 
completed early in 2012, and STUK found no cause 
for remarks in the analysis reports.
Probabilistic risk analyses
The review of the probabilistic risk analyses (PRA) 
of Olkiluoto 3 focused in 2012 on ensuring the ac-
tualisation of the fundamental design principles in 
the detailed design materials of systems and con-
structions (including I&C architecture, system de-
scriptions, topical reports and failure analyses). In 
addition, the aim has been to ensure that sufficient 
precautions are in place regarding localised events 
(internal fires and flooding) and external events. 
Updates are expected for the materials delivered 
for information purposes, as detailed design, par-
ticularly that of I&C systems, is still in progress.
Due to the unfinished state of the I&C design, 
the assessment of the overall reliability of I&C re-
quested by STUK has not yet been submitted.
Radiation safety
A radiation protection inspection included in the 
construction-time inspection programme was car-
ried out in 2012. The inspection paid attention to 
the radiation safety of the upcoming test operation 
of the plant unit, the licensee’s radiation protec-
tion functions and purchases, radiation protection 
training of the personnel, the radiation protection 
procedures required of the licensee, radiation level 
measurements of the plant unit during test opera-
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tion, and the status of radiological safety analyses. 
Three requirements were issued on the basis of the 
inspection; these concerned supplementing the sys-
tem descriptions with information of the radiation 
measurement instruments which are the licensee’s 
responsibility, planning of training and induction 
for the temporary radiation protection personnel 
that will be involved in the commissioning of the 
plant unit, and an assessment of the updating and 
development needs of the licensee’s radiation pro-
tection procedures with regard to the processing of 
the operating licence application.
In connection with the suitability assessment 
of electrical and I&C equipment, STUK also re-
viewed fulfilment of the requirements regarding 
the radiation resistance of equipment in normal 
use and during accident situations. STUK also 
took part in the factory testing of the components 
of the Olkiluoto 3 radiation measurement systems 
in 2012. At the licensee’s request, the deadlines for 
updating several radiation measurement system 
materials were postponed in 2012.
Fire safety at the plant
STUK reviewed the updated structural fire hazard 
analyses (FHA) of the plant with the purpose of 
demonstrating the adequacy of the fire compart-
ment structures and penetration seals. In addi-
tion to the structural fire hazard analyses, STUK 
reviewed updated fire hazard functional analyses 
(FHFA) showing the potential impact of fires on 
the safety functions of the plant. After cable routes 
are confirmed for the final plant design, STUK will 
verify that the corresponding analyses are up to 
date and requires that the plant’s defence-in-depth 
be confirmed with appropriate sensitivity analyses 
which assume the deterioration of fire protection 
measures, including the inoperability of the fire 
dampers installed at the plant.
VTT completed its fire safety investigations re-
garding the fire-retardant power and I&C cables to 
be installed at Olkiluoto 3, and produced a summa-
ry report in 2011. The properties of the cable types 
presented by the plant supplier were assessed 
from the point of view of fire safety and found to be 
appropriate regarding the general fire protection 
arrangements of the plant. STUK is still waiting 
for the licensee’s account regarding demonstration 
of the sufficiency of fire protection in certain cable 
rooms and routes. As the cable types and volumes 
of the nuclear power plant are confirmed, the 
comprehensiveness of VTT’s investigations will be 
verified. STUK will then require further investiga-
tions and accounts for those cable types that were 
not investigated by VTT, if necessary. Following 
these additional investigations, STUK will make 
an overall assessment of the acceptability of the 
fire risk carried by cables.
STUK continued the assessment of the flood 
risk arising from a potential rupture in the fire 
water pipeline in the annulus space between the 
inner and outer containment walls. To be able to 
confirm the adequacy of the by-pass line and valve 
arrangement planned for the fire water pipeline to 
limit leakages in order to reduce the risk of flood, 
risk assessment must be updated and adequate 
first-aid fire extinguishing capacity confirmed. 
STUK will perform an overall assessment of the 
acceptability of the annulus flooding risk on the 
basis of PRA level 1 and 2 risk assessments.
Design of components and structures
STUK continued the review of detailed plans for 
safety class 2 components and structures in 2012. 
The key objects of this review were the construc-
tion and work plans of steel structures, as well as 
the construction plans of mechanical equipment 
and their updates. STUK has also reviewed and 
approved containment testing plans related to the 
commissioning of the nuclear power plant unit.
STUK has reviewed and approved nearly all 
construction plans of safety-classified concrete 
structures. The plans for steel linings of the fuel 
pools have been approved for the most part. A 
major part of the planning documentation of steel 
platforms, originally only intended for use as main-
tenance platforms, has also been reviewed. The 
safety importance of the steel platforms has in-
creased because process pipelines and equipment 
important to safety will be supported on them in 
deviation from the original plans. This applies to 
about 150 different steel platforms. In accordance 
with a procedure approved by STUK, steel plat-
forms have been used for component installation 
purposes after construction inspections done in 
stages. The fulfilment of the requirements set by 
plant operation will be confirmed before the final 
commissioning of the steel platforms. STUK has 
paid inspection visits to the site and verified that 
TVO’s inspections have progressed in line with the 
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In autumn 2011, Areva carried out examina-
tions of the formed parts of small pipes. The ex-
amination was targeted at formed parts that were 
manufactured from one nozzle material batch and 
in which surface indications had been observed. 
Based on the examinations, it was stated that 
surface indications are possible in the entire batch. 
It was also found that the manufacturer’s process 
produces faulty T pieces. The problems concerned a 
total of 10,612 formed pieces, of which 7,411 were 
already installed.
When the extent of the problems was revealed, 
Areva halted pipe installations that involved 
formed pieces from the batch in question or other 
T pieces from the same manufacturer in February. 
More detailed surveys showed that the high in-
clusion rate in the material batch in question, 
together with the cold-moulding method used by 
the manufacturer, led to the creation of surface 
indications. All uninstalled formed pieces were 
inspected and indications removed, after which 
the pieces were inspected again. The installed 
pipe parts’ impact on nuclear safety, operability, 
the dispersion of radioactive materials, safety of 
pressure equipment and fire safety was analysed. 
Replacement needs for each target were assessed 
on the basis of the analysis. The deviation reports 
and replacement plans were delivered to STUK for 
approval at the end of 2012, and were approved. It 
was found that 1,560 installed pipe parts, approxi-
mately 25 per cent of installed formed pieces, had 
to be replaced.
approved procedure. STUK will review the final de-
sign documentation of steel platforms before start-
ing its own commissioning inspections where fulfil-
ment of the requirements will be finally verified.
During 2012, STUK continued the review of 
final strength analyses of the main components 
of the reactor coolant system. STUK was provided 
with supplementary and modification documenta-
tion on the strength analyses where the modifica-
tions made during manufacture had been taken 
into account. The basic inspection plans of periodic 
inspections, periodic inspection programmes and 
qualification documentation concerning inspection 
systems compliant with Guide YVL 3.8 regarding 
pressure vessels, heat exchangers, pumps, valves 
and pipelines continued in 2012.
Design of the nuclear island pipelines also con-
tinued in 2012. Calculations of pipeline support 
structures and pipeline stress analyses as well as 
construction plans and construction plan updates 
concerning Safety Class 1 and 2 components were 
submitted to STUK for review. The amount of re-
view work carried out by STUK in 2012 remained 
high due to the large amount of design modifica-
tion documentation.
The design of the I&C of the fuel handling 
systems and safety class 3 cranes continued in 
2012. Example materials of one lifting device in 
accordance with the requirements was submit-
ted to STUK for review and approved with minor 
changes. The design documentation of electrical 
and I&C systems of safety class 3 equipment must 
be approved and the equipment tested before use, 
but some of the cranes have been used for installa-
tion work at the Olkiluoto 3 site before these mea-
sures. However, approval of the design and tests is 
a prerequisite for the final commissioning of lifting 
and transfer equipment before fuel is loaded in the 
reactor.
4.3.3 Construction
Except for some final touches, the construction 
work of the Olkiluoto  3 buildings is completed. 
STUK oversaw and inspected grouting, anchoring 
and injection work related to component installa-
tions, as well as the installation of steel platforms.
The procedures to determine readiness to start 
concrete casting, post-tensioning and grouting 
have proven to function well. These procedures 
have served to ensure that the plant supplier and 
TVO have reviewed and approved the plans for the 
structures and the work to be carried out before 
STUK is requested to give permission to start the 
work.
4.3.4 Manufacturing of components and pipes
Manufacturing of Olkiluoto  3 components and 
pipes continued in 2012. STUK oversaw and in-
spected the manufacture of safety class 1 and 2 
pipelines, tanks, heat exchangers, pumps, valves 
and steel structures. STUK also oversaw and in-
spected the manufacture of fuel handling equip-
ment as well as the emergency diesel generators 
and their auxiliary equipment.
With regard to the reactor coolant system com-
ponents, the factory testing of the control rod drive 
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mechanisms revealed scratching on the inner sur-
faces of the guide tubes. Two mechanisms were 
subjected to additional testing required by STUK. 
In the additional testing, the scratching was as-
sessed to be insignificant.
STUK’s construction inspections, intended to 
ensure that the manufacture of components com-
plies with requirements, still revealed issues pre-
venting the inspections from being carried out 
as planned. The most serious of these issues con-
cerned the equipment’s readiness for inspection 
and open issues related to construction plans. As 
early as 2008, STUK required TVO and the plant 
supplier to ensure before the inspections that 
the prerequisites for construction inspection exist. 
TVO and the plant supplier have changed their 
supervision and inspection procedures with the 
aim of ensuring readiness for inspection prior to 
STUK’s inspections.
The manufacture of auxiliary equipment for the 
emergency diesel generators continued in 2012. 
Changes to the piping design delayed the manufac-
ture and installation of prefabricated pipes of the 
diesel facility. Problems of the design and manufac-
ture of the auxiliary equipment have continued to 
delay the installation work in the diesel buildings 
in 2012.
4.3.5 Installation work
The main components of the plant unit’s reactor 
coolant system were installed in 2011. The installa-
tion of the reactor pressure vessel internals contin-
ued in 2012. The reactor’s control rod drive mecha-
nisms were delivered to Olkiluoto at the end of 
2011, and the installation of their pressure frames 
began in early 2012. During installation, problems 
were detected with the seals of the pressure frames, 
and the installation work had to be interrupted. 
After a change made to the tolerance range of the 
seal dimensions, the seals functioned as required.
Appropriate quality requirements were not 
complied with when grinding the butt welds of the 
reactor coolant system pipes, which means that the 
roughness of the surface profile will, among other 
things, make future periodic inspections more dif-
ficult. The suitability of the joints for periodic 
inspections will be verified during 2013 after the 
qualification of an appropriate inspection method.
Welding work on the lining sheets of the reac-
tor building and fuel building pools continued 
throughout the year. Some of the pools were com-
pleted and filled with water for leak testing. STUK 
oversaw the tests and found the results accept-
able. The installation of sump filters in the in-
containment refuelling water storage tank began 
in the spring and continued for the rest of the year. 
Repairs of factory welds and inspections were also 
carried out on the filters.
Installation of pipes and supports in the nu-
clear island continued with reduced capacity due 
to problems observed in the formed parts of small 
bore pipes. STUK has followed the progress of pipe 
installations and the adequacy and level of super-
visory activities by the licensee, plant supplier and 
the plant supplier’s subcontractors. In 2012, STUK 
paid attention to issues such as the plant supplier’s 
HR resources in the supervision of welding, and 
required that the supervision plan that had been 
presented to STUK be complied with.
STUK has discovered many different deficien-
cies in the construction inspections and pressure 
tests of the installed pipelines. The repairs of these 
deficiencies have slowed down the inspections and, 
as a whole, STUK has spent a lot of oversight re-
sources on the inspection when compared to the re-
sults achieved. The plant supplier and the licensee 
have changed their testing procedures based on 
feedback from STUK.
Installation work on the electrical equip-
ment and cabling continued at the nuclear island 
throughout 2012. Approximately 85% of the nucle-
ar island cables had been installed by the end of 
2012. Almost all low and medium voltage switch-
gears and distribution and regulating transform-
ers have been installed. Most of the other electri-
cal equipment (rectifiers, batteries, inverters and 
converters) have been installed. Cable connection 
work has also been in progress throughout 2012. 
STUK has overseen the installation of the electri-
cal equipment.
The installation of containment cable penetra-
tions continued in 2012, and a total of 60 pen-
etrations had been installed by the end of October 
2012. The total number of containment cable pen-
etrations at Olkiluoto 3 is 83.
The low-voltage cable trays in the plant’s main 
cable routes are rather full, which is why it has 
been necessary to make the trays wider or install 
parallel trays, and reconsider the dimensioning 
of certain cables. Most of this work has been com-
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pleted in 2012. In December 2012, TVO delivered 
to STUK an account of the acceptability of multi-
layer cable installations. The report supplements 
the cable dimensioning report already approved by 
STUK. STUK will decide the matter in early 2013.
STUK inspected TVO’s installation supervision 
in several inspections carried out in accordance 
with the inspection programme during construc-
tion in order to ensure the adequacy of TVO’s su-
pervision procedures. Adherence to the approved 
instructions and procedures was monitored during 
daily inspection rounds. STUK also participated 
in quality audits of subcontractors carried out by 
the plant supplier and TVO at the plant site. No 
significant deviations were observed.
4.3.6 Commissioning
Commissioning of buildings and structures
Commissioning inspections of the building struc-
tures began in 2011, and continued in accordance 
with the procedures approved by STUK. STUK 
made on-site inspection visits to oversee the com-
missioning inspections carried out by TVO and the 
plant supplier. After this, STUK has carried out its 
own commissioning inspection of structural enti-
ties to verify the quality assurance records made 
by the licensee and to close the potential deviations 
in structures inspected during construction. STUK 
performed, among other inspections, the commis-
sioning inspection of cooling water inlet and dis-
charge tunnels. After the approval of the inspec-
tions, the tunnels were flooded. STUK has not yet 
begun building-specific commissioning inspections.
Test operation of equipment and systems
Test operation of the components and systems of 
the turbine island began in 2012. The absence of 
operational I&C of the nuclear island prevents 
test operations on any large scale. Installation of 
equipment and pipes of the nuclear island is also 
incomplete, which also prevents the commission-
ing of process systems. In other respects, TVO and 
the plant supplier would be prepared to begin the 
test operation of the nuclear island (the neces-
sary personnel, information management systems, 
procedures, etc.). In February, STUK reviewed the 
organisational capacity of TVO and the plant sup-
plier to begin test operation of the nuclear island, 
and found no obstacles.
Commissioning tests have been performed on 
some self standing systems of the nuclear island 
that do not require the plant’s operational I&C, 
such as some filter changing equipment. To allow 
the launch of test operation of electrical systems, 
the plant supplier has brought temporary I&C 
cubicles to the plant site for controlling the nuclear 
island’s electrical systems. Test operation of the 
electrical systems has begun.
STUK has performed several dozens of com-
missioning inspections for the pressure equipment 
of the turbine island and opened commissioning 
records for them. The pressure equipment will be 
later added to the pressure equipment register.
STUK oversaw the commissioning tests at the 
plant site, including the testing of circulating wa-
ter pumps at the turbine island and the commis-
sioning of the temporary I&C cubicles used for con-
trolling the electrical systems of the nuclear island. 
Commissioning operations were found appropriate, 
but there has been some delay in the completion 
of the test operation result reports. STUK has 
advised TVO to pay attention to the matter and to 
emphasise to the plant supplier that reports must 
be produced without delay after the test.
Due to the delay of operational I&C, the plant 
supplier has developed a temporary control system 
that allows the commissioning testing of systems 
needed for the containment pressure and tightness 
test. Some of the tests will be repeated after the 
installation of the final operational I&C. In a meet-
ing held in December 2012, TVO and the plant sup-
plier explained to STUK the use of the temporary 
control system for the pressure and tightness test 
and for the preparation of testing. STUK saw no 
obstacles to proceeding according to the plan.
Review of test operation plans is an important 
element of STUK’s oversight work. STUK has ap-
proved all the turbine island test plans that need 
STUK’s approval. Some of the nuclear island test 
operation programmes are yet to be approved, 
and changes may be necessary to the ones already 
approved due to open I&C issues. STUK received 
from TVO an account of the role of the process 
system testing programmes in the testing of I&C 
functions. The account described well the testing 
of plant control functions, but the relation of the 
process system testing programmes to the test-
ing of I&C interfaces or fault situations remained 
unclear. STUK required that TVO submit an ad-
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operating phase. The organisation of the prepara-
tions was considered at a general level, and more 
detailed accounts were made of the preparation of 
plant procedures, planning of outage operations, 
and the status of the information systems needed 
during production operations. As a result of the 
inspection, STUK required that TVO ensure that 
the administration of the preparations for the op-
erating phase meet the objectives set for it. TVO 
assessed the situation and added more detail to 
the project plan to be used when preparing for the 
operating phase.
The preparation of plant procedures and the op-
erational limits and conditions, as well as the vali-
dation of the procedures, the control room and the 
operating interfaces, has been delayed due to the 
delays in the I&C design. During the year, STUK 
received hardly any materials concerning these 
subject areas. STUK has already required that 
more detail be added to the operating procedure 
validation plan and that detailed validation plans 
be produced for certain areas of the procedures, 
and for the main control room and interfaces. The 
plans were not delivered to STUK during the year.
4.3.7 Review of documents related to the 
operating licence application
STUK has agreed with TVO that STUK may re-
view parts of the operating licence application 
documents before the delivery of the actual oper-
ating licence application. The adopted procedure 
balances the work load of the various parties to 
the process as completed thematic sections are pro-
cessed in advance. The documents submitted for 
advance processing must form a unified whole, and 
be descriptions of the final plant design. As a result 
of the advance inspection, STUK presents a deci-
sion including potential observations and requests 
for further accounts. The advance review also func-
tions as practice to the review procedures planned 
for the operating licensing stage. All the documents 
that are delivered to STUK in connection with an 
operating licence application will be reviewed by 
STUK at the operating licence stage as a whole, 
and STUK will approve their essential parts before 
delivering a safety assessment and a statement on 
the operating licence application to the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy.
The advance processing of the operating licence 
application documents began with the review of 
ditional account of the matter. No account was 
received in 2012.
The joint operating organisation of TVO and 
the plant supplier, used during commissioning, has 
been strengthened during the year. Each shift in-
cludes TVO’s operator trainees and plant supplier’s 
personnel. The work of the shifts is supported by 
operating information releases and a list of targets 
to be regularly inspected at the plant. TVO has 
adopted an electronic operating log. The controls 
required by the turbine island test operation are 
performed from the temporary control room of the 
turbine island. At the nuclear island, the control of 
the I&C cubicles is arranged at the main control 
room. The work permit office is also located in the 
main control room. STUK inspected control room 
operations in the construction-time inspection pro-
gramme’s I&C inspection in April. Control room 
operations were found to be competent and well 
organised.
Regular weekly reporting of the progress of test 
operations to STUK began in February. The reports 
list all the commissioning tests and inspections 
performed during the week as well as any sig-
nificant events, fault observations and deviations. 
Exact test operations schedules for the following 
two weeks are attached to each report.
Preparations for future 
operation of the plant unit
Besides technical test runs, commissioning also in-
cludes verification of the organisation’s capability 
to operate the plant in a safe manner. The pre-
requisites of safe operation include an adequate 
number of licensed operators and the necessary 
plant documentation, such as procedures and the 
operational limits and conditions.
Operator trainees have not yet been able to 
receive the required simulator training, as the 
simulator does not yet correspond to the final plant 
design because I&C design is not complete. STUK 
reviewed the training of operators in a construc-
tion-time inspection in March 2012. Based on the 
inspection, STUK required that TVO produce a 
plan on how TVO will approve the simulator for 
training while the current situation prevails. TVO 
has applied for postponement of the deadline for 
the plan until the end of March 2013.
The construction-time inspection carried out in 
March also considered TVO’s preparations for the 
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Quality management
TVO’s	 independent	 quality	 assurance	 (QA)	 unit	
monitors the quality of the Olkiluoto 3 project and 
its management by processing any product devia-
tions, audit results, and critical or significant de-
viations observed in the operations of the plant 
supplier and its subcontractors, as well as by re-
cording into statistics and analysing information 
pertaining to the causes of the deviations. STUK 
approves the closing of significant deviations based 
on applications by the licensee, and appropriate 
closure of all deviations pertaining to the inspec-
tion target is confirmed during commissioning in-
spections. In 2012, TVO carried out internal audits 
of the OL3 project according to plans. Operations 
of the subcontractors active on the site were also 
systematically audited after STUK targeted an ad-
ditional inspection at the operation and resources 
of the Areva OL3 project quality management at 
the beginning of the year based on observations 
made in earlier inspections.
STUK found that the OL3 audit procedures 
contained contradictory requirements concern-
ing the processing of recommendations. Generally 
only significant observations that are clearly non-
compliant with requirements are classified as de-
viations. Observations that are classified as recom-
mendations are more problematic, as these do not 
require immediate corrective measures. Each case 
is assessed individually, and no clear procedure ex-
ists for them.
Another concern in the OL3 project was the 
high number of open issues, and the postponement 
of their solving to the commissioning and operating 
licence phases. STUK has emphasised in several 
connections that TVO should develop the manage-
ment of open issues as a whole, taking the different 
phases of the project into account.
Safety culture
TVO has been systematically developing and intro-
ducing procedures related to the development and 
monitoring of safety culture at the OL3 site since 
2008. The safety culture report is published twice 
a year, most recently in July 2012. Based on the re-
port, all areas show improvement since 2009. The 
only report indicator that has gone down is compli-
ance with regulations and instructions.
the methodology reports and radiological analyses 
presented in chapter 15 of the final safety analysis 
report. The materials were delivered to STUK in 
late summer, and three working meetings were or-
ganised at STUK in November and December with 
AREVA presenting the contents of the documents. 
At the meetings, review observations presented by 
STUK in advance were discussed, together with 
open comments to the preliminary safety analysis 
report. Tables for the follow-up of STUK’s inspec-
tion comments were produced at the meetings and 
will be officially delivered to TVO in a letter.
4.3.8 Organisational operations 
and quality management
Functionality of the management system
The management system of the OL3 project is a 
part of TVO’s management system, which means 
that a considerable part of it concerns the OL3 
project. In 2011, TVO carried out an independent 
assessment of the menegement system’s confor-
mity, performance and effectiveness targeted at 
the OL3 project management system. Operations 
improved in 2012 on the basis of the assessment; 
for example, the OL3 project synchronised its an-
nual planning with the operating plant units. The 
management system of the OL3 project has been 
comprehensively defined and works with adequate 
efficiency according to the assessment. The trans-
fer to the operating organisation and management 
system will constitute a challenge. At the final 
stages of the project, the division of authorisations 
and responsibilities between the responsible man-
ager of the nuclear facility and the project manage-
ment must be clear.
STUK inspected the measures carried out on 
the basis of the assessment and paid attention 
to the fact that many sections of the assessment 
report have not yet been acted upon. The report 
states that it is not clear in all cases which pro-
cedure or system should be implemented, and 
that the structure of the procedures is not clear to 
the users. Responsibility for familiarisation of the 
employees with the procedures has been given to 
supervisors, who should see to proper training, but 
no measures have been taken to clarify the proce-
dures.
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In the construction-time inspection of project 
management and the management of safety car-
ried out in 2012 STUK interviewed the manage-
ment of TVO for their views of the safety culture 
and its development within the OL3 project. The 
safety culture of the OL3 project was generally con-
sidered to have developed in a good direction, even 
though no existing models were available for it; in-
stead, new procedures had been created for the de-
velopment and measurement of the safety culture. 
As an example of the improvements, it was pointed 
out in the interviews that general orderliness and 
tidiness of the employees has improved. The plant 
supplier has also worked to improve the safety cul-
ture of its subcontractors. The biggest threat in the 
development of safety culture was considered to 
be the performance of token measures that use up 
resources and may deteriorate the credibility of the 
safety culture but do not actually improve safety. A 
wide and unified understanding of what is impor-
tant for safety was considered the most important 
factor in the promotion of safety culture.
Leadership and project management
The OL3 project does not include the distinctive 
features of a project in all respects. The scheduling, 
resourcing and organisation of the operations has 
been difficult to manage. STUK believes that con-
tractual difficulties have been reflected in decision-
making. Challenges also include the combining 
of the project’s and line organisation’s resources. 
STUK has paid attention to the need for strong 
management and decision-making based on key 
indicators. The management should go through the 
assessments and reports concerning the operations 
and learn from them.
Personnel, competence and the 
adequacy of resources
The total number of personnel working at the 
Olkiluoto 3 project site towards the end of 2012 
was about 3,400, of which about 3,100 were in the 
plant supplier’s site organisation and about 350 in 
TVO’s project organisation. TVO’s project organisa-
tion consists of in-house project personnel (about 
65), TVO’s line organisation personnel (about 80) 
and consultants (about 200).
During the year, STUK reviewed the planning 
and targeting of the TVO’s human resources, 
maintenance and development of the personnel’s 
competence, and supervisory procedures. Concerns 
included the maintenance of motivation during 
the prolonged project and the feasibility of the 
HR management considering the controlled 
disassembly of the OL3 project organisation.
Procurement
When the problems with products and materials 
have been investigated, deficiencies in the manage-
ment of procurement chains and networks have 
been revealed. For example, the quality issues re-
lated to the delivery of pipe sections concerned the 
management of the delivery chain and the relay-
ing of requirements in the long delivery chain, as 
well as the supervision and inspection of deliveries. 
STUK has required that TVO develop its supplier 
supervision and control procedures. TVO must en-
sure that the delivery chain complies with the YVL 
Guides, the latest approved project specifications, 
and the quality plans.
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4.4 Preparation for new projects
In 2008 and 2009, Teollisuuden Voima (TVO), 
Fortum and Fennovoima (FV) applied for the 
Government’s decisions-in-principle regarding 
the construction of new nuclear power plant units 
in Finland. The decision-in-principle process in-
cludes STUK’s preliminary safety assessment in 
compliance with the Nuclear Energy Act. STUK 
completed this assessment in October 2009 when 
the preliminary safety assessment concerning 
Fennovoima was submitted to the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy. The Government 
rejected Fortum’s application and made on 6 May 
2010 positive decisions-in-principle regarding 
TVO’s and Fennovoima’s new plant units. In its 
decision regarding Fennovoima, the Government 
reduced the number of possible plant units from 
two to one. At the same time, the Government is-
sued a positive decision-in-principle to Posiva re-
garding the final disposal of spent fuel from TVO’s 
new nuclear power plant unit. The Parliament 
ratified the Government’s decisions-in-principle 
before its summer recess on 1 July 2010. Following 
the Government’s decision-in-principle process, 
Fortum ended its Loviisa 3 project.
The next licensing phase prescribed in the 
Nuclear Energy Act for new nuclear power plant 
units will be the construction licence phase. In its 
decision-in-principle, the Government ordered that 
the power companies must apply for the permit 
prescribed in the Nuclear Energy Act for initiat-
ing the construction of the nuclear power plant 
unit (construction licence) within five years from 
Parliament’s decision to uphold the decision-in-
principle (2015). However, before the construction 
licence phase, STUK assessed the safety-related 
sections of TVO’s and Fennovoima’s invitations 
to tender in compliance with Section 2.2 of Guide 
YVL 1.1 during 2011.
STUK has established an oversight project 
(VALVE) in preparation for the construction li-
cence application processing phase of Olkiluoto 
4 and Fennovoima’s Hanhikivi 1 nuclear power 
plant units. In its preparatory project, STUK col-
lected, classified and analysed experience from the 
Olkiluoto 3 oversight project in 2011. In addition 
to analysing written documentation, the managers 
of projects and sub-projects participating in the 
oversight project were interviewed. The experi-
ence gained will be utilised when preparing for 
new projects. Requirements management meetings 
with power companies have also been launched 
within the VALVE project in 2012 to discuss the 
requirements management processes and require-
ments set for the management of the requirements 
of the companies and STUK.
STUK continued to work closely with the pow-
er companies regarding the design capabilities, 
suitability and locations of plant alternatives. In 
these meetings, STUK was presented with the 
preparations of power companies for the projects, 
and STUK presented observations regarding the 
organisational capabilities of the power companies. 
STUK also participated in the power companies’ 
meetings assessing the suitability of plant alterna-
tives, where the impact of Finnish nuclear safety 
requirements on the planning for plant alterna-
tives was discussed.
STUK continued the examination of the de-
sign basis concerning the Fennovoima plant site, 
Hanhikivi, and participated in the second, larger 
public assembly organised at the invitation of 
the municipality of Pyhäjoki and the local press. 
At the assembly, STUK discussed radiation and 
nuclear safety. STUK has also participated in 
various seminars for the authorities concerning 
the permit processes of regional authorities and 
the Centre for Economic Development, Transport 
and the Environment (ELY Centre) as well as the 
launch of safety and preparedness planning with 
local authorities.
Fennovoima’s preliminary plans for meteoro-
logical measurements at the plant site, surveys of 
the basic radiation in the environment, and the en-
vironmental radiation safety analyses to be carried 
out at the project’s construction licence phase were 
discussed in subject-specific meetings.
As a part of international cooperation of the 
authorities, STUK has participated in an OECD/
NEA working group for the exchange of experi-
ences of new nuclear power plant projects between 
the authorities of different countries. The working 
group has also produced comparative surveys of the 
various official operations within the construction 
projects. In 2012, STUK participated in the gather-
ing of information for a survey concerning evalu-
ation operations in the construction licence phase 
by reporting to the working group the scope and re-
sourcing of the safety assessment carried out in the 
construction licence phase of the Olkiluoto 3 project.
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4.5 Research reactor
VTT’s FiR 1 research reactor was commissioned in 
1962. The reactor was built for research and educa-
tional purposes and for producing isotopes. The re-
actor underwent considerable modifications in the 
1990s, and in 1999, the use of the reactor for the 
boron neutron capture therapy (BNCT) of cancers 
in the head and neck area began. BNCT treatment 
and the related research became the reactor’s most 
important use in the 2000s.
The Government renewed the reactor’s operat-
ing licence in 2011, and the new licence period of 
the FiR 1 research reactor, extending to 2023, be-
gan at the beginning of 2012. The operation of the 
reactor was greatly affected by the bankruptcy of 
Boneca Oy, which had been responsible for the or-
ganisation of the BNCT operations. Only a few ra-
diotherapy sessions could be organised in the first 
part of the year. The production of isotopes con-
tinued as usual, and basic training was provided 
to Finnish and Swedish university students. The 
number of operating days remained under 100.
VTT decided to end the reactor operation and 
to decommission it for financial reasons. The reac-
tor is still to be operated while decommissioning 
plans are being detailed and approval of authori-
ties is applied for. The environmental impact of the 
decommissioning must be assessed in accordance 
with the environmental impact assessment regula-
tions before approval can be obtained.
STUK’s safety assessment prepared in con-
nection with the renewal of the operating licence 
included some issues that required immediate 
follow-up; these were reviewed in 2012. In addi-
tion to the safe operation of the reactor, STUK paid 
particular attention to safety management, more 
specific planning of decommissioning with respect 
to nuclear waste management, and to the develop-
ment of physical protection.
During the year under review, STUK carried 
out inspections on the operational safety, physical 
protection, nuclear safeguards, nuclear waste man-
agement and radiation protection in accordance 
with the oversight plan for the FiR 1 reactor. The 
inspection of emergency preparedness operations 
was postponed to 2013.
STUK approved the reactor’s new responsible 
manager and the deputy. In November, an ex-
amination of operators was organised at the FiR 1 
reactor. STUK issued an approval for 2013–2016 
to two operators on the basis of the results of the 
examination.
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5 Regulatory oversight of the spent 
nuclear fuel disposal project
In 2001, Parliament ratified the decision-in-prin-
ciple issued by the Government the year before to 
the effect that the final disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel from the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs in the 
bedrock at Olkiluoto is in line with the overall good 
of society. The decision-in-principle states that the 
spent nuclear fuel disposal project may proceed 
to the construction of an underground research 
facility and more detailed investigation. With this 
statement, the Government indicated how far the 
implementation of the final disposal project may 
proceed pursuant to the decision-in-principle, tak-
ing into account that the underground research 
facility, Onkalo, referred to in the decision-in-prin-
ciple is designed to form a part of the final disposal 
facility to be constructed later. The decision-in-
principle regarding final disposal of spent fuel was 
later extended to serve the Olkiluoto 3 and 4 plant 
units.
After receiving the decision-in-principle, Posiva 
began investigations regarding the suitability of 
the final disposal site at Olkiluoto. Construction of 
the underground research facility began in 2004. 
Since the research facility is designed to form part 
of the final disposal facility to be constructed later, 
it has been constructed in accordance with the re-
quirements concerning nuclear facilities with the 
corresponding regulatory oversight.
The companies with nuclear waste manage-
ment obligations have taken the final disposal 
project forward in accordance with the policies and 
schedules defined by the Government. Major areas 
of focus include research of the intended disposal 
location, the construction of the underground re-
search facility, design and development of the final 
disposal system and the repository, and safety as-
sessment.
5.1 Spent nuclear fuel disposal project
In 2012, both the construction of Onkalo and the 
preparation of the licence application proceeded. In 
December, Posiva submitted a construction licence 
application concerning the Olkiluoto encapsula-
tion and final disposal facility to the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy, and delivered the 
materials required by the Nuclear Energy Decree 
to STUK. The materials delivered by Posiva were 
supplemented at the beginning of 2013, particu-
larly in the sections concerning long-term safety.
Oversight of the construction of Onkalo pro-
ceeded according to plan in 2012. Oversight by 
STUK was particularly targeted at the review of 
construction and quality assurance documentation, 
as well as monitoring the construction of demon-
stration tunnels and holes.
Companies with nuclear waste management 
obligations submitted a three-year waste manage-
ment programme to the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy for review in autumn 2012. The 
programme mainly focuses on the spent nuclear 
fuel final disposal project. The Ministry has re-
quested a statement from STUK concerning the 
programme in accordance with the Nuclear Energy 
Decree in January 2013. STUK’s review is mainly 
targeted at the functionality of the final disposal 
system and proving its feasibility, but STUK is 
only able to give a detailed estimation of the addi-
tional work required when the construction licence 
application is being processed.
With regard to the final disposal project, STUK’s 
major duties in 2012 included planning the pro-
cessing of the construction licence and organisa-
tion of regulatory oversight. STUK has prepared a 
plan for the oversight operations, provided further 
detail to the criteria to be used in the processing 
of the application, and ensured the availability of 
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external resources through measures such as ex-
tensive competitive tendering.
5.1.1 Posiva’s organisational operations 
and quality management
During the years 2009–2011, Posiva has planned 
and implemented changes in the quality and safety 
management procedures. The most important of 
these changes include transfer from a line organ-
isation to a matrix organisation, and the definition 
of the organisation’s processes and their functions. 
In 2011, Posiva assessed the changes and their 
impact via a safety assessment, a self-assessment 
of the system, and management planning days. 
From time to time, Posiva has ordered third-party 
management system assessments to complement 
the certification audits. Starting from 2013, Posiva 
also intends to complement the certification au-
dits with independent third-party evaluations that 
focus on the assessments of the management sys-
tem. The evaluations will pay particular attention 
to the special nature of the requirements in the 
nuclear field. Posiva has made a preliminary deci-
sion on targeting the 2013 evaluation at the whole 
of the management system, with an emphasis on 
the encapsulation and final disposal facility design 
process.
STUK evaluated Posiva’s management system 
and its functionality in 2012 by a review of the 
management of the Onkalo project. As a result of 
the review, STUK stated that needs for improve-
ments still exist in Posiva’s quality management 
and assurance procedures. STUK required, among 
other things, that Posiva defines the responsibili-
ties concerning the control and inspection actions 
that aim to ensure the conformity of the end prod-
uct. An unambiguous definition of responsibilities 
also serves to ensure the independence of op-
erations. Furthermore, STUK required that Posiva 
provide a plan of the procedures to be used in the 
future to systematically continue the improvement 
of the management system and procedures. No es-
sential changes were made to the organisation and 
structures of Posiva in 2012. Posiva is currently 
making preparations for the construction phase 
of the project and planning the organisational 
changes required by this phase, including the 
development of the project organisations for the 
encapsulation plant and the final disposal facility 
construction projects.
5.1.2 Oversight of the construction of 
research facility (Onkalo oversight)
Overview
The excavation of the Onkalo access tunnel was 
mostly completed in 2012. The combined length 
of the access tunnel and other tunnels is 4,987 m, 
and the deepest part is 455 m deep (Figure 15). The 
Onkalo sections excavated in 2012 include a large 
parking area (the southern parking hall), back 
parts of the personnel and canister shafts, connec-
tion tunnels, a pumping facility and a precipitation 
tank. Concrete casting for building systems was 
carried out in these sections at the end of 2012.
The addition of new support structures to the 
arch of the first part of the access tunnel began 
in the latter half of 2012. The need for additional 
support arose from the excavation work for the 
ventilation and hoist building of the final disposal 
facility to be built above ground level.
RSC demonstration
Posiva has excavated in Onkalo two demonstration 
tunnels, located slightly to the north from the ac-
cess tunnel crossing section that begins at chain-
age 4,399 at level –420 m. The main purpose of the 
demonstration tunnels is to yield information for 
the development of the rock suitability classifica-
tion (RSC), as well as information for the needs of 
characterisation and modelling of the Onkalo bed-
rock. Various testing of technical barriers, instal-
lation and operation procedures and simultaneous 
application of several technical barriers is also car-
ried out in the demonstration tunnels.
Posiva has completed the RSC description and 
detailed model description of demonstration tun-
nel 1 as well as the suitability analyses of four ex-
perimental deposition holes. Posiva estimated that 
three of the deposition holes met the requirements. 
Inflow water measurements were also developed in 
demonstration tunnel 1.
Demonstration tunnel 2 was excavated to 105 
metres during 2012. A geological survey and vari-
ous geophysical surveys to reveal fractures, frac-
ture zones and water-conducting structures, among 
others, were carried out. Six pilot holes were 
drilled in the floor of demonstration tunnel 2 with 
the purpose of obtaining geological and hydro-geo-
logical information for the drilling of experimental 
deposition holes in 2013. STUK closely monitors 
Posiva’s RSC development work.
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Rock falls
STUK received information on one incident of loose 
rock in Onkalo during 2012. On 13 September 
2012, a large rock fell in demonstration tunnel 2 
into a net bolted to the roof in an area which had 
already been reinforced. The area had been cleared 
as safe for working and inspecting. As a result 
of the incident, the communication and reporting 
practices between Posiva and STUK have been re-
evaluated to ensure that STUK receives adequate 
information and is able to assess the safety signifi-
cance of events.
Grouting of Onkalo shafts to 
manage inflow water
So far, only the ventilation shaft (ONK-KU2) is 
open all through. In 2012, Posiva performed grout-
ing of leaks in the Onkalo personnel shaft (ONK-
KU1) and inlet air shaft (ONK-KU3) at a level of 
–290 m in six to seven phases, but the leaks still 
exceeded the grouting threshold set by Posiva. In 
December 2012, Posiva announced that a decision 
on upward drilling of the personnel shaft and inlet 
air shaft will be made early in 2013. STUK has 
monitored the progress of shaft grouting in on-site 
inspections and Onkalo follow-up meetings.
Research activities
In 2012, Posiva conducted studies on the long-term 
safety of nuclear waste disposal in the Onkalo re-
search facility. The studies were targeted at the 
following themes:
•	 the	properties	of	bentonite	in	the	conditions	of	
the final disposal facility
•	 rock	mechanical	 properties	 of	Onkalo,	 such	as	
the direction of tension stress in the rock, or its 
thermal properties
•	 the	extent	of	the	excavation	damage	zone	(EDZ)	
and its impact on the water conductivity of the 
bedrock
•	 surveys	 of	 water	 conductivity	 between	 water-
conducting fractures
•	migration	 and	 retention	 of	 radioactive	 sub-
stances in the Olkiluoto bedrock
•	 survey	 of	 the	 groundwater’s	 sulphate/sulphide	
balance and oxidation-reduction reactions 
through groundwater chemistry and geo-micro-
biological sampling and laboratory tests.
Surveys of Onkalo also include the survey of incom-
ing inflow water and measuring the total volume 
of inflow water. The total volume varied between 
34.0–40.5 l/min in 2012. In 2012, the measured 
total volumes of inflow water in Onkalo remained 
clearly below the first measure threshold of 80 l/
min set by Posiva.
The expansion of the Olkiluoto micro-seismic 
network at levels –290 m and –437 m was com-
pleted during 2012. The measurement system can 
be used to monitor the excavation of Onkalo and, 
Figure 15. Status of the excavation of Onkalo in December 2012 (Posiva Oy).
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later, the final repository, as well as the potential 
micro-seismic events induced by explosions, such 
as rock faults.
Construction inspection 
programme of Onkalo
Onkalo’s construction-time inspection programme 
for 2012 included four inspections. These focused 
on project management, the development of the 
rock suitability classification, seepage water man-
agement in Onkalo, and the management of for-
eign materials. STUK set requirements for Posiva 
and paid special attention to the following issues:
•	 The	 requirements	 issued	 for	 the	 development	
of the rock classification system concerned the 
publication schedule of the instructions for 
Onkalo’s tunnel survey phases and pilot hole 
surveys, and the significant delay observed in 
the pilot hole reporting.
•	 STUK	 required	 improved	 seepage	water	man-
agement, including more precise monitoring of 
seepage water and consideration of sources of 
error, as well as a survey of grouting alterna-
tives.
•	 The	 requirements	 issued	 on	 the	 management	
of foreign materials concerned delays in the 
reporting of foreign substances, instruction up-
dates, the production of a task description for 
the person responsible for foreign materials, 
conducting an internal audit of Posiva’s foreign 
material management and supervision, surveys 
of the root causes of foreign material deviations 
and environmental damage, as well as the plan-
ning of corrective measures.
Construction document reviews
In August 2012, STUK reviewed the additional 
reinforcement plans for the TU1 phase (PLV 0000–
1011) of Onkalo. The reinforcement plans were 
found adequate and consistent, which supports the 
launch of the work. During the review, attention 
was paid to the planned service life of the reinforce-
ment bolts in the access tunnels and the shafts. 
The required service life stated in the Onkalo plan-
ning documentation varies, and in STUK’s view 
the technical solution and the selected steel mate-
rial are in line with the planned service life. STUK 
will continue investigations in 2013.
Inspection of the readiness to 
start construction work
STUK inspected the readiness to start construction 
work in area 5 of the TU5A phase of Onkalo (ONK-
TT-4366, chainage 22–55) in August 2012. A new 
excavation contractor received permission to begin 
work. The resources of the contractor are limited, 
but adequate considering the small scale and un-
hurried schedule. At the inspection, requirements 
concerning the grouting work and the recording of 
information were presented. After a report submit-
ted by Posiva, STUK issued a decision in December 
2012 to the effect that the rock excavation work in 
area 5 of the TU5 phase may continue. STUK will 
oversee the development of the practices and as-
built documentation of double plug measurement 
of grouting in connection with the approval of fu-
ture work phases.
In 2012, STUK carried out a total of seven 
inspections of the readiness to start construction 
work for shotcreting. During the inspections, the 
rock surfaces of the Onkalo area in question were 
compared against the survey documentation; the 
results of laser beam measurements and the struc-
tures reaching across Onkalo were also considered. 
Inspections also included a visit to the area. In 
all shotcreting readiness inspections, Posiva was 
granted permission to begin work, and no addi-
tional requirements were issued.
Commissioning inspections
In September and December 2012, Posiva inspect-
ed the as-built documentation concerning the con-
struction of the TU4 phase of Onkalo (PLV 3116–
4340). Posiva was not able to present all the results 
of the grout and bolt tests required by the excava-
tion work report and quality control procedure. 
STUK required that Posiva provide an account of 
the quality deviations and their causes. In the ac-
count, Posiva had to assess the significance of the 
quality deviations and to define corrective mea-
sures to prevent similar deviations in the future. 
STUK will continue the processing of the as-built 
documentation of Onkalo in 2013.
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Follow-up meetings on the 
construction of Onkalo
STUK regularly conducted follow-up meetings on 
the construction of Onkalo together with Posiva 
to discuss the work in progress. The discussions 
included overviews of the general status of the con-
struction work, the site, design and engineering, 
the rock facility process and surveys, the develop-
ment	of	the	rock	suitability	classification,	QA	mat-
ters, exchange of letters between STUK and Posiva, 
Onkalo construction inspections, non-proliferation 
control, deviations, and potential environmental 
damage caused by foreign materials.
5.1.3 Overseeing the research, development 
and design work for further 
specification of the Safety Case
In 2012, oversight of the research, development 
and design work was carried out in accordance 
with the procedure adopted in the previous year 
and the plan made at the beginning of the year. In 
the final part of the year, STUK consciously limited 
the amount of planned oversight to allow Posiva to 
allocate adequate resources for the preparation of 
the construction licence application.
STUK reviewed Posiva’s materials concerning 
the design of the disposal canister and delivered a 
statement to Posiva in February. As a conclusion of 
the review, it could be stated that the design and 
descriptions of the disposal canister were consider-
ably more detailed compared to the design materi-
als presented on earlier occasions. However, the 
canister design and its design basis still include 
open issues which Posiva needs to investigate 
further, such as proving that the performance of 
the canister meets the requirements set by Posiva. 
STUK also reviewed documentation concerning 
the corrosion of the canister’s copper material, and 
issued a statement to Posiva in September. As a 
conclusion to the review, it could be stated that ma-
jor progress had taken place in the development of 
the disposal canister for spent nuclear fuel as well 
as in the evaluation of the canister’s corrosion risk. 
Deficiencies were observed in the assessment of 
corrosion risks, and these areas need further inves-
tigation to reduce the uncertainties related to the 
evaluation of the long-term safety of the disposal 
operations. Both the design of the canister and the 
corrosion of copper were discussed in the meetings 
of STUK and Posiva.
In the second half of the year, STUK carried out 
a preliminary review of the draft documentation 
of Posiva’s final disposal system. The results of the 
review are utilised in the review of the design re-
quirements attached to the submitted construction 
licence application. No actual safety assessment 
reports on the long-term safety of final disposal 
were delivered to STUK in 2012. Nuclide migration 
analyses include a simplified model of the final dis-
posal facility barriers, considered a complementary 
report. The model may be reviewed in connection 
with the review of the construction licence docu-
mentation.
Companies with nuclear waste management 
obligations submitted a nuclear waste manage-
ment programme (YJH-2012) produced by Posiva 
to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy in 
September. STUK reviewed the plans for the next 
period and delivered a statement to the Ministry at 
the beginning of 2013. STUK’s assessment focused 
on the research and development concerning the 
feasibility of final disposal, and on long-term safety 
at a preliminary level. Due to the programme 
review schedule’s relation to that of Posiva’s con-
struction licence application, safety-related mate-
rials were not available to STUK, and STUK was 
therefore not able to assess the need for additional 
research in this area.
STUK followed Posiva’s research, development 
and design work as projects progressed. STUK’s 
oversight operations were targeted at areas such 
as canister fall tests and analyses, the design and 
manufacture experiments of canisters and the 
buffer, analysis of the feasibility and scenarios of 
the final disposal system, properties of the final 
disposal location, and the monitoring programme.
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6 Regulatory oversight of 
nuclear non-proliferation
6.1 The basis, subjects and 
methods of regulatory control 
of nuclear materials
Regulatory control of nuclear materials 
and activities is based on the Nuclear 
Energy Act, Nuclear Energy Decree 
and international treaties.
Safeguarding nuclear materials and nuclear ac-
tivities constitutes a requirement for the peace-
ful use of nuclear energy. In Finland, the national 
system for nuclear material control is maintained 
by STUK. Provisions on the control system are laid 
down in section 118 of the Nuclear Energy Decree, 
and its purpose is to carry out the safeguards for 
the use of nuclear energy that are necessary for the 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to ensure 
that the operations are compliant with the obliga-
tions of international nuclear energy treaties.
International safeguards are implemented by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
and the European Commission’s Directorate 
General for Energy, Directorates D and E, 
“Euratom”. IAEA safeguards are based on the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Safeguards 
Agreement signed by non-nuclear weapon EU 
Member States, the European Atomic Energy 
Agency and the IAEA, as well as the Additional 
Protocol of the Safeguards Agreement. EU safe-
guards are based on the Euratom Treaty and 
Commission Regulation EURATOM 302/2005. 
According to section 63 of the Nuclear Energy Act, 
STUK participates in the inspections performed 
by the IAEA and the European Commission in 
Finland.
The IAEA must be able to satisfy itself that 
the member country has no undisclosed activi-
ties related to the nuclear fuel cycle, and that the 
member country honours its obligations under the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In addition to 
the nuclear material records, states must notify 
the IAEA of nuclear facility sites, research and de-
velopment projects related to the nuclear fuel cycle, 
as well as of the manufacture of certain, separately 
defined, components in the nuclear field as well as 
their export, including the export of enriched ura-
nium. The operators in the industry report nuclear 
materials to the Commission and STUK in com-
pliance with the Commission Regulation. STUK 
submits to the IAEA and the Commission the dec-
larations concerning Finland and Finnish facilities 
required by the Additional Protocol. In support of 
its controls, the IAEA gathers information from 
open sources, uses satellite imagery and collects 
environmental samples. The Additional Protocol 
also allows the IAEA more extensive access rights 
to inspect activities related to the nuclear fuel 
cycle in the whole country.
In the IAEA’s integrated safeguards, the con-
trol under the Safeguards Agreement and that 
under the Additional Protocol have been matched 
together so that the IAEA carries out fewer rou-
tine inspections, but it has the possibility to make 
inspections unannounced or at very short notice 
at plants or of activities related to the nuclear 
fuel cycle. The IAEA’s integrated control began 
in Finland on 15 October 2008. The efficient en-
forcement of the IAEA’s Integrated Safeguards in 
Finland is made possible by the national control 
system maintained by STUK. STUK has enhanced 
its inspectors’ capabilities for participating in the 
IAEA’s Unannounced Inspections (UI) or Short 
Notice Random Inspections (SNRI).
In parallel with the expansion of the IAEA’s 
regulatory control, the Commission also developed 
its inspection activities. The number of inspec-
tions carried out by the IAEA and the Commission 
has been decreasing since 2009. The number of 
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inspections carried out by STUK has increased. 
The increase is due to new projects such as 
Posiva’s Onkalo project, TVO’s Olkiluoto 3 and 4, 
Fennovoima’s Hanhikivi 1 and the uranium pro-
duction operations of the Talvivaara mine.
STUK reports all nuclear material inspections 
to the Commission. The inspections of the IAEA or 
the Commission in Finland can only be carried out 
by inspectors authorised for Finland. In addition, 
STUK is responsible for the approval process of 
international inspectors.
Regulatory control is targeted at facilities 
and operators in the nuclear fuel cycle
STUK’s nuclear safeguards apply to all nuclear 
fuel cycle activities in Finland as well as to nu-
clear commodity accounting and control systems, 
import, use, transport, storage, transfers, removal 
from use and final disposal. Nuclear items include 
nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium and tho-
rium), deuterium and graphite, as well as nuclear 
devices, equipment, software and technology. Most 
nuclear materials in Finland (99.8%) are contained 
in nuclear power plants. A few consignments of 
fresh nuclear fuel are imported to Finland and 
transported within Finland annually.
STUK inspects the holders of nuclear items 
and stakeholders in the nuclear industry through 
facility and transport inspections and document 
reviews. At the facilities, STUK verifies that the 
quantity of nuclear items and their physical loca-
tion comply with the accounting records. STUK 
reviews the documents on the facilities’ nuclear 
items management: reports, notifications and nu-
clear safeguards manuals, and grants licences re-
quired by legislation.
The technical analysis methods applied to nu-
clear items ensure that nuclear materials and 
operations are in accordance with the reports 
and that all operations are reported. STUK ap-
plies non-destructive methods and environmental 
sample analyses to verify that the information re-
ported by the facilities regarding nuclear materials 
and their use – for example, the degree of uranium 
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Figure 16. Uranium	in	nuclear	fuel	at	the	Finnish	NPPs.
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Figure 17. Plutonium in spent nuclear fuel at the Finnish NPPs.
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enrichment as well as fuel burn-up and the cooling 
period – is correct and complete.
Figures 16 and 17 contain information on the 
nuclear fuel assemblies located in Finland, as 
well as the quantities of uranium and plutonium 
contained in them. Table 5 presents the quanti-
ties of nuclear materials in Finland by facility and 
category.
Control of transfers of nuclear products
In order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
materials and sensitive nuclear technology, STUK 
controls the transfer of nuclear products and co-
operates with Finnish Customs, the police and 
other public authorities. A licence granted by ei-
ther STUK or the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
is required for the import and export of nuclear 
products. Licence from STUK, as well as a trans-
port plan and transport security plan approved by 
STUK, are required for the transport of nuclear 
materials. Customs and STUK co-operate in pre-
venting illegal imports and exports at Finnish bor-
ders.
Nuclear security and cooperation 
between authorities
Another objective of the oversight of non-prolifera-
tion is to ensure that appropriate security arrange-
ments are in place for nuclear items. ‘Security 
arrangements’ here refers to the deterrence, pre-
vention and detection of and response to illegal 
activities related to nuclear and other radioactive 
materials, as defined by the IAEA under the head-
ing ‘Nuclear Security’. In addition, the security ar-
rangements of the oversight of non-proliferation 
include acting as a liaison authority for Customs 
in actions required by irregularities observed in 
radiation monitoring at the borders, and also as an 
expert when developing these radiation monitoring 
operations.
Oversight of non-proliferation in 
final disposal of nuclear fuel
Final disposal of nuclear fuel in inaccessible under-
ground facilities sets new kinds of requirements 
for nuclear safeguards. After encapsulation, it is 
no longer possible to verify nuclear material in the 
same way as in traditional facilities or in long-term 
storage. STUK has obligated Posiva Oy, the com-
pany in charge of the disposal project, to ensure the 
implementation of nuclear safeguards during the 
construction of Onkalo, the underground research 
facility, as it is designed to become part of the final 
disposal facility. The aim of the obligation is to 
ensure that all necessary information on the final 
disposal facility will be available in due course, and 
that it will be possible to show that no undeclared 
facilities or operations relevant to nuclear safe-
guards exist in the final repository area.
Implementation of nuclear safeguards at the 
final disposal facility must be ensured so that ap-
propriate international oversight is possible. The 
IAEA must be able to satisfy itself that there are 
no undeclared nuclear activities in Finland during 
the construction or use of the final disposal facility 
or after its closure; the Commission, on the other 
hand, will verify that the operator’s actions are 
sufficient for implementing nuclear safeguards 
at the final disposal facility. The development of 
nuclear safeguards for the final disposal facility is 
a demanding task because there is no experience 
of controlling a similar facility anywhere in the 
world. Both the IAEA and the Commission plan 
and implement their own regulation and inspec-
tion procedures on the basis of declarations made 
by the operator and the Government.
The IAEA finalised the control criteria for the 
final disposal facility and encapsulation plant in 
2009 and 2010. On their basis and on the basis 
of experience from overseeing Onkalo, STUK has 
Table 5. Nuclear materials in Finland on December 31 2012.
Location
Natural uranium 
kg
Enriched uranium 
kg
Depleted 
uranium kg
Plutonium 
kg
Torium 
kg
Loviisa plant – 603 178 – 5 529 –
Olkiluoto plant – 1 528 383 – 11 313 –
VTT / FiR 1 research reactor 1 511 60 ~0 ~0 ~0
Other facililties 4 402 < 1 1 353 ~0 ~3
78
STUK-B 162
participated in the development of international 
requirements for nuclear safeguards in the IAEA’s 
ASTOR support group for control activities.
STUK has prepared the actual oversight opera-
tions together with the IAEA, the Commission and 
Posiva with workshops, discussions conducted in 
connection with inspections, and at Safeguards 
by Design meetings. In early 2012, STUK organ-
ised an internal brainstorming session on the 
verification of the fuel destined for final disposal. 
STUK has also proposed a final disposal nuclear 
safeguards development project that would focus 
on the development of fuel assembly verification 
equipment (tomography) and the continuity man-
agement of control information. The conceptual 
plan for the project has also been presented to the 
Swedish nuclear authority who is an important 
partner in the development of safeguards opera-
tions. The project has not been launched yet.
STUK has organised the review of Posiva’s 
construction licence application into a project that 
covers nuclear safety, security arrangements and 
nuclear safeguards at the Olkiluoto encapsulation 
and final disposal facilities.
6.2  Nuclear safeguards, activities 
and results in 2012
Licences and approvals
During 2012, STUK received 36 licence applica-
tions concerning nuclear items and 314 nuclear 
safeguards reports, notifications or other applica-
tions. All licence applications were approved. No 
significant deviations were detected in document 
reviews. In 2012, STUK granted three import li-
cences for nuclear materials and seven for nuclear 
equipment or components, as well as one modified 
licence for the possession of equipment. STUK also 
granted a total of 16 licences for the import, pos-
session or assignment of nuclear technology and 
two licences for the export of waste, and approved a 
modification for one licence concerning the import 
and transportation of waste.
Posiva and Fortum (the Loviisa power plant) 
submitted updates of nuclear safeguards manuals, 
compliant with Guide YVL 6.9, for approval. STUK 
reviewed the manuals and required improvements 
to both of them. STUK then approved both updated 
manuals with the improvements.
Ten transportation-related approvals were 
granted in 2012. These included approvals of 
transport package designs, transportations with 
special arrangements, and transportation plans for 
nuclear fuel.
Two applications for the approval of responsible 
managers and persons responsible for nuclear safe-
guards, referred to in the Nuclear Energy Act, were 
received for processing. In 2012, approvals were 
granted for the person responsible for nuclear safe-
guards at the Loviisa power plant as well as his 
deputy (approval of task rotation), and the deputy 
for the person responsible for nuclear safeguards 
at the Olkiluoto power plant. In addition, the re-
placements of the person responsible for nuclear 
safeguards at Posiva, as well as the deputy, were 
processed as received for information.
The qualification requirements of the respon-
sible persons include sufficient knowledge of the 
legislation and other regulations governing nucle-
ar safeguards. STUK is responsible for assessing 
the fulfilment of these qualification requirements 
before approval. Competence was assessed by writ-
ten questions and an oral examination. This pro-
vided a good indication of the person’s competence. 
When necessary, additional familiarisation may 
be required of the person in connection with the 
approval. In such a case, fulfilment of the require-
ment is also monitored and the person’s level of 
competence is re-assessed later.
During 2012, the IAEA and the European 
Commission sent a total of 27 applications regard-
ing the appointment of new inspectors. STUK 
asked the major holders of nuclear materials and 
the Finnish Security Intelligence Service to pro-
vide statements regarding the inspectors and ap-
proved all the proposed inspectors, 15 IAEA inspec-
tors and 12 European Commission inspectors.
Declarations and inspection visits 
pursuant to the Additional Protocol 
to the Safeguards Agreement
STUK submitted all declarations pursuant to the 
Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Safeguards 
Agreement within the set time limits. STUK was 
also able to verify that the Commission had sub-
mitted the declarations regarding Finland under 
its responsibility within the time limits. The IAEA 
did not request any additional accounts on the 
basis of the declarations sent from Finland, and it 
has been able to verify on the basis of the declara-
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tions sent that activities in Finland have been in 
line with the notifications. Two short notice inspec-
tions were carried out in Finland for the Olkiluoto 
facilities in 2012, one for the OL1 plant unit and 
one for the interim storage for spent nuclear fuel. 
No cause for remarks was found in the inspections.
Inspections as part of nuclear safeguards
In 2012, STUK carried out a total of 41 inspections. 
Two of the planned inspections were postponed to 
2013 due to reasons related to plant operations. Of 
minor holders of nuclear materials, the Tornio steel 
mill of Outokumpu Oy was inspected. In addition, 
STUK performed an inspection of three uranium 
producers: Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy, OMG 
Kokkola Chemicals Oy and Talvivaara Sotkamo 
Oy. No cause for remarks was found in the inspec-
tions. The inspection reports by the IAEA and the 
European Commission (Statement 90a) indicate 
that the Finnish nuclear operators have met the 
obligations of international control. No significant 
deviations were detected in document reviews. In 
December 2012, STUK submitted a preliminary 
safeguards inspection plan for 2013 to the IAEA 
and the European Commission for information.
STUK carried out nuclear fuel verification mea-
surement campaigns, one at the Olkiluoto plant 
and one at the Loviisa plant. STUK took environ-
mental samples at the facilities of two uranium 
producers, in Harjavalta and Kokkola.
Inspections as part of nuclear safeguards 
regarding the disposal facility
STUK has carried out nuclear safeguards control 
at the Onkalo facility constructed by Posiva, in-
tended as part of the disposal facility. STUK’s con-
trol activities have been implemented in line with 
the national nuclear safeguards plan. Finland is 
the first country in the world to implement nuclear 
safeguards regarding disposal facilities, which is 
why STUK holds a key position in the develop-
ment and implementation of international nucle-
ar safeguards regarding disposal facilities. The 
implementation of international safeguards has 
been complicated by the fact that Posiva was not 
a licensee referred to in the Nuclear Energy Act. 
International safeguards operations are targeted 
at the nuclear facility already being planned. The 
IAEA and the Commission carried out the inspec-
tions under their inspection programme at the 
Onkalo construction site and at the plant area 
referred to in the Additional Protocol.
Control meetings with licensees
STUK usually organises oversight meetings with 
major operators twice a year. In 2012, 12 over-
sight meetings were organised with TVO, Fortum, 
Fennovoima, Posiva and VTT. One joint oversight 
meeting of operators was held in Vienna together 
with the IAEA.
Results and conclusions of 
inspection activities
STUK delivered protocols of all nuclear mate-
rial inspections to the IAEA and the European 
Commission for information within three days of 
the inspection, even in cases where the IAEA or 
the EC did not participate in the inspection.
The IAEA and the Commission sent 18 re-
ports to STUK on the results and conclusions of 
inspection activities. The reports did not contain 
inconclusive results. STUK compared the inspec-
tion results in the IAEA’s and the Commission’s 
reports to the results of its own inspections and 
found the information to be very coherent. STUK 
sent the inspection results to the inspected plants 
for information.
Regulatory control of nuclear materials 
begins at the design stage of a new plant
It is important that nuclear safeguards are includ-
ed in the design and construction of new plants. 
This saves costs and additional work required, for 
example, in the installation of surveillance cam-
eras in the reactor hall when the plant is other-
wise complete. In March 2012, STUK organised 
the second Safeguards by Design training event at 
TVO’s training facilities in Helmiranta in coopera-
tion with the IAEA and the European Commission. 
At the training event, operators received an overall 
picture of the basics of nuclear safeguards and 
the principles of safeguards operations during the 
design and construction of a new facility. An ex-
ercise on how the safeguards could be taken into 
account at the participants’ own plants was also 
included. In addition to the training events, STUK 
has actively ensured that safeguards operations 
will be taken into account in TVO’s OL4 project 
and Fennovoima’s FH-1 project as well as in the 
construction of Posiva’s encapsulation and final 
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disposal plant. STUK has participated in the devel-
opment of IAEA standards in order to inform plant 
suppliers and licensees of the needs of safeguards 
operations as early as possible.
It was observed during the Safeguards by 
Design training events of 2011 and 2012 that op-
erators need more real information on the super-
vision of technology exports. Technologies are an 
essential part of the design of a new power plant 
unit, and export supervision becomes an extremely 
topical issue when invitations for tenders are sent 
out. A better shared understanding of the mat-
ter between the authorities and operators was 
achieved as a result of the meetings concerning 
technologies, and it was agreed that in cases of 
individual questions, operators should always con-
tact the proper authorities directly; open and pro-
active communications are the best option. It was 
also agreed that, in future, meetings concerning 
technologies will be organised when changes are 
made to the nuclear energy legislation and when 
new YVL Guides enter into force.
Remote surveillance of nuclear facilities
The IAEA and European Commission use surveil-
lance cameras for control. The cameras are located 
in the reactor halls and spent fuel storage facilities 
at the Olkiluoto and Loviisa plants. The camera 
surveillance of the IAEA and the Commission has 
been in use at both plant units for about twenty 
years. The IAEA and the Commission have re-
placed the video tapes or hard disks during inspec-
tions. Current technology also allows the sending 
of surveillance data from nuclear power plants di-
rectly to the IAEA and the Commission. The re-
mote use of surveillance systems has proceeded 
so that reports on the safety impact of the imple-
mentation of new systems have been requested 
from power companies, STUK has produced the 
necessary assessments, and more information on 
the technical implementation has been requested 
from the IAEA and the Commission to ensure the 
information security of the systems. Remote use of 
surveillance equipment also allows the reduction 
of the number of inspection visits by the IAEA and 
the Commission, and better planning of inspec-
tions in Finland.
Regulatory control of transport 
of nuclear material
STUK inspected transports in line with the inspec-
tion plan for 2012. Nuclear materials and nuclear 
security experts participated in the inspections. 
One of the inspections concerned TVO’s transports 
and one those of Fortum’s.
Cooperation with the police continued as in 
previous years. Transportation-related practices 
were discussed with the police before transports 
and inspections. STUK performed the inspections 
of transports in good cooperation with the police. 
During the last inspection, police provided particu-
larly useful assistance in the interpretation of the 
transport regulations concerning dangerous goods. 
STUK included a remark on the matter in the in-
spection records.
STUK participated in a tabletop preparedness 
exercise concerning the transport of natural ura-
nium, organised by Talvivaara Sotkamo Oy and 
Cameco Corporation. The exercise dealt with the 
operations of the various parties in exceptional 
situations.
Enhancement of radiation control at borders
Finnish Customs and STUK launched a joint proj-
ect for revising radiation control at borders. The 
project is called RADAR. The project will be imple-
mented during 2009–2014, and it includes equip-
ment purchases, an update of common operational 
methods and instructions, as well as a training 
plan and provision of training together with the 
Customs School.
The purchases necessary to establish radiation 
control at the Kotka–Hamina ports began in 2012. 
Installations at the Helsinki Airport were supple-
mented by neutron moderation of the detectors.
6.3 The Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) prohibits all nuclear testing. The Treaty 
was opened for signing in 1996. It will enter into 
force after ratification by 44 separately designated 
states. Of these, eight are yet to sign the Treaty. 
Finland ratified the Treaty in 1999, and a total 
of 183 countries had signed and 158 counties had 
ratified the Treaty by the end of 2012. Adherence to 
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the Treaty is monitored by a global network of 321 
observation stations. Of these, 80 stations detect 
radioactive particles in the atmosphere and 40 are 
also capable of detecting radioactive xenon gas. 
The other stations measure seismic, hydro-acoustic 
or infrasound waves. The measurement results of 
the monitoring system are available to all Member 
States.
A special Preparatory Commission, convening 
in Vienna, is preparing for the Treaty’s entry 
into force. All signatory states are represented 
in the Commission. The Provisional Technical 
Secretariat, whose tasks include constructing and 
maintaining the international monitoring system, 
also operates in Vienna.
The National Data Centre, based on the CTBT 
and operating in conjunction with STUK, contrib-
uted to the work of the Preparatory Commission 
for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organisation (CTBTO) in establishing a cost-effec-
tive NDC organisation that is functional from the 
Finnish perspective.
Activities of the National Data Centre in 2012
The data systems of the National Data Centre 
have operated without interruption for the whole 
year, apart from a few maintenance breaks last-
ing a few minutes. The automatic analysis soft-
ware used for the NDC’s own routine monitoring 
analysed on average more than 1,000 spectra per 
day towards the end of 2012. Routine monitor-
ing is facilitated by an alarm system transmitting 
data on unusual observations to NDC personnel. 
The planned development and testing of noble gas 
analysis software was not carried out due to the 
slowness of the international community and the 
resource changes taking place in STUK’s internal 
organisation. This software still needs further de-
velopment, but the lack of resources prevents the 
work from being completed in Finland at the mo-
ment; instead, the results of international coopera-
tion are utilised as efficiently as possible. During 
the year under review, STUK has participated in 
WGB meetings and acted as one of the chairs of the 
radionuclide expert group.
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Loviisa nuclear power plant
An inspection within the periodic inspection pro-
gramme was carried out on 2 May 2012. An ex-
tensive inspection of security arrangements was 
included in accordance with the inspection plan. 
Examples include the security systems’ mainte-
nance and fault reporting procedures which now 
have improved work order practices. The train-
ing processes of the security organisation together 
with job-specific and personal training plans were 
discussed during the inspection, as well as issues 
concerning the practical security arrangements 
and the exercises of the security organisations, in-
cluding those conducted in cooperation with the 
authorities. No deviations were detected in the 
inspection. The measures resulting from remarks 
made in the course of earlier inspections were also 
considered to be appropriately implemented.
The security arrangements of the power plant 
were inspected during the annual outage, on 21 
August 2012. The inspection focused on the re-
sources needed for the maintenance of adequate 
security arrangements during an annual outage, 
development measures and their status during 
the outage, and the surveillance of the refuelling 
area. The power plant has improved the security 
arrangements in accordance with the principle of 
continuous improvement. The TUVA project con-
cerning the security surveillance operations will 
implement further improvements of the technical 
security systems.
An information security inspection was carried 
out with a focus on the I&C systems of the Loviisa 
power plant. Based on the inspection, it was stated 
that continuous improvement of information se-
curity takes place at the Loviisa power plant, but 
further investments by the power plant are still 
required. The Loviisa power plant had conducted 
an extensive risk assessment concerning the I&C 
system upgrade on the basis of a requirement is-
sued in an earlier inspection. According to STUK’s 
estimate, the risk assessment was carried out us-
ing the best information security practices.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
STUK inspected the security arrangements at the 
plant during the annual outage on 8 May 2012. 
The inspection focused on the resources needed 
for the maintenance of adequate security arrange-
ments during an annual outage, development mea-
sures and their status during the outage, and the 
preparedness of the security organisation.
The security arrangement inspection on 8 
October 2012 focused on matters such as the im-
provement measures implemented on the basis of 
an extensive third-party evaluation of the security 
arrangements carried out in 2010. The operative 
response of the licensee’s security organisation and 
the related details were also assessed during the 
inspection. In 2012, TVO increased the number of 
drug and alcohol tests carried out by the security 
personnel. Structural improvements of the security 
arrangements have also been implemented.
The information security of the Olkiluoto power 
plant was inspected in two parts in 2012 (from 31 
May to 1 June and from 9 October to 10 October). 
The first part, carried out at the turn of May to 
June, focused on the technical information security 
solutions of the operating plant units. The second 
part, carried out in October, focused on the organ-
isation of information security, competence devel-
opment, and administration. Concerning the OL3 
project, STUK inspected the construction inspec-
tion programme and inspections of the information 
security of subsystems. STUK participated as an 
observer in the audits of potential OL4 plant sup-
pliers using the KATAKRI criteria.
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As a part of the spent fuel storage expansion 
project, STUK inspected the security arrange-
ments of the KPA storage during expansion work.
Fennovoima’s nuclear power plant project
In October 2011, Fennovoima Oy decided to concen-
trate its efforts on the preparation of the construc-
tion licence application solely on the Hanhikivi 
plant site, located in the Pyhäjoki municipality in 
North Ostrobothnia. In 2012, Fennovoima asked 
STUK to review certain plans and documents it 
had prepared and to provide preliminary instruc-
tions concerning, among other issues, security ar-
rangements at the plant and the plant site. STUK 
complied with these wishes and also reviewed the 
design basis for the security arrangements. At the 
request of Fennovoima, STUK participated as an 
observer in the plant supplier audits carried out 
using the KATAKRI criteria.
Otaniemi research reactor
STUK requested statements from the Ministry 
of the Interior and the Advisory Commission on 
Nuclear Security concerning the updated security 
regulations for the FiR1 research reactor. When 
the statements had been received, STUK requested 
that VTT implement into the security regulations 
the changes proposed in the statements as a condi-
tion to the qualification of the regulations.
A third-party evaluation of the structures and 
organisation of security arrangements for the re-
search reactor was carried out in 2011. The evalu-
ation team proposed several targets for develop-
ment. VTT prepared an action plan to remove the 
deficiencies observed in the safety arrangements of 
the research reactor, and implemented certain im-
provements. Due to the changed situation of the re-
search reactor (plans to end operations), the action 
plan to develop security arrangements, prepared 
on the basis of an evaluation, was updated as a 
part of the overall security plan of the research 
reactor. STUK inspected the state of the research 
reactor’s security arrangements in November 2012, 
after which VTT submitted an updated action plan 
and overall security plan to STUK for approval. 
The changes will continue in 2013 after the ap-
proval of the action plan.
Spent nuclear fuel disposal project
STUK has processed the security arrangements 
concerning the IV and lifting equipment buildings 
included in Posiva’s final disposal project. At the 
end of 2012, Posiva submitted the safety-classified 
security arrangement documentation to STUK for 
processing together with the construction licence 
application.
Talvivaara uranium recovery project
Planning and construction of a uranium recovery 
plant in Talvivaara began in 2011. After requesting 
a statement from the Kainuu Police Department, 
STUK approved the security arrangement docu-
mentation of the Talvivaara uranium recovery 
plant. The practical security arrangements will be 
inspected in 2013 in accordance with the decision.
Transport of nuclear material 
and nuclear waste
STUK ensured that transport of nuclear fuel took 
place according to approved transport security 
plans. STUK inspected on site the implementation 
of the security arrangements of one transport by 
Fortum and one by TVO.
Security regulations, their development 
and Design Basis Threat
On 22 December 2011, the Government presented 
Parliament with a proposal concerning an amend-
ment to the Nuclear Energy Act. The latest update 
to the Nuclear Energy Act entered into force on 
1 October 2012 (410/2012). A modification of the 
Government Decree 734/2008 concerning security 
arrangements entered into force on 1 May 2012. 
YVL Guides concerning security arrangements will 
be produced in connection with the overall revision 
of the guides.
Design Basis Threat (DBT) is one of the tools 
for setting regulatory requirements on nuclear 
security. It defines the threat to be used as the 
basis for planning and evaluating security ar-
rangements. Design Basis Threat is based on the 
threat assessment of unlawful acts related to use 
of nuclear energy and radiation, and the potential 
consequences of such unlawful acts. The threat as-
sesment has been prepared under the leadership of 
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the Finnish Security Intelligence Service and in co-
operation with the relevant authorities, and it has 
been updated on an annual basis. The 2012 update 
focused on information security threats. STUK has 
prepared the DBT during 2009–2012. During the 
preparations, STUK has consulted the operators of 
nuclear facilities and received statements from the 
Ministry of the Interior, the National Police Board 
and organisations under it – the police depart-
ments who participated in the preparations of the 
threat assessment or have regional responsibility 
in the areas where nuclear facilities are located 
– as well as the Advisory Commission on Nuclear 
Security. In 2012, STUK discussed the application 
of the DBT with nuclear facility operators. The 
DBT was completed at the end of 2012, and is to be 
approved at the beginning of 2013.
A pilot project was organised on the use of PRA 
in the planning of security arrangements; parties 
to the project included TVO, Fortum and STUK. 
STUK will compile a report of the results in the 
first half of 2013. According to the new Guide YVL 
A.11, nuclear facilities must utilise PRA in the 
planning of security.
Emergency preparedness instructions, 
emergency response training and exercises
STUK’s emergency preparedness (contingency) in-
structions for scenarios involving unlawful opera-
tions were updated.
STUK participated in a joint preparedness ex-
ercise of various authorities (CBRNE 2012) to 
practise operations in scenarios of unlawful acts 
related to radioactive materials. In an emergency, 
STUK adopts the role of an expert organisation 
within the joint organisation of the authorities, 
headed by the police in situations where unlawful 
acts are involved. STUK continues the develop-
ment of integrated operations for various situa-
tions together with other authorities, using the 
results of the exercises.
STUK participated in a tabletop preparedness 
exercise concerning the transport of natural ura-
nium, organised by Talvivaara Sotkamo Oy and 
Cameco Corporation. The exercise dealt with the 
operations of the various parties in exceptional 
situations.
STUK’s internal cooperation group 
and nuclear security programme
STUK has a cross-department cooperation group 
on security, responsible for ensuring that in STUK, 
tasks related to nuclear security are carried out 
in close cooperation, employing the resources of 
the various departments and units. In 2012, the 
group met regularly, followed the implementation 
of STUK’s security tasks and exchanged informa-
tion related to internal, national and international 
nuclear security collaboration.
National and international cooperation 
for developing nuclear security
The Advisory Commission on Nuclear Security, ap-
pointed by the Government and operating under 
STUK, met three times in 2012. The Commission 
discussed, among other things, the operations and 
security regulations of the research reactor, chang-
es to the nuclear energy legislation, security as-
sessment procedures of nuclear facilities, and the 
international peer evaluation of security arrange-
ments (IPPAS).
STUK participated in the national cooperation 
group for the prevention of terrorism, operating 
under the auspices of the National Police Board, 
and in the CBRNE cooperation forum led by the 
police. STUK also participated in Satakunta Police 
Department’s OL3 project steering group during 
the year.
In 2011, STUK launched tests on the structural 
endurance of nuclear facilities in cooperation with 
Defence Forces Technical Research Centre. The 
work continued in 2012.
STUK was the Finnish representative of the Ad 
Hoc Group on Nuclear Security (AHGNS) of the 
Council of the European Union. The final report of 
the Group was published on 6 June 2012. In 2012, 
STUK also participated in international nuclear 
security cooperation within the IAEA and ENSRA.
International assessment of nuclear security
The international IPPAS assessment group per-
formed a follow-up assessment of Finland’s nuclear 
security and security arrangements on 16–27 April 
2012 at the request of the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy. The first IPPAS assessment 
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was completed in summer 2009. The group stated 
that the recommendations issued during the first 
evaluation have been implemented to a very good 
degree. Finland also received some new recom-
mendations to further improve nuclear security. 
IPPAS (International Physical Protection Advisory 
Service) is an assessment programme organised by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The most important recommendations given 
to Finland in the 2009 assessment concerned the 
development of nuclear energy legislation to better 
protect confidential information, the definition of 
the design basis threat used as a basis of the secu-
rity arrangements in the use of nuclear energy and 
the use of radiation, and the increase of security-
related resources at STUK. Legislation has been 
revised to protect information, the definition of 
the design basis threat is completed and human 
resources at STUK have been increased.
The follow-up assessment resulted in only a few 
new recommendations. These mainly concerned 
matters that were introduced into the follow-up 
assessment as new subjects, such as information 
security procedures. One of the recommendations 
was that the legislation should be changed to de-
fine a fixed term of validity for the safety assess-
ments of people working in the nuclear industry.
The oversight of the security arrangements of 
the future Talvivaara uranium recovery plant was 
found to be a good practice. Good feedback was also 
received for the radioactive materials detection 
and analysis system developed by STUK and used 
to provide expert support to the operations of other 
authorities.
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8 Safety research
The purpose of publicly funded safety research is 
to ascertain that the authorities have adequate 
expertise available, including a concern for unfore-
seeable issues affecting the safety of nuclear fa-
cilities. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Finnish 
safety research has typically taken the form of 
four-year research programmes. Safety research 
is divided into two research programmes, of which 
SAFIR2014 focuses on nuclear power plant safety 
and KYT2014 on the comparison of the practices 
and methods of nuclear waste management. The 
projects under the research programmes are se-
lected annually on the basis of a public call for 
projects. The projects selected for the programmes 
must be of a high scientific standard, and their re-
sults must be available for publication. The results 
Nuclear safety research in Finland
In Finland, nuclear safety research is conducted by 
research institutions, universities and utilities operat-
ing nuclear power plants. In general terms, nuclear 
safety research comprises two distinct areas of re-
search: nuclear power plant safety and nuclear waste 
management safety.
The new research programmes, which started at 
the beginning of 2011, are SAFIR2014 and KYT2014. 
The purpose of these programmes is not only to pro-
vide scientific and technical results, but also to ensure 
the maintenance and development of Finnish exper-
tise. Further information on the projects is available 
on the websites of the research programmes at   
http://virtual.vtt.fi/virtual/safir2010/,   
http://virtual.vtt.fi/virtual/safir2014/,   
http://www.ydinjatetutkimus.fi and   
http://kyt2014.vtt.fi/.
Pursuant to Finnish legislation, the parties with 
nuclear waste management obligations are unam-
biguously responsible for the design, implementation 
and cost of managing the waste they have produced, 
including the associated research and development 
work. Regarding final disposal, this research and 
development work is carried out by Posiva Oy with 
its extensive research programme. Finnish actors con-
tribute extensively to international nuclear safety 
research within the framework of the following pro-
grammes and organisations: the European Union’s 
framework research programmes (both fission and 
fusion research), the Nordic NKS safety research 
programme, the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the 
OECD, and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) within the UN family.
Finnish actors have also preliminarily charted 
issues related to the technology, safety and economy 
of new-generation GEN4 reactors. GEN4 research 
is financed within the four-year Sustainable Energy 
(SusEn) research programme of the Finnish Academy 
of Science and Letters, launched at the beginning of 
2008. Research into fourth-generation reactors is part 
of energy technology research.
must have a broader scope of applicability than the 
nuclear facility of a particular licensee. Funding 
is not granted for research which is directly con-
nected with projects that licensees, or parties rep-
resenting them, carry out for their own needs, or 
for research which is directly provided by nuclear 
energy regulatory oversight.
STUK controls this research by contributing 
to the work of the programmes’ steering and 
reference groups. Every year, the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy ascertains that 
the proposed set of projects meets the statutory 
requirements and STUK’s nuclear safety research 
needs. In February 2012, STUK issued statements 
on the SAFIR2014 research programme and the 
KYT2014 programme.
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In 2011, a new four-year safety research pro-
gramme, SAFIR2014, was initiated as a continu-
ation of the previous SAFIR2010 programme. The 
new programme is more extensive than the previ-
ous one due to the decisions-in-principle issued 
in the summer 2010 regarding new plant units. 
Following the decisions, additional funds for the re-
search programme were collected according to the 
maximum outputs defined in the licence conditions 
for the new plant units (funding from the National 
Nuclear Waste Management Fund). The annual 
volume of the SAFIR2014 programme was EUR 
9.9 million in 2012, of which the National Nuclear 
Waste Management Fund covered EUR 5.6 million. 
The project programme initiated at the beginning 
of the year provided funding for 47 projects. The or-
ganisation providing the largest amount of funding 
was VTT whose share was EUR 2.7 million.
The SAFIR2014 research programme is divided 
into nine competence areas, which mainly cor-
respond to the support group areas of the previ-
ous research programme. The new support group 
introduced at the beginning of 2011 is Support 
Group 9, Infrastructure, since the construction of 
significant arrays of test equipment is funded and 
guided at, for example, VTT and the Lappeenranta 
University of Technology. The areas of research un-
der SAFIR2014 and their shares of the total fund-
ing are shown in Figure 18.
In autumn 2012, the call for projects for the 
2013 project programme was updated with the 
additions to the SAFIR2014 framework plan con-
sidered necessary as a result of the Fukushima 
Dai-ichi nuclear disaster that took place in March 
2011. The call for projects resulted in new accident 
management proposals and expansion of earlier 
projects that dealt with the management of severe 
accidents and the provisions made for external 
threats.
Figure 18. Research	areas	of	SAFIR2014	programme	
and their shares of the total funding in 2012. 
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Development of research infrastructure
The research programme involved extensive 
development of Finnish expertise for defining the 
design basis of nuclear power plants and for pro-
ducing safety analyses, as well as for managing ex-
pert work and organisations with a high standard 
of safety culture. One topical detail is the research 
on external threats where the potential impacts 
of climate change on the extreme weather condi-
tions and sea water levels occurring in Finland 
were studied, along with the seismic requirements 
for nuclear facilities. Another topical issue is the 
definition of the source term for an accident, and 
provisions for accidents of a long duration.
The new four-year research programme 
KYT2014 covering the period 2011–2014 was also 
initiated in 2011. The programme framework con-
sists of research targets important to national com-
petence, organised into coordinated projects. The 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy ordered 
an international assessment of the programme, 
including an evaluation of the targets, practical 
execution and effectiveness of the programme. 
Results will be available in 2014. The KYT steer-
ing group gave its funding recommendations to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy, relying 
on the assessments of support groups. In 2012, 
the research programme provided funding for 31 
research projects representing new and alterna-
tive technologies for nuclear waste management 
(3 projects), safety research on nuclear waste man-
agement (27 projects), and social nuclear waste 
management research (1 project).
The safety research included three extensive 
and coordinated projects: safety case, the perfor-
mance of the buffer and backfilling materials, and 
the long-term durability of the canister. The other 
safety studies represented approximately 36% of 
the total volume of the programme. In 2012, the 
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Figure 19. Research areas of KYT2014 programme and 
their shares of the total funding in 2012.
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total funding of the KYT2014 programme was 
about EUR 2.7 million, of which funding from the 
National Nuclear Waste Management Fund makes 
up about EUR 1.7 million. Figure 19 shows the 
relative shares of these areas of the total funding.
A total of 37 proposals for research projects 
were submitted for the KYT2014 programme for 
2013. These have been evaluated using the same 
criteria as in the previous year, listed in the call 
for projects. The research programme according to 
the management group’s funding recommendation 
includes 32 research projects.
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9 Oversight of nuclear 
facilities in figures
9.1 Review of documents
In all, 3,351 documents were submitted to STUK 
for review in 2012. Of these, 1,163 concerned the 
nuclear power plant unit under construction, and 
241 were related to the final disposal facility for 
spent nuclear fuel. 3,355 document reviews were 
completed, including documents submitted in 
2012, those submitted earlier and licences granted 
by STUK in accordance with the Nuclear Energy 
Act, which are listed in Appendix 4. The average 
Figure 21. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on the Loviisa plant.
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Figure 22. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on the operating plant units of Olkiluoto.
Figure 23. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on Olkiluoto plant unit 3.
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Figure 20. Number of documents received and 
reviewed as well as average document review time.
Figure 24. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on Posiva.
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document review time was 129 days. The number 
of documents and their average review times in 
2008–2012 are shown in Figure 20. Figures 21–24 
present the distribution of review times for the 
document concerning the different plant units and 
Posiva.
9.2 Inspections on site and at 
suppliers’ premises
Periodic inspection programmes
A total of 20 inspections at the Loviisa plant and 
24 at the Olkiluoto plant were carried out un-
der the 2012 periodic inspection programme 
(Appendix 5). STUK carried out 14 inspections 
within the Olkiluoto 3 construction inspection pro-
gramme (Appendix 6) and four inspections within 
the Onkalo construction inspection programme 
(Appendix 7). The main findings of the inspections 
are presented in the chapters on regulatory over-
sight.
Other inspections at plant sites
A total of 1,030 inspections on site or at suppliers’ 
premises were carried out in 2012 (other than in-
spections of the periodic or construction inspection 
programmes, of the safeguards of nuclear materi-
als and of the construction inspection programme 
of the underground research facility at Olkiluoto, 
which are discussed separately). An inspection 
comprises one or more partial inspections, such as 
a review of results documentation, an inspection of 
a component or a structure, a pressure or leakage 
test, a functional test or a commissioning inspec-
tion. Of the inspections, 105 were related to the 
regulatory oversight of the plant under construc-
tion and 925 to that of the plants in operation.
The number of inspection days on site and at 
component manufacturers’ premises totalled 3,779. 
This number includes not only inspections pertain-
ing to the safety of nuclear power plants, but also 
those associated with nuclear waste management 
and safeguards, and audits and inspection of the 
underground research facility at Olkiluoto. A total 
of 294 inspection days outside normal working 
hours were spent at operating plant units, mostly 
during annual outages, as well as 96 inspection 
days at the plant unit under construction. Six 
resident inspectors worked at the Olkiluoto power 
plant and two resident inspectors at the Loviisa 
power plant. The numbers of on-site inspection 
days in 2008−2012 are shown in Figure 25.
9.3 Finances and resources
The duty area of nuclear safety regulation included 
basic operations subject to a charge, as well as op-
erations not subject to a charge. Basic operations 
subject to a charge mostly consisted of the reg-
ulatory oversight of nuclear facilities, with their 
costs charged to those subject to oversight. Those 
basic operations not subject to a charge included 
international and domestic cooperation, as well as 
emergency response operations and communica-
tions. Basic operations not subject to a charge are 
publicly funded. Overheads from the preparation 
of regulations and support functions (administra-
tion, development projects in support of regulatory 
activities, training, maintenance and development 
Figure 25. Number of inspection days onsite and at 
component manufacturers’ premises.
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Figure 26. Income	and	costs	of	nuclear	safety	
regulation.
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of expertise, and reporting, as well as participation 
in nuclear safety research) were carried forward 
into the costs of both types of basic operation and 
of contracted services in relation to the number of 
working hours spent on each function.
In 2012, the total cost of the regulatory over-
sight of nuclear safety subject to a charge was 
EUR 17.0 million. The total cost of nuclear safety 
regulation was EUR 18.6 million. The share of ac-
tivities subject to a charge was thus 91.4%.
The income from nuclear safety regulation in 
2012 was EUR 17.0 million. Of this, EUR 3.7 mil-
lion and EUR 10.7  million came from the in-
spection and review of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plants, respectively. In addition to 
the operating plant units, the income from the 
Olkiluoto plant includes that derived from the reg-
ulatory oversight of the Olkiluoto 3 construction 
project. The income from the regulatory oversight 
of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant also includes 
the costs invoiced for the safety assessment of 
the new plant unit projects. The income from the 
inspection and review of Posiva Oy’s operations 
was EUR 2.2 million. Figure 26 shows the annual 
income and costs from nuclear safety regulation in 
2008−2012.
The time spent on the inspection and review 
of the Loviisa nuclear power plant was 15.7 per-
son-years, i.e. 10.7% of the total working time of 
the nuclear safety regulation personnel. For the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant’s operating units it 
was 12.3 person-years, which accounts for 8.4% of 
the total working time. In addition to the oversight 
of the operation of nuclear power plants, the figure 
includes nuclear material control. The time spent 
on the inspection and review of Olkiluoto 3 was 
29.8 person-years, i.e. 20.2% of the total working 
time. Work related to the new power plant units 
amounted to 1.3 person-years, i.e. 0.9 % of the total 
working time. A total of 9.5 person-years, 6.4% of 
the total working time, were spent on inspection 
and review of Posiva’s operations. The time spent 
on international co-operation regarding regulatory 
oversight of nuclear safety was 4.0  person-years, 
and that spent on the FiR 1 research reactor was 
0.2 person-years. The working time spent on small-
scale users of nuclear material was 0.4 person-
years. Figure 27 shows the division of working 
hours of the personnel engaged in nuclear safety 
oversight (in person-years) by subject of oversight 
during 2005–2012.
Where necessary, STUK commissions indepen-
dent safety analyses and research in support of reg-
ulatory decision making. Figures 28 and 29 show 
the costs incurred by orders during 2005–2012. 
The costs in 2012 were mainly related to compara-
tive analysis, independent assessments and third-
party consultants’ inspection work concerning the 
plant unit under construction, as well as to assess-
ment work concerning the safety documentation 
for final disposal of nuclear waste. Appendix 8 
shows the assignments financed by STUK in 2012 
regarding the safety of nuclear power plants and 
final disposal of nuclear waste. Assessment of the 
safety documentation for final disposal of nuclear 
waste is discussed in section 5.1.3.
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Figure 27. Distribution of working hours (person-years) of the regulatory personnel by subject of oversight  
in	2005–2012.	Until	2011	the	nuclear	waste	management	includes	both	the	oversight	of	the	operating	
nuclear power plants’ nuclear waste management as well as the oversight of Posiva, since 2012 only the 
oversight of Posiva. The oversight of the operating nuclear power plants’ nuclear waste management is 
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Figure 28. The costs of research and commissioned 
work pertaining to the safety of nuclear power plants.
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Figure 29. The costs of research and commissioned 
work pertaining to nuclear waste management and 
nuclear non-proliferation.
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Table 6. Distribution of working hours (person-years) of the regulatory personnel in each duty area.
Duty area 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Basic operations subject to a charge 60.7 68.0 70.5 70.2 68.9
Basic operations not subject to a charge 6.3 6.6 7.8 8.8 5.6
Contracted services 2.2 1.7 1.9 1.7 2.2
Rule-making and support functions 31.5 33.6 38.2 43.0 46.3
Holidays and absences 21.1 23.5 24.3 24.7 24.7
Total 121.8 133.5 142.9 148.4 147.7
The distribution of the annual working time 
of the nuclear safety regulation personnel to the 
various duty areas is shown in Table 6.
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10 Development of 
regulatory oversight
10.1 STUK’s own development projects
Changes in practices and the organisation 
updated into the quality manual
A total of 36 guides were updated in the nuclear 
safety regulation quality manual, and 37 appen-
dices to the guides were updated. Two new guides 
were completed, together with a total of three ap-
pendices to different guides. The new guides con-
cerned the management of the access rights to 
the TARKKA system, used in the preparation of 
inspection records, and the oversight of the final 
disposal of radioactive materials. The guides were 
updated following changes in procedures as well 
as changes in the personnel of the Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation department and the Nuclear Waste and 
Material Regulation department.
International assessment of STUK’s 
regulatory oversight operations
A team of more than 20 experts headed by the IAEA 
carried out an extensive evaluation of STUK’s over-
sight operations in October 2012. The final report 
of the evaluation team was completed in November, 
and STUK used the recommendations to produce 
an action plan. On the whole, STUK’s nuclear en-
ergy oversight operations were assessed to be of a 
high quality. Recommendations were given on the 
independence of STUK, on the development of in-
spection and review procedures, and competence 
management.
The assessment results were also utilised in 
the development of STUK’s strategy. The agreed 
development measures will be implemented during 
2013–2015.
Development project for the 
periodic inspection programme
The operational model developed within the pe-
riodic inspection programme development project 
(KOTKA) was adopted. The new model includes a 
systematic assessment of the organisation’s opera-
tions in all the inspections of the periodic inspec-
tion programme; the observations will be summed 
up in quarterly briefings. The new model allows 
easier assessment of overall safety.
Development of the oversight of 
nuclear waste management
In 2012, the development of nuclear waste manage-
ment focused on the planning of oversight practices 
for the final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, 
and the further development of inspection criteria 
for the construction licence application. Since this 
is the first application of the plant type, oversight 
must be planned in stages as the project proceeds.
Development of the records 
management system
A version upgrade to the records management 
system adopted in 2009 was prepared in 2012. 
However, the adoption of a shared system for sev-
eral state agencies was postponed to 2013.
Electronic inspection protocols 
were adopted in new areas
The electronic inspection protocol system 
(TARKKA) introduced in 2011 was expanded to the 
periodic inspection programme protocols. The func-
tionality and availability of the system was also 
improved on the basis of feedback gathered when 
the system was first taken into use.
10.2 Renewal and human resources
Training for inspectors was organised, for example, 
concerning nuclear power plant systems and regu-
latory activities. New STUK inspectors participat-
ed in a national training programme in the field 
of nuclear safety (the YK course), which STUK 
organises together with other actors in the field. 
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The total duration of the ninth YK course was 20 
days in six periods. Three of the periods took place 
in spring 2012. Eight STUK employees partici-
pated in the YK9 course. In the autumn 2012, the 
YK10 course began with eight STUK inspectors 
participating. The total number of participants in 
the YK10 course was 75.
STUK was actively involved in the plan-
ning and execution of nuclear waste manage-
ment training, now organised for the third time 
as a course of a little over a week’s duration. 
The course gathered together 24 students, and 
the lecturers were experts from the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy, STUK, Posiva, 
Fortum, Fennovoima, TVO, Aalto University, the 
Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University 
of Helsinki, and Saanio & Riekkola. The course 
focused on the main themes of nuclear waste man-
agement, covering the entire nuclear fuel cycle. In 
addition to lectures, the course involved an exer-
cise on safety argumentation.
STUK’s inspectors also participated in training 
provided by external enterprises, such as lead au-
ditor training, project operations training and au-
dit training. STUK’s inspectors also participated in 
various domestic and international training events 
in the sector, both as participants and lecturers. In 
addition, supervisors in the field of nuclear safety 
participated in management and leadership skills 
coaching programmes.
Two Master’s theses were completed in the 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation department in 2012, 
one concerning the assessment of the adequacy of 
Olkiluoto 3 test operation on the basis of accident 
analyses, and one concerning the generation of 
cross section data files in the Serpent-ARES cal-
culation chain. In addition to these, two Master’s 
theses were prepared for completion in 2013.
On average, 9.8 days per inspector in the field 
of nuclear waste and materials regulation and 8.2 
days per inspector in the field of nuclear reactor 
regulation were spent on developing the expertise 
of STUK’s nuclear safety experts in 2012.
Five new employees were hired for nuclear 
reactor regulation in 2012. Their position are in 
the oversight of operation, water chemistry, regu-
lations and competence development. Three new 
inspectors were recruited for the regulatory over-
sight of nuclear waste management in the areas 
of management system and quality assurance, as-
sessment of the bedrock in the final disposal facil-
ity, and oversight of the design and engineering of 
nuclear waste facilities.
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11 Emergency 
preparedness
In 2012, Finnish nuclear power plants reported 
14 events of failures to the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority. The nuclear power plant control 
rooms tested regularly the secured telephone con-
nections built for emergency situations and real-
time data transfer from power plant process com-
puters to STUK’s emergency response centre.
STUK organised emergency training and exer-
cises related to nuclear power plant and radiation 
emergencies. The exercises test the operation of 
the emergency response organisation, the feasibil-
ity of the emergency response procedures and the 
usability of the emergency response premises in 
practice. Operations, procedures and tools are re-
vised on the basis of the feedback received from the 
exercises. The exercises also serve to familiarise 
new personnel with their duties in the emergency 
response organisation.
The Olkiluoto exercise was organised on 18 
October 2012 as an annual drill by the power 
plant and STUK, with the Finnish Meteorological 
Institute and the Regional Rescue Service of 
Satakunta also involved. Other participants in-
cluded the on-call personnel from the Ministry 
of the Interior, the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health, and the Government Situation Centre. 
Other parties required in the situation were simu-
lated by STUK. The date of the exercise had been 
provided in advance, but not the exact time. The 
actual weather conditions were used in the exer-
cise.
STUK tested the initial stage operations and 
the generation of status information as well as 
cooperation with other organisations. STUK 
launched the necessary measures with no delay. 
STUK produced status reports, recommendations 
for the protection activities required by the hypo-
thetical situation, and press releases. The exercise 
was the first time that STUK tested the use of 
an information officer of the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health for the preparation of press re-
leases in Swedish. The practice proved successful. 
Information was transmitted in STUK’s protected 
Finri site. The exercise was also the first time that 
the relay of status information using the IAEA’s 
USIE website, especially built for exercises, was 
tested.
The exercise was a part of the international 
IRRS evaluation of nuclear safety, nuclear ma-
terials and preparedness. International review-
ers gave positive feedback on the competence 
and motivation of STUK personnel and the work, 
procedures and tools of the emergency response 
organisation. STUK also had its own reviewers in 
all action groups. A total of 65 persons from STUK 
participated in the exercise.
STUK actively participated in the work of the 
emergency response cooperation groups in both 
Eastern Uusimaa and Satakunta. Both groups 
include the most important operators of the early 
stages of an emergency: in addition to STUK, rep-
resentatives from the power companies, the rescue 
services and the police. The Satakunta group also 
includes the Finnish Border Guard; the Eastern 
Uusimaa group also involves the emergency care 
organisation. Meetings of the cooperation teams 
discussed issues such as emergency response train-
ing, experiences gained from drills, the update 
status of external rescue plans, organisations’ de-
velopment projects, and changes to legislation.
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12 Communication
STUK’s nuclear safety communications are based 
on active, immediate, open and honest communica-
tion and media services. In 2012, STUK published 
approximately 30 pieces of news on nuclear safety. 
Nuclear safety specialists also gave numerous in-
terviews to domestic and international media on 
subjects such as the stress tests of the nuclear 
power plants and the final disposal of spent nucle-
ar fuel.
Direct communications to the public via STUK’s 
website and social media, such as Facebook and 
Twitter, are an important part of the communica-
tions. STUK also answers questions that the public 
presents by telephone or e-mail, participates in 
public meetings and receives guest groups.
In 2012, STUK’s nuclear safety communications 
were focused on the improvement of the safety of 
nuclear power plants as a result of the Fukushima 
nuclear power plant accident. In this context, 
STUK provided information on the progress and 
results of national assessments and the EU’s stress 
tests throughout the year. A total of seven press re-
leases were published. The ability of the Olkiluoto 
power plant to deal with a long power outage was a 
particular topic of public discussion.
The European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group 
(ENSREG) published a summary of the stress tests 
of European nuclear power plants on 26 April and 
organised a public event in Brussels at the begin-
ning of May to let nuclear safety regulators, power 
companies, civic organisations, the media, and the 
interested public discuss the stress tests. STUK 
provided information on the ENSREG report and 
invited the representatives of Finnish civic organ-
isations and media to the event in Brussels.
STUK also organised its own event in Finland, 
directed at stakeholders and the public, on 16 May. 
The event was broadcasted live via the STUK web-
site.
On 11 March, the anniversary of the Fukushima 
disaster, STUK’s experts answered questions about 
Fukushima on STUK’s Facebook page. The infor-
mation from Fukushima investigations has been 
gathered under its own section on STUK’s Finnish 
website.
During the year, STUK provided information 
for two international assessments organised by the 
IAEA. The international IPPAS group performed a 
follow-up assessment of Finnish nuclear security 
and security arrangements in April. An interna-
tional IRRS peer evaluation of Finnish oversight of 
nuclear energy and the use of radiation took place 
in October.
STUK also organised a briefing about the IRRS 
evaluation together with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency IAEA as soon as the first evalu-
ation results were available. The briefing was 
broadcast live via the website; a recording of it is 
still available.
At the end of May and the beginning of June, 
STUK’s directors and experts told the public in 
Loviisa and Eurajoki about the results of the over-
sight activities at the nuclear power plants and 
their environment, and about topical issues related 
to nuclear safety. The public events were organised 
in cooperation with the municipalities. 
STUK provided information as quickly as possi-
ble on all deficiencies observed at Finnish nuclear 
power plants that require a special report from the 
licensee or that are otherwise considered matters 
of public interest. 
In 2012, STUK gave information on its website 
about observations made in the inspections and 
oversight of the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit, currently 
under construction, on 15 separate occasions. Even 
though the events did not put the safety of the 
plant or the environment at risk, STUK reported 
them with no delay in accordance with its commu-
nications policy.
STUK-B 162
97
STUK reports the operation, events and over-
sight of the operating power plant units as well 
as the oversight of Olkiluoto 3 and nuclear waste 
management on a quarterly basis. In the annual 
report published in April 2012, STUK reported 
the regulatory oversight of nuclear safety and the 
related observations in 2011. The annual report 
included, among other things, the overall safety as-
sessments of nuclear power plants, produced on the 
basis of the observations made during oversight ac-
tivities. The reports were published in printed form 
and as electronic versions on the STUK website.
With regard to international cooperation, STUK 
provided information on a cooperation agreement 
being signed with the regulatory authority of South 
Korea, on the appointment of Director General 
Tero Varjoranta as the head of the European 
Nuclear Safety Regulators Group ENSREG, and on 
a nuclear safety conference organised by the IAEA 
in August.
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 13 International cooperation
International evaluation of the 
measures launched as a result 
of the Fukushima accident
EU stress tests
As a result of the Fukushima accident, the EU 
launched stress tests for operating nuclear power 
plants and for those under construction. The pur-
pose of these tests was to establish how the plants 
would cope with exceptional external events and 
other situations associated with the simultane-
ous loss of operability of several safety systems. 
The national stress test reports were prepared by 
nuclear safety authorities by the end of 2011, and 
an international peer evaluation of the national 
measures was carried out at the beginning of 2012.
The peer evaluation of national reports took 
place in a two-week event held in Luxembourg 
in February. The evaluation was carried out by 
three parallel groups that examined the reports 
by subject area: external threats, loss of safety 
functions, and serious accident management. One 
expert from STUK participated in the work of each 
evaluation group. Before the two-week event, the 
evaluation groups had presented additional ques-
tions on the basis of the national reports; these 
questions were answered within each group in 
a two-hour discussion session. Finland only sent 
STUK specialists to the peer evaluation, but many 
other countries also sent representatives of power 
companies to answer questions. Country-specific 
draft evaluation reports were prepared based on 
the Luxembourg event.
Evaluations were continued in March during 
country visits, including discussions with each 
country’s authorities and visit to one plant. During 
the country visit, questions that had remained 
open in Luxembourg were answered, and the situ-
ation of the plants was verified as far as possible 
during the short visit. Two STUK experts par-
ticipated in country visits to other countries. STUK 
acted as host to the visit to Finland, and the plant 
visit took place at the Loviisa power plant. At the 
power plant, STUK managed the discussions with 
the evaluation group, and the representatives of 
the licensee guided the guests around the plant. 
Country-specific evaluation reports were finalised 
during the visits, and comments from STUK were 
requested for the report concerning Finland to 
avoid any misunderstandings.
ENSREG (European Nuclear Safety Regulator’s 
Group) used the peer evaluations as a basis for rec-
ommendations that should be taken into account 
when making safety improvements to nuclear pow-
er plants. The recommendations and the country-
specific evaluations were published at the end of 
April. The Finnish country report did not reveal 
any major issues that STUK had not already in-
cluded in its requirements to the power companies 
or in planned revisions to regulatory guidelines.
In December 2011, power companies had pre-
sented their own plans and estimates for the safety 
improvements to be implemented following the 
Fukushima disaster. STUK wanted to see the re-
sults of the stress test peer evaluation before com-
menting on these plans. After publication of the 
peer evaluation results, STUK issued decisions and 
additional requirements for the licensee’s plans in 
July 2012. Some issues were still left to wait for 
the final requirements of the nuclear safety regula-
tions currently being revised.
In September 2012, additional visits to some 
nuclear power plants in selected countries were 
made within the stress tests. Finland was not a 
target of these visits, but one representative of 
STUK participated in plant visits in other coun-
tries.
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Second extraordinary meeting of the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety
The second extraordinary meeting of the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) was held 
in Vienna at the end of August to discuss the 
safety improvements implemented following the 
Fukushima disaster. Unlike the EU stress tests, 
the CNS meeting also discussed implemented mea-
sures and the prerequisites of the maintenance of 
safety on a national level. STUK had delivered a 
report on Finland’s status to the meeting in May 
2012. The CNS meeting discussed nuclear safety 
issues in groups in accordance with the subjects 
included in the report: external threats, design 
basis, serious accident management, national or-
ganisations, emergency response operations, and 
international cooperation. Several STUK experts 
participated in the meeting to ensure representa-
tion in all groups. The director general of STUK 
chaired the design basis group in the meeting. Of 
the power companies, TVO had also sent a repre-
sentative to the meeting.
Further plans
ENSREG will organise an evaluation of the nation-
al plans to be executed on the basis of the stress 
tests. National plans were delivered to ENSREG 
by the end of 2012. The plans aimed to demon-
strate that ENSREG’s recommendations had been 
followed. National plans will be evaluated simi-
larly to the national stress test reports in April 
2013 in a one-week meeting held in Brussels. In 
Finland, many of the recommended measures were 
already in place before the Fukushima disaster.
International operating experience feedback
STUK’s activities
STUK has a working group for follow-up and re-
view of international operating experience events 
and reports from nuclear power plants. The work-
ing group includes STUK experts from various 
fields of technology. In 2012, the working group 
assessed in its monthly meetings a total of ap-
proximately 100 reports received from the IAEA’s 
operating experience database. Of 81 assessed re-
ports, 60 required no measures at Finnish nuclear 
power plants. With regard to five events, the prac-
tices and arrangements in place at Finnish nuclear 
power plants were found to be adequate to prevent 
similar events. In the cases of 14 event reports, it 
was decided that the situation at Finnish nuclear 
power plants should be subjected to closer assess-
ment in connection with the periodic inspection 
programme or the inspections carried out during 
the annual outage. Two reports, one of which was 
an event at Olkiluoto 1 reported by STUK, were 
considered to require measures at Finnish nuclear 
power plants or in future nuclear power projects.
One new report, one addition to an earlier re-
port and one follow-up report of events at Finnish 
nuclear power plants were added to the IAEA’s 
operating experience database (International 
Reporting System for Operating Experience, IRS). 
The new report concerned fractures observed in 
the valves of an overpressure protection and re-
sidual heat removal system of the reactor cool-
ant system at Olkiluoto  1 and Olkiluoto  2; the 
addition to an earlier report concerned the outer 
steam line isolation valves’ disturbances detected 
at Olkiluoto  1 in 2009; and the follow-up report 
concerned the repairs and modifications carried 
out for the pipe penetrations of the emergency 
cooling system pump rooms of the Olkiluoto plant 
units to repair the deficiencies reported in 2009. In 
addition, STUK submitted four feedback reports 
to the IAEA’s IRS system on measures required on 
the basis of these reports in Finland.
STUK’s expert acted as a national specialist at 
the EU OEF Clearinghouse, Petten, for the entire 
year preparing a report on the events of digital 
I&C systems.
Major events
The inspections carried out on Doel 3 in Belgium 
in July revealed indications in the pressure ves-
sel material, believed to have been created during 
manufacturing due to deficient hydrogen removal 
heat treatment. Doel 3 is a pressurised water unit 
first commissioned in the first half of the 1980s, 
with a pressure vessel manufactured at a Dutch 
shipyard. The shipyard has manufactured pres-
sure vessels during the period for several plants in 
Europe and the U.S. There are no pressure vessels 
from this manufacturer in Finland. The Belgian 
nuclear safety authority published a preliminary 
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IRS report on the observations, and asked at the 
same time the authorities of other countries about 
the kinds of inspections that had been carried out 
at other plants. European countries which have 
pressure vessels from the same manufacturer also 
reported their measures at the meetings of the 
IAEA’s IRS coordinators and the operating experi-
ence group (WGOE) of the OECD/NEA.
Another event that had launched measures at 
Finnish power plants already a year earlier was 
a fire in the containment of Ringhals 2 during an 
annual outage. As a result of the fire, it was ob-
served that the containment spray system could 
potentially be blocked (plugs and welding residue 
from modification work carried out in 1988). The 
investigations and resulting measures of Finnish 
nuclear power plants remain unfinished.
International conventions
STUK prepared a national report for the extraor-
dinary meeting of the Convention on Nuclear 
Safety and delivered it to the IAEA according to 
the agreed schedule. The meeting considered the 
safety improvement and preparedness measures 
deemed necessary following the Fukushima disas-
ter, as well as the need to modify the Convention on 
Nuclear Safety and the related evaluation process.
It was decided that the Convention shall not 
be modified at this stage, but detail was added 
to the evaluation procedure. In addition, it was 
decided that a new working group would be estab-
lished to discuss the needs for modifications in the 
Convention and the related practices. The results 
will be reported in the sixth review meeting of the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety in spring 2014.
STUK experts presented Finland’s report in the 
review meeting of the international nuclear waste 
management convention. The report and Finland’s 
practices were well received. The meeting stated 
that Finland’s long-term strategy for the final dis-
posal of spent nuclear fuel, as well as the definition 
of strict dose limits for both the employees and the 
general population, were good practices. It was also 
stated that future challenges include the schedule 
of the final disposal project, the management of na-
tional competence, the nuclear waste management 
of the new operator, and the safety improvements 
required following the Fukushima disaster.
Cooperation within international 
organisations and with other countries
MDEP
The Multinational Design Evaluation Programme 
(MDEP) was established upon the initiative of the 
United States nuclear safety authority (Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, NRC). It involves ten 
countries with the objective of improving coopera-
tion in the field of the assessment of new nuclear 
power plants and developing convergent regula-
tory practices. In addition to the U.S., the follow-
ing countries participate in the programme: South 
Africa, India, South Korea, France, Finland, the 
United Kingdom, Russia, and the United Arab 
Emirates. Participants in the programme include 
only those countries with new nuclear power plants 
at some stage of assessment by the regulatory au-
thorities. The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency func-
tions as the secretariat for the programme.
The MDEP’s work is organised in design-spe-
cific and issue-specific working groups. In addi-
tion, the MDEP has a management group and a 
steering group. STUK is represented in all these 
groups. There are three plant type-specific working 
groups: the EPR group, the AP 1000 group and the 
APR1400 group. Finland is involved in the work 
of the EPR and APR1400 groups. An EPR unit 
is currently under construction in Olkiluoto, and 
APR1400 is one of the alternatives for the OL4 
plant unit. The other countries in the EPR group 
include France, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Canada and China. The participants in 
the APR1400 group include, in addition to Finland, 
the United Arab Emirates, South Korea, and the 
United States. The EPR working group is chaired 
by the Finnish representative; the working group 
has four subgroups dealing with plant automa-
tion, accidents and transients, severe accidents 
and probabilistic risk analyses (PRAs). STUK’s 
representative chairs the PRA subgroup. The EPR 
group’s work was originally a continuation of coop-
eration between the Finnish and French authori-
ties concerning safety assessment of EPR power 
plants. The APR1400 group held its first meeting 
in late 2012. Finland will be involved in the work of 
the group for as long as the plant type is one of the 
alternatives for the OL4 unit.
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The MDEP working groups independent of 
plant design dealt with the following three subjects:
•	Inspections	of	plant	and	equipment	suppliers
•	Pressure	equipment	standards
•	Programmable	I&C.
STUK participated in the activities of all three 
issue-specific working groups. The objective of the 
working group dealing with plant and equipment 
supplier inspections is to establish the procedures 
and requirements applied to inspections by the 
participating countries and to create the proce-
dures and goals for joint inspections. The objective 
of the working group dealing with pressure equip-
ment is the harmonisation of requirements in dif-
ferent standards. The Digital I&C working group 
aims to promote coordinated development of the 
IEC and IEEE standards, among others. In addi-
tion, some individual issues have been chosen, on 
which common positions have been drafted.
Co-operation within the IAEA
The IAEA continued to revise its regulatory guides 
on nuclear safety. STUK had a representative in 
the Commission on Safety Standards (CSS) man-
aging the preparation of the regulatory guides as 
well as in the committees dealing with the con-
tent of the regulatory guides, i.e. the Nuclear 
Safety Standards Committee (NUSSC), the 
Waste Safety Standards Committee (WASSC), the 
Radiation Safety Standards Committee (RASSC) 
and the Transport Safety Standards Committee 
(TRANSSC). STUK issued statements on the IAEA 
regulatory guides under preparation. STUK also 
participated in the composition of regulatory guide 
drafts in small expert groups.
STUK’s representatives were included in ex-
pert groups assembled by the IAEA to assess the 
operations of Swedish, Greek and Slovakian safety 
authorities, and in the IAEA group to assess the 
safety of the injection-based final disposal of liquid 
waste in Russia.
STUK is the Finnish contact organisation for 
the following nuclear energy information exchange 
systems maintained by the IAEA:
•	 Incident	Reporting	System	(IRS)
•	 Incident	Reporting	System	 for	Research	Reac-
tors (IRSRR)
•	 International	Nuclear	Event	Scale	(INES)
•	 Power	Reactor	Information	System	(PRIS)
•	 Nuclear	 Fuel	 Cycle	 Information	 System	 (NF-
CIS)
•	 Net	 Enabled	 Waste	 Management	 Database	
(NEWMDB)
•	 Directory	for	Radioactively	Contaminated	Sites	
(DRCS)
•	 Illicit	Trafficking	Database	(ITDB)
•	 Database	 on	 Events	 that	 have	 arisen	 during	
Transport of Radioactive Material (EVTRAM).
Cooperation within the EU
STUK participated in the activities of the EU 
Member States’ nuclear safety regulators’ coop-
eration group (ENSREG, European Nuclear Safety 
Regulators Group) and in two of its subgroups (nu-
clear safety and nuclear waste management). The 
cooperation group took part in the preparation of 
the nuclear waste management directive and co-
ordinated the implementation of the directive, as 
well as that of the nuclear safety directive, in the 
member countries. The director general of STUK 
chaired ENSREG starting from July.
STUK participated in the nuclear safety, nu-
clear waste and decommissioning work carried 
out by WENRA (Western European Regulators’ 
Association) and its working groups. The groups 
have developed common safety reference levels 
on the basis of the IAEA standards, and an agree-
ment regarding their implementation in all mem-
ber countries has been concluded between the 
members of WENRA. WENRA continued the ear-
lier work for defining the safety objectives of new 
plants and for establishing the differences and 
common features of inspection operations in differ-
ent countries.
Cooperation within the OECD/NEA
The Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD (NEA) 
coordinates international cooperation in the field of 
safety research in particular. The organisation also 
provides an opportunity for co-operation between 
regulatory authorities. STUK was represented in 
all main committees of the organisation dealing 
with radiation and nuclear safety issues. The main 
committees’ fields of activity are:
•	 Nuclear	 safety	 regulation	 (CNRA,	 Committee	
on Nuclear Regulatory Activities)
•	 Safety	research	(CSNI,	Committee	on	the	Safe-
ty of Nuclear Installations)
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•	 Radiation	safety	(CRPPH,	Committee	on	Radia-
tion Protection and Public Health)
•	 Nuclear	waste	management	 (RWMC,	Radioac-
tive Waste Management Committee).
Other international cooperation
STUK organised a meeting of the Network of 
Regulators of Small Nuclear Programs (NERS). 
The aim of the NERS cooperation is to promote co-
operation between the authorities of small nuclear 
power countries in issues typical of these coun-
tries. In addition to Finland, the following coun-
tries participate in NERS: Argentina, Belgium, 
South Africa, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Slovakia, 
Switzerland and the Czech Republic. Finland 
chaired the NERS.
STUK participated in the cooperation between 
the regulatory authorities of countries with VVER 
power plants (such as the Loviisa NPP) via the 
VVER Forum. STUK’s representative chairs the 
safety oversight working group. The working 
group’s focused on the assessment and oversight of 
management systems.
STUK’s representatives were members of the 
supporting committee to the Swedish nuclear safe-
ty authority, and a reactor safety expert group 
called by the Swiss nuclear safety authority.
STUK participated in the work of the European 
Safeguards Research and Development Association 
(ESARDA). The purpose of ESARDA is to promote 
and harmonise the European research and devel-
opment work on nuclear safeguards.
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Summary of the safety performance 
indicators for nuclear power plants
Background and objectives 
of the indicator system
Safety is a primary prerequisite for the operation 
of nuclear power plants. The power companies and 
STUK evaluate and oversee the safety and op-
eration of the plants in many ways. Along with 
inspections and safety reviews, indicators are a 
method of acquiring information on the safety level 
of the plant and on any changes to the safety level. 
The STUK indicator system consists of two main 
groups: 1) plant safety indicators, and 2) indicators 
describing the efficiency of the authorities. This 
summary covers the indicators describing plant 
safety.
The objective of the indicator system is to rec-
ognise changes in plant safety as early as possible. 
If the indicators weaken, the factors behind the 
development are defined and changes to plant op-
eration and STUK’s oversight of the area are con-
sidered. Indicators can also be used to monitor the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the corrective mea-
sures. The information yielded by the indicators is 
also used when communicating nuclear safety.
In the indicator system, nuclear safety is divid-
ed into three sectors: 1) safety and quality culture, 
2) operational events, and 3) structural integrity. 
STUK began the development of its own indicator 
system in 1995. Since 2006, indicator information 
has been managed in STUK’s INDI (INdicator 
DIsplay) information system. Nominated STUK 
representatives are responsible for the mainte-
nance and analysis of the indicators. Individual 
indicators, their maintenance procedures and the 
interpretation of results are presented at the end 
of this summary. A brief summary of the safety 
situation in each plant in 2012 is presented below, 
followed by the detailed results by indicator.
Nuclear safety
A.I Safety and quality culture A.II Operational events A.III Structural integrity
1. Failures and their repairs 1. Number of events 1. Fuel integrity
2. Exemptions and deviations from 
the Operational Limits and 
Conditions
3. Risk-significance of events
2. Primary and secondary circuits 
integrity
3. Unavailability of safety systems 4. Accident risk of nuclear facilities
3. Containment integrity
4. Occupational radiation doses
5. Number of fire alarms5. Radioactive releases
6. Investments in facilities
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Results of the safety performance 
indicators for the nuclear 
power plants in 2012
Summary of indicator results for 
the Loviisa power plant
Structural integrity
In 2012, the reactor of Loviisa 1 had no leaking 
fuel. A minor fuel leak was observed at Loviisa 2 in 
December 2012. The leaking fuel assembly will be 
removed in the 2013 annual outage. Based on in-
dicator values, the integrity of the reactor coolant 
system of both plant units remained good in 2012.
The overall as-found leakage of the outer isola-
tion valves of Loviisa 1 has decreased. At Loviisa 2, 
the overall as-found leakage increased, and based 
on the first tests, exceeded the limit set for overall 
leakage. Two outer isolation valves with plenty of 
leakage formed 85% of the overall as-found leak-
age. Both lines also have inner isolation valves. 
After the repair of the valves, the overall as-found 
leakage was again below the set limit.
The indicator describing the overall as-found 
leakage of the personnel airlock, material airlock, 
emergency personnel airlock, reactor pit, inward 
relief valves, cable penetrations and bellows seals 
(RA, RL, TL23), is good at both plant units.
Radiation doses and releases
In 2012, the eight-year annual outage took place at 
Loviisa 1, and a short annual outage at Loviisa 2. 
The time used for annual outages was long, and 
there was a high amount of work with signifi-
cance for radiation protection, which resulted in a 
total collective dose that was higher than that of 
the previous years. Radiation protection measures 
were carried out in the appropriate manner, and 
the occupational radiation doses at the nuclear 
power plant were below the personal dose limits. 
Releases into the environment were small in 2012, 
well below the set limits.
Operational events at the plant
Two reactor trips took place at the Loviisa power 
plant in 2012. The number of reactor trips has 
always been low at the power plant. The previous 
reactor trips happened in 2004 and 2010. The num-
ber of reported operational transients increased 
Safety and quality culture is assessed on the 
basis of information concerning the radiation pro-
tection and the operation and maintenance of the 
plant. The operation and maintenance of the plant 
is monitored using the failure and maintenance 
data for the components with an effect on the safe 
operation of the plant, as well as by monitoring 
compliance with the operational limits and con-
ditions (OLC). The success of radiation protec-
tion is monitored on the basis of the employees’ 
radiation doses and radioactive releases into the 
environment. When assessing the safety and qual-
ity culture, attention is also paid to investments to 
improve the plant and to the up-to-dateness of the 
plant documentation.
The indicators concerning operational 
events are used to monitor special situations and 
significant disturbances at the plant. Special situ-
ations include events with an effect on the safety 
of the plant, the personnel or the environment. A 
special report is required for any special situa-
tions. Correspondingly, a disturbance report must 
be prepared for any significant disturbances oc-
curring at a plant unit. Such disturbances include 
reactor and turbine trips, and other operational 
transients leading to a forced reduction of more 
than 5% in the reactor power or average gross 
power. Risk indicators are used to monitor the 
safety effect of the equipment’s unavailability pe-
riods and the development of the plant’s risk level. 
The results provide insight into the operational 
activities at the plant and the efficiency of the op-
erating experience feedback system.
Structural integrity is assessed on the basis 
of the leak-tightness of the multiple radioactivity 
confinement barriers – the fuel, primary and sec-
ondary circuits, and the containment. The integri-
ty must meet the set objectives while the indicators 
must show no significant deterioration. Fuel integ-
rity is monitored on the basis of the radioactivity 
of the primary coolant and the number of leaking 
fuel bundles. The water chemistry indicators are 
used to monitor and control primary and second-
ary circuit integrity. The monitoring is done by 
indices depicting water chemistry control and by 
following selected corrosive impurities and corro-
sion products. The integrity of the containment is 
monitored by testing the leak tightness of isolation 
valves, penetrations and air locks.
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from the previous years, but remained reasonable 
when long-term data is considered. Seven opera-
tional transients occurred during the year. A leak 
in the reactor coolant pump seal water line at 
Loviisa 2 was a significant operational event. The 
plant unit was consequently shut down for a short 
outage. The number of events discussed in spe-
cial reports was clearly higher than in the previ-
ous years. The number of events constituting non-
compliance with operational limits and conditions 
(OLC) was considerably higher in 2012 than in the 
previous years. The events had no impact on the 
safety of the plant or its environment.
For the Loviisa power plant, the most signifi-
cant factors affecting the overall accident risk in-
clude internal plant events during outages (such as 
falling heavy loads in the reactor hall), fire, a high 
level of seawater during power operation and oil 
spills during a refuelling outage. The annual prob-
ability of a severe reactor accident calculated for 
the Loviisa plant units has decreased by about 27% 
from the previous year. Several minor plant modifi-
cations, improvements of computational modelling 
and verification of reliability data have contributed 
to the reduction of the risk. Loviisa power plant’s 
accident risk has continued to decrease over the 
last 10 years, and new risk factors discovered as 
the scope of the risk analysis has been extended, 
have been systematically removed.
The functionality of safety systems is monitored 
at the Loviisa power plant on the basis of the un-
availability of the high-pressure safety injection 
system, the emergency feed water system and the 
emergency diesel generators. As in previous years, 
safety systems remained in good condition in 2012. 
The indicators show that the maintenance of and 
fault repairs to components important to safety 
was appropriate.
There were no events classified as fires at the 
Loviisa power plant or in its immediate vicinity in 
2012. The power plant’s fire detection system had 
a similar number of faults as in the previous year. 
The average fire safety of the Loviisa plant has re-
mained at the same level.
The number of common cause failures has in-
creased slightly from the previous years. In 2012, 
three safety-significant common cause failures 
were identified at the Loviisa power plant. These 
included the neglect of the testing of recombiners 
in the reactor building’s annular space in accor-
dance with the operational limits and conditions, 
faulty settings of the thermal relays in the motors 
of 0.4 kV pumps, and the programmable technol-
ogy found in the voltage relays installed into safety 
classified switchgear. The common cause failure 
with the most safety significance was the faulty 
setting of the thermal relays in the motors of the 
0.4 kV pumps. Human factors were behind the ob-
served common cause failures.
Summary of indicator results for 
the Olkiluoto power plant
Structural integrity
Based on water chemistry indicators, the integrity 
of the reactor coolant circuits of the Olkiluoto plant 
units was good in 2012. The impurity and corrosion 
product levels in reactor water and feed water, fol-
lowed in STUK’s indicator scheme, were in keeping 
with the guide values set by the licensee at both 
plant units.
Fuel integrity of Olkiluoto 1 was good in the 
2011–2012 operating cycle, and no leaks were 
detected.
One leaking fuel assembly was removed from 
the reactor of Olkiluoto 2 during the annual out-
age. The leak started in 2011. Several fuel leaks 
have occurred in the 2000s at the Olkiluoto plant 
units, particularly at Olkiluoto 2. The main reason 
for the leaks has been small foreign objects enter-
ing the reactor during maintenance operations, 
which can get caught in the fuel assembly struc-
tures. The coolant flow may make the loose objects 
vibrate and break the fuel cladding. To prevent 
this, fuel assemblies with new sieve structures for 
foreign objects have been loaded into the reactor of 
Olkiluoto 2 in 2012. The sieve profiling has been 
changed to make the grid denser.
The overall as-found leakage of the outer iso-
lation valves of Olkiluoto 1 increased when com-
pared to the previous year, but remained clearly 
below the limit set in the operating limits and 
conditions (OLC). The overall as-found leakage of 
the outer isolation valves of Olkiluoto 2 decreased 
from the previous year, and was below the limit 
set in the OLC. The percentage of isolation valves 
that passed the leak tightness test at first attempt 
has remained high for both plant units. The overall 
as-found leakage rate of containment penetrations, 
in which TVO includes leakages in the upper and 
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lower personnel airlocks, the maintenance dome 
and the containment dome, has remained small for 
both plant units.
Radiation doses and releases
The radiation doses received by employees and the 
releases into the environment remained small and 
clearly below the limits set in official regulations. 
At Olkiluoto, the occupational radiation dose was 
the lowest in the power plant’s operational history. 
The new steam driers, installed to the reactors in 
2005 and 2006, have further lowered the radiation 
levels in the turbine island and thus the collective 
dose.
The releases of substances with gamma activity 
into the sea from the Olkiluoto power plant have 
been decreasing in recent years. In 2012, the atmo-
spheric releases of radioactive substances were of 
the same magnitude as in previous years.
Operational events at the plant
For the Olkiluoto power plant, the most important 
factors affecting the overall accident risk include 
internal events during power operation (compo-
nent failures and pipe ruptures leading to an op-
erational transient). The annual probability of a 
severe reactor accident calculated for the Olkiluoto 
plant units remained roughly the same as in the 
previous year.
No reactor trips took place at the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant in 2012. The number of events 
warranting a special report (five) follows the aver-
age of the last ten years. The number of events 
warranting a transient report (three) was be-
low the average. Three of the events discussed 
in special reports included non-compliance with 
the operational limits and conditions without an 
advance safety analysis and STUK’s permission. 
Such events did not occur in the three previous 
years. All of these non-compliances were uninten-
tional. TVO analysed the events and defined cor-
rective measures to prevent similar events from 
occurring in the future.
The production losses at Olkiluoto 1 due to fail-
ures were higher than in the previous years. This 
is mainly explained by the generator failure that 
occurred in the spring and led to TVO deciding to 
begin the annual outage of Olkiluoto  1 nearly a 
month earlier than planned. TVO replaced the gen-
erator during the annual outage. The production 
losses resulting from failures at Olkiluoto 2 were 
virtually nonexistent.
Two of the shut-down secondary cooling sys-
tems of Olkiluoto 2 were unavailable at the same 
time for little less than eight hours due to failures 
at the end of July. This increased the annual risk 
for Olkiluoto  2 by 29%. Such an increase due to 
a double common cause failure proves the impor-
tance of the secondary cooling system for plant 
safety. The dependence of safety of the secondary 
cooling circuit will decrease in future when the 
327 auxiliary feed water system will be modified 
to function independently of the secondary cooling 
circuit. The project has been active for years, and is 
not a result of the event described above.
No events classified as fires occurred in the 
Olkiluoto power plant area in 2012. Five events 
classified as fires occurred outside the plant area. 
The fires were minor and could be put out using 
first aid extinguishers. No defects were found in 
the fire detector system.
The number of common cause failures has 
increased in recent years. In the three previous 
years, the total number of common cause failures 
has been 12. Most of these have occurred in the 
emergency diesel generators (six failures) and the 
relief system (three failures). TVO has initiated a 
planning process for replacing the emergency die-
sel generators.
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Safety performance indicators
A.I Safety and quality culture
A.I.1 Failures and their repairs
A.I.1a Failures of components subject to 
the operational limits and conditions
Definition
The number of failures causing the unavailability 
of components defined in the operational limits 
and conditions (OLC) during power operation is 
monitored as an indicator. The failures are divided 
by plant unit into two groups: failures causing 
an immediate operation restriction and failures 
causing an operation restriction in connection with 
repair work.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the work order systems 
and the operational documents of the power plants.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to assess the plant life-cycle 
management and the development of the condition 
of components.
Responsible units/persons
Resident inspectors
Petri Vastamäki (Loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jukka Kallionpää (Olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
The total number of failures causing an operation 
restriction of components subject to the OLC in 
2012 was 172. The average of failures in the four 
previous years was 182, which means that there 
was no significant change in the number of failures 
in 2012 or in the failure trend.
The number of failures per year has remained 
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stable. Any variation therein has been caused by 
the random occurrences of failures that occur in 
any large number of components. Failure detection 
and anticipation have been continuously improved 
in plant maintenance operations at Loviisa, and 
components have been replaced. Due to these mea-
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sures, there have been no failures with a signifi-
cant impact on plant safety, and the management 
of component availability has been successful. 
Based on the above, it can be stated that the in-
dicator or the failure data behind it does not show 
any significant negative effects associated with the 
ageing of the facilities, which is an indication of 
well-functioning component life-cycle management 
and component maintenance.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The number of failures occurring during power 
operation and causing the unavailability of compo-
nents subject to the OLC has been increasing since 
2009. In 2011, the number of failures was nearly 
double the number of failures in 2009. In 2012, the 
number of failures went down to the level of 2010. 
The number of failures indicates that maintenance 
work has been successful. 
The unavailability times of OLC components 
occurring at OL1 during all four quarters of 2012 
were brief.
At OL2, most of the unavailability times of OLC 
components were brief in 2012. The number of op-
erating restrictions was increased by the washing 
of the heat exchangers in the cooling systems.
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A.I.1b Maintenance of components subject 
to the operational limits and conditions
Definition
The indicator is used to follow the number of fault 
repairs and preventive maintenance work orders 
for components subject to the operational limits 
and conditions (OLC) by plant unit.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the plant work order 
systems, from which all preventive maintenance 
operations and fault repairs are retrieved.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator describes the volumes of fault re-
pairs and preventive maintenance and illustrates 
the condition of the plant and its maintenance 
strategy. The indicator is used to assess the main-
tenance strategy executed at the plant.
Responsible units/persons
Resident inspectors
Petri Vastamäki (Loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jukka Kallionpää (Olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
When considering the annual variation in the vol-
ume of fault repairs and particularly in the num-
ber of preventive maintenance works, the schedul-
ing of various annual outages (refuelling outage, 
short annual maintenance, four-year annual main-
tenance, eight-year annual maintenance) included 
in the maintenance strategy of the Loviisa power 
plant during a four-year cycle should be considered 
as this can have a significant impact on the annual 
figures. In 2012, Loviisa  1 had an eight-year an-
nual outage, and Loviisa 2 a short annual outage. 
Based on the data behind the indicator, 2012 
showed no major deviation from the average num-
bers of fault repairs and preventive maintenance 
volumes of the four previous years. In 2012, the 
number of maintenance tasks on components sub-
ject to the OLC was 3% higher than the average. 
Similarly, the volume of preventive maintenance 
was 5% higher than the average, and the number of 
fault repairs 14% lower.
The ratio of preventive maintenance and failure 
repairs was 5.7. This is 16% higher than the 4.9 
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average of the four previous years, which means 
that the share of preventive maintenance of all 
maintenance work has remained high.
The large share of preventive maintenance 
operations reflects the selected maintenance strat-
egy, the purpose of which is to keep the number of 
faults and the effects of faults at a tolerable level.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The number of maintenance works causing in-
operability of components, included in the indica-
tor, decreased during 2006–2009 due to the lower 
number of fault repairs. In 2010, the number of 
fault repairs increased while the number of pre-
ventive maintenance operations decreased. 
In 2012, the number of fault repairs that caused 
inoperability of components remained at the 2011 
level. The number of preventive maintenance tasks 
increased slightly, improving the ratio of preventive 
maintenance and fault repairs from 2011. 
Based on the development of the ratio of 
preventive maintenance work to fault repairs and 
the assessment of the work behind the figures, the 
maintenance strategy can be considered successful.
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A.I.1c Repair time for components subject 
to the operational limits and conditions
Definition
As an indicator, the average repair time of failures 
causing the unavailability of components defined 
in the operational limits and conditions (OLC) is 
monitored. With each repair, the time recorded is 
the time of inoperability. It is calculated from the 
detection of the failure to the end of the repair 
work, if the failure causes an immediate opera-
tion restriction. If the component is operable until 
the beginning of repair, only the time of the repair 
work is taken into account.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the power plant’s work 
order systems and maintenance and operation doc-
umentation.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator shows how quickly failed compo-
nents subject to the operational limits and condi-
tions (OLC) are repaired in relation to the repair 
time allowed in the OLC. The indicator is used to 
assess the strategy, resources and effectiveness of 
plant maintenance.
Responsible units/persons
Operational safety (KÄY), resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jukka Kallionpää (Olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
The operational limits and conditions define the 
maximum allowed repair times for components 
based on the components’ safety significance. 
The times vary between four hours and 21 days. 
Failures in OLC components are to be repaired 
within the allotted time without undue delay.
Due to the small amount of work requiring 
operation restrictions and the varying allowable 
repair times, an individual operation may have a 
significant effect on the indicator value even when 
it is performed within the allotted time. This as-
pect of the indicator is taken into account in the 
interpretation of the indicator by evaluating the 
significance of individual long-term failure repairs 
in terms of maintenance strategy, resources and ef-
ficiency of operations.
The average repair times for failures causing 
unavailability of components have remained stable 
at the Loviisa plant for several years; in addition, a 
decreasing trend can be traced over the last three 
years. In 2012, the average repair time at the plant 
units was 21.6 hours while the average for the 
four preceding years was 31.0 hours. The average 
repair time of OLC component failures that had 
an allowed repair time of 72 hours or less was 11.3 
hours at LO1 and 14.8 hours at LO2 in 2012.
Based on the 2012 indicators and the data be-
hind them, the plant’s maintenance operations can 
be considered appropriate. In spite of the positive 
development in repair times, attention still needs 
to be paid to the power plant’s maintenance on 
having the necessary resources available for fault 
repairs and on carrying out the repairs without un-
necessary delays.
0
10
20
30
40
50
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 21.5 22.9 29.1 38.0 27.3 20.9 20.9
 48.4 40.4 26.6 43.1 36.6 25.9 22.1
 35.0 31.7 27.9 40.6 32.0 23.4 21.5
LO1
LO2
LO1,2
Average of real repair times of OLC component failures, 
Loviisa NPP
0
10
20
30
40
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 6.4 9.4 4.9 10.7 7.5 5.9 7.9
 5.5 36.5 6.0 9.7 6.5 7.0 8.5
 6.0 23.0 5.4 10.2 7.0 6.5 8.2
OL1
OL2
OL1,2
Average of real repair times of OLC component failures, 
Olkiluoto NPP
STUK-B 162
113
APPENDIX 1 STUK’S SafeTy performance indicaTorS for nppS in 2012
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The indicator is used to monitor the repair times 
of components subject to the operational limits and 
conditions (OLC). The repair time allowed in the 
OLC is usually 30 days for faults concerning one 
subsystem and three days for faults concerning 
two subsystems. Depending on the system and the 
component, other allowed repair times may be de-
fined in the OLC. 
Over a longer period, the average repair time 
has varied from six to ten hours with the excep-
tion of 2007. In that year, repair times increased 
strongly for both plant units to 1.5 times the previ-
ous year’s figure at OL1 and to more than six times 
the previous year’s figure at OL2. For both plant 
units, the increase was due to a failure in a single 
device. In 2012, the average repair time of failures 
causing the unavailability of components defined 
in the OLC was about 8 hours at OL1 and about 
8.5 hours at OL2. At both plant units, the average 
repair time of failures causing the unavailability 
of components defined in the OLC was of the same 
order of magnitude as in 2010 and 2011.
On the basis of the 2012 indicators and the data 
behind them, the plant’s maintenance operations 
were appropriate.
A.I.1d Common cause failures
Definition
As the indicator, the number of common cause fail-
ures of components or systems defined in the op-
erational limits and conditions (OLC) is followed.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the reports 
by the utilities of works causing an operation re-
striction.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the quality of main-
tenance.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Niko Mononen (Loviisa)
Suvi Ristonmaa (Olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
In 2012, three safety-significant common cause 
failures were identified at the Loviisa power plant. 
These included the neglect of the testing of re-
combiners in the reactor building’s upper space in 
accordance with the operational limits and condi-
tions, faulty settings of the thermal relays in the 
motors of 0.4 kV pumps, and the programmable 
technology found in the voltage relays installed 
into safety classified switchgear. The common 
cause failure with the most safety significance was 
the faulty setting of the thermal relays in the mo-
tors of the 0.4 kV pumps. Human factors were be-
hind the observed common cause failures.
Olkiluoto
The number of common cause failures has in-
creased in recent years. In the three previous 
years, the total number of common cause failures 
has been 12. Most of these have occurred in the 
emergency diesel generators (six failures) and the 
relief system (three failures). TVO has initiated a 
planning process for replacing the emergency die-
sel generators. 
When a fault is observed in a safety-critical 
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system, component or structure in connection with 
maintenance, periodic testing or other monitoring 
operation, the corrective measures include an 
investigation of whether the fault is a single fault 
or whether there might be other similar faults 
in the system. Four common cause failures were 
found in the safety systems of Olkiluoto  1 and 
Olkiluoto 2 in 2012. These included the loosening 
and breaking off of the fixtures of the blowdown 
system pipes, an earth fault due to a failed core 
winding insulation in the rotor of an emergency 
diesel generator, dirty water and sedimentation 
in the emergency diesel cooling circuit due to the 
excess solvent content of the manufacturer’s anti-
corrosion agent, and fractures and damage in the 
shut-down secondary cooling system’s pressure 
measurement nozzles.
A.I.1g Production loss due to failures
Definition
As the indicator, the loss of power production 
caused by failures in relation to rated power (gross) 
is monitored.
Source of data
Data for the indicator is obtained from the annual 
and quarterly reports submitted by power compa-
nies.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the significance of 
failures from the point of view of production.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Niko Mononen (Loviisa)
Suvi Ristonmaa (Olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
Production losses due to failures have been small 
at both Loviisa and Olkiluoto, as is also indicated 
by the plants’ high load factors.
Loviisa
Loviisa 1 experienced less-than-average production 
losses from component failures. Loviisa 2’s 
production losses from component failures were 
higher than in the previous years. Most of the 
losses were due to a leaking seal water line in a 
reactor coolant pump. The plant was run down to a 
cold shutdown state for repairing this fault.
Olkiluoto
In 2012, Olkiluoto 1 experienced a higher number 
of faults resulting in production losses than in the 
previous years. This is mainly explained by the 
generator failure that occurred in the spring and 
led to TVO deciding to begin the annual outage at 
the plant unit nearly a month earlier than planned. 
TVO replaced the generator during the annual out-
age. The production losses resulting from failures 
at Olkiluoto 2 were virtually nonexistent. 
Most of the production losses at Olkiluoto  1 
(91%) were due to the generator failure mentioned 
above. Other production losses were mostly caused 
by the identification and repair of turbine island 
faults during power operation. Reactor power was 
decreased during fault repairs. Such work included 
the repair of a leaking flange in the reheater drains 
cooler level measurement, replacement of a leaking 
rubbing-face seal of a feed water pump, and repair 
of a leak detected in the steam extraction system.
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A.I.2 Exemptions and deviations from 
the operational limits and conditions
Definition
As indicators, the number of non-compliances 
with the operational limits and conditions (OLC), 
as well as the number of exemptions granted by 
STUK, are monitored.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from applica-
tions for exemption orders and from event reports.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the utilities’ activi-
ties in accordance with the OLC: compliance with 
the OLC and identified situations during which it 
is necessary to deviate from them; of which conclu-
sions can be made as regards the appropriateness 
of the OLC.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Niko Mononen (Loviisa)
Suvi Ristonmaa (Olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
The main purpose of the OLC exemption procedure 
is to enable alterations and maintenance that im-
prove safety and plant availability.
Non-compliance with the OLC refers to a situ-
ation where the plant or a system or component of 
the plant is not in a safe state as required by the 
operational limits and conditions. The objective is 
that no events with non-compliance to the OLC 
occur at the plants. The licensee always prepares 
a special report on the non-compliance and any 
corrective action, and submits it to STUK for ap-
proval.
Loviisa
Exemptions
The Loviisa power plant applied for permissions 
from STUK for five planned deviations from the 
Operationl Limits and Conditions during 2012. 
The number of applications was slightly lower 
than the average of previous years (6). Two of the 
applications were related to failure repairs, one to 
a change of the plant’s operating mode while an 
emergency diesel generator was isolated, one to 
the I&C upgrade, and one to a modification carried 
out at the 110 kV switchyard. STUK approved the 
applications because the assessments carried out 
indicated that the deviations had no significant 
implications for the safety of the plant or the envi-
ronment.
Events non-compliant with the OLC
In 2012, the number of events non-compliant with 
the OLC clearly exceeded the average of recent 
years (2). The Loviisa plant had seven events dur-
ing the year when the plant was not in a state 
compliant with the OLC. The situations were re-
lated to neglected periodic testing of components 
subject to OLC (2 events), faulty isolations and re-
pairs (4 events) and uncertainty of the operability 
of replaced valves in the pressure control system 
during start-up. Most of the events took place dur-
ing annual maintenance. The events did not put 
nuclear or personal safety at risk.
Olkiluoto
Based on the results of the last 10 years, the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant applies for STUK’s 
approval for non-compliance with the OLC seven 
times per year on average. Hence, the number of 
applications in 2012 (ten) was slightly higher than 
the average. Six of the applications were related to 
modifications, one to replaced equipment, two to an 
error detected in the control rod efficiency calcula-
tion method, and one to a periodic test. Half of the 
applications were related to the ongoing replace-
ment of the plant’s radiation measurement sys-
tems. Individual measurements had to be disabled 
for a few days during the replacement of equip-
ment or the structure of the equipment location. 
As the planned deviations had no significant safety 
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implications, STUK approved all applications. In 
2004 and 2005, the number of deviations was in-
creased by work and installations related to the 
modernisation of OL1 and OL2 and the construc-
tion of OL3. Similarly, major modifications were 
carried out during 2010 and 2011.
Events non-compliant with the OLC
In 2012, TVO reported three events during which 
the plant was non-compliant with the OLC without 
an advance safety analysis and STUK’s permis-
sion. Such events did not occur in the three previ-
ous years. 
All of these non-compliances were uninten-
tional. In one of the cases, non-compliance with 
the OLC was due to a human error in the planning 
stage of a modification, and in another case, a hu-
man error in the implementation stage of a modifi-
cation. In the third case, an error in the calculation 
method used to assess the efficiency of control 
rods during plant start-up led to non-compliance 
with the OLC. The individual events did not put 
the plant or its environment at risk. There were, 
however, three events in total, which makes it im-
portant to ensure that there are no deficiencies in 
the knowledge of the OLC or the procedures to fol-
low the OLC that would lead to unintentional non-
compliance. TVO analysed all events and defined 
corrective measures to prevent similar events from 
occurring in the future.
A.I.3 Unavailability of safety systems
Definition
As the indicators, the unavailability of safety sys-
tems is monitored separately for each plant unit. 
The systems monitored at the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant are the containment vessel spray sys-
tem (322), the auxiliary feed water system (327) 
and the emergency diesel generators (651…656). 
Those followed at Loviisa nuclear power plant are 
the high-pressure safety injection system (TJ), 
auxiliary feed water system (RL92/93, RL94/97) 
and the emergency diesel generators (EY).
Essentially, the ratio of a system’s unavail-
ability hours and its required availability hours is 
calculated as the indicator. Unavailability hours 
are the combined unavailability of redundant 
subsystems divided by the number of subsystems.
Annual plant criticality hours are the availabil-
ity requirement for the 322, 327, TJ and RL sys-
tems. For diesels, the requirement is continuous, 
i.e. equal to annual operating hours.
Subsystem unavailability hours include the 
time required for the planned maintenance of 
components and unavailability due to failures. The 
latter includes, in addition to the time spent on 
repairs, the estimated unavailability time prior to 
failure detection. If a failure is estimated to have 
occurred in a previous successful test, but to have 
escaped detection, the time between periodic tests 
is added to the unavailability time. If a failure has 
occurred between tests so that its date of occur-
rence is unknown, half of the time period between 
tests is added to the unavailability time. Whenever 
the occurrence of the failure can be identified as an 
operational, maintenance, testing or other event, 
the time between the event and the fault detection 
is added to the unavailability time.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the power 
companies. Licensee representatives submit the 
necessary data to the relevant person in charge at 
STUK.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator indicates the unavailability of safety 
systems. The indicator is used to track the condi-
tion of safety systems and any identifiable trends.0
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Responsible units/persons
Operational safety (KÄY), resident inspectors
Petri Vastamäki (Loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jukka Kallionpää (Olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
TJ system
Analysis of the unavailability figures of the high 
pressure safety injection systems (TJ) of the plant 
units and their background information shows that 
the LO1 plant unit had three faults that caused 
system unavailability amounting to 178.1 hours. 
Of this time, 167.0 hours were spent on the re-
placement of a switch based on observations of 
vibration in pump 12TJ52D0001. Two faults oc-
curred at LO2, resulting in 12.7 hours of unavail-
ability. 
The failures of TJ systems were not serious. 
Apart from one job, the repairs were completed 
within the repair times allowed in the OLC. The 
three-week repair time allowed for the replace-
ment of TJ52D0001 switch was deviated from on 
the basis of STUK exemption order 6/A42272/2012.
The significant unavailability of the high pres-
sure safety injection systems was caused by a 
single fault at LO1. When that is taken into ac-
count, it can be stated that the unavailability of TJ 
systems was low in 2012, i.e. their condition and 
availability were good.
RL system
At LO1, the total unavailability time was 136.0 
hours, of which 33.4 hours were attributable to a 
single fault occurring during power operation. At 
LO1, the rest of the unavailability was caused by 
the 102.6-hour annual outage work carried out on 
the RL94 system. 
Similarly, the total unavailability time for LO2 
was 104.7 hours. Of this time, 39.3 hours were due 
to three failures during power operation, and 65.4 
hours resulted from the annual maintenance of 
RL97.
The unavailability of the auxiliary feed water 
systems was low in 2012, i.e. their condition and 
availability were good.
EY system
In 2012, the total unavailability time for all eight 
diesel generators was 734 hours. The 17-year peri-
odic maintenance of the diesel generator 21EY02 
amounted to 244 hours of the total. The main-
tenance of 21EY02 began as planned before the 
shutdown of LO2 for annual maintenance. While 
availability requirement based on the OLC existed, 
connection to the Ahvenkoski hydropower plant 
was used as a replacement of 21EY02.
There were a total of 23 diesel generator faults 
in 2012, of which nine caused immediate operation 
restrictions while 15 caused operating restrictions 
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from the beginning of the repair work. The failures 
detected were mainly caused by the normal ageing 
of components and did not have any serious impli-
cations. 
The unavailability of the emergency diesel gen-
erators (EY) increased slightly from the previous 
year, but when the impact of the planned periodic 
maintenance of 21EY02 is taken into account, the 
total unavailability still remains low, i.e. availabil-
ity was satisfactory.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The unavailability times of the containment spray 
system have been decreasing since 2005. In 2007, 
2008, 2010 and 2011, the unavailability was zero 
for both plant units, and almost zero in 2009 and 
2012. 
The unavailability of the auxiliary feed water 
system increased after 2004, at which point the 
unavailability was in practice zero. The higher 
unavailability of Olkiluoto  1 in 2006 was due to 
faults in the recirculation and safety valves of 
system 327. There were no significant failures in 
2007, 2008 or 2009, and the unavailability of the 
auxiliary feed water system decreased to nearly 
zero in 2009 at both plant units. In 2010, unavail-
ability at OL1 was still zero but increased slightly 
at OL2 from the previous year, mainly as a result 
of several new faults discovered during the outage. 
In 2011, the figure for OL1 was multiplied many 
times over as the result of a latent fault in one 
auxiliary feed water system valve that remained 
faulty for 504 hours. See section A.II.3. In 2012, the 
unavailability of the auxiliary feed water system 
returned to the level prior to 2011.
The unavailability of the diesel generators has 
decreased since 2004, and was very low in 2006 
and 2007. In 2008, the value increased by nearly 
95% compared to the previous year. The increase 
was due to latent faults in the compressed air mo-
tors of the diesels in both plant units. In 2009, the 
unavailability of diesel engines decreased consider-
ably from the 2008 figures. In 2010, unavailability 
increased somewhat from the previous year as a 
result of failures occurring in connection with pe-
riodic tests. At OL1, the stator winding of a diesel 
generator failed in connection with a periodic test 
in August 2010, and the generator was replaced 
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with an overhauled unit. In 2011, the unavail-
ability of EDGs was over four times higher than 
in 2010, the highest figure ever recorded while the 
parameter has been monitored. The reason for the 
increase was the generator fault discussed above, 
which may have lasted as long as from August 
2010 to May 2011. In addition, there were faults in 
exhaust manifolds and exhaust pipes in 2011. In 
2012, unavailability of emergency diesel genera-
tors was zero.
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A.I.4 Occupational radiation doses
Definition
As the indicators, collective radiation exposure of 
nuclear power plant employees by plant site and 
plant unit is monitored, together with the annual 
average of the 10 highest occupational doses.
Source of data
The data on the collective dose is received from the 
quarterly and annual reports of the power plants 
as well as the national dose register. The data 
on individual radiation doses is obtained from the 
national dose register.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicators are used to control the radiation ex-
posure of employees. In addition, compliance with 
the YVL Guide’s calculated threshold for one plant 
unit’s collective dose averaged over two successive 
years is followed. The threshold value, 2.5 manSv 
per one gigawatt of net electrical power, means a 
radiation dose of 1.22 manSv for one Loviisa plant 
unit and 2.15 manSv for one Olkiluoto plant unit. 
The collective radiation doses describe the success 
of the plant’s ALARA programme. The average of 
the 10 highest doses indicates how close to the 
20  manSv dose limit the individual occupational 
doses at the plants are, at the same time indicating 
the effectiveness of the plant’s radiation protection 
unit.
Responsible unit/person
Radiation protection (SÄT)
Antti Tynkkynen
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
Most doses are incurred through work done dur-
ing outages. Thus outage duration and the amount 
of work having significance on radiation protec-
tion affect the annual radiation doses. Both Loviisa 
plant units have more extensive annual outages 
every four and eight years (the four-year annual 
outage and the eight-year annual outage) so that 
both plant units never have a major annual main-
tenance outage in the same year. The four-year and 
eight-year outages have been held in even years 
and normal annual outages in odd years. The effect 
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of annual outages on collective doses can be seen 
in the Collective radiation dose, Loviisa graph. In 
2012, the eight-year annual outage took place at 
Loviisa 1, and a short annual outage at Loviisa 2. 
The time used for annual outages was long, and 
there was a high amount of work with significance 
for radiation protection, which resulted in a total 
collective dose that was higher than that of the 
previous years. Still, the collective doses during an-
nual outages were the lowest ever achieved during 
annual outages of a similar type.
The radiation doses for nuclear power plant 
workers were below the individual dose limits. The 
increase in the average of the ten highest doses 
was due to the extensive eight-year outage with 
plenty of work, which resulted in some workers 
being exposed to a higher amount of radiation. 
The dose average was slightly lower than in 2010, 
which was the year when such extensive outages 
last took place. The Radiation Decree (1512/1991) 
stipulates that the effective dose for a worker from 
radiation work must not exceed the 20 manSv/year 
average over any period of five years, or 50 manSv 
in any one year.
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Furthermore, the threshold set for the collective 
occupational dose was not exceeded in 2012. If, at 
one plant unit, the collective occupational radiation 
dose average over two successive years exceeds 
2.5  manSv per one GW of net electrical power, 
the power company is to report the causes of this 
to STUK, together with any measures possibly 
required to improve radiation safety (Guide 
YVL 7.9).
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Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
Most doses are incurred through work done during 
outages. Thus outage duration and the amount of 
work having significance on radiation protection 
affect the annual radiation doses. The annual out-
ages for the Olkiluoto power plant units are di-
vided into two groups: refuelling outage and main-
tenance outage. The refuelling outage is shorter 
in duration (approximately 7 days). The length of 
the maintenance outage depends on the amount of 
work (2–3 weeks). Annual outages are scheduled so 
that in the same year, one plant unit has a mainte-
nance outage and the other a refuelling outage. In 
2012, the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant achieved 
its lowest radiation doses since the plant’s first 
years of operation. The previous lowest-ever collec-
tive radiation dose was recorded at the power plant 
in 2010. The new steam dryers installed at the 
plant units in 2005–2006 have further reduced the 
radiation levels and collective doses at the turbine 
plant.
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averaged over two succesive years,
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In 2012, the average of the 10 highest radiation 
doses was lower than average. The prescribed 
dose limits (Radiation Decree 1512/1991) were not 
exceeded.
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A.I.5 Radioactive releases
Definition
As the indicators, radioactive releases into the sea 
and the atmosphere from the plants are monitored, 
together with the calculated dose due to releases to 
the most exposed individual in the vicinity of the 
plant.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the power 
companies’ quarterly and annual reports. From 
this data, the calculated radiation dose for the 
most exposed individual in the vicinity of the plant 
is defined.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the amount and 
trend of radioactive releases and to assess the 
causes of any changes.
Responsible unit/person
Radiation protection (SÄT), Antti Tynkkynen
A.I.5a Releases into the atmosphere
Interpretation of the indicator
In 2012, the radioactive releases into the 
atmosphere from the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plants were of the same magnitude as in 
previous years. The releases into the environment 
were small, well below the set limits.
The releases of noble gases and particulate 
aerosols from the Loviisa power plant were of 
the same magnitude as in previous years. The 
releases of iodine isotopes continued to decrease 
and were lower than average despite the fuel leak 
at Loviisa 2 that began in the final part of 2012. 
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At Olkiluoto, the releases of noble gases and 
particulate aerosols into the atmosphere were on 
the same approximate level as in the previous 
years. The releases of iodine isotopes increased 
compared to 2011 due to a minor fuel leak at 
Olkiluoto 2. The fuel leak also had an effect on the 
released volume of noble gases.
Gaseous fission products, noble gases and iodine 
isotopes originate from leaking fuel rods, from the 
minute amounts of uranium left on the outer 
surfaces of fuel cladding during fuel fabrication, 
and from reactor surface contamination from 
earlier fuel leaks. At both Loviisa and Olkiluoto, 
there have been very few leaking fuel rods and 
the leaks have been small. A leak was detected 
in one fuel rod at Loviisa 2 late in 2012. At 
Olkiluoto, the leaking fuel assembly was replaced 
with a new one at annual outage. The indicator 
A.III.1 describes fuel integrity. The noble gas 
releases from the Loviisa plant are dominated 
by argon-41, an activation product of argon-40, 
found in the airspace between the reactor pressure 
vessel and the main radiation shield. Aerosol 
nuclides (including activated corrosion products) 
are released during maintenance work.
Aerosol releases to atmosphere (Bq), 
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A.I.5b Releases into the sea
Interpretation of the indicator
Releases of radioactive substances emitting 
gamma radiation into the environment from the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants were 
clearly below the set limits. During 2001, 2004 and 
2009, the Loviisa power plant discharged low-ac-
tivity evaporation residues into the sea as planned. 
Consequently, the releases of substances with 
gamma activity were larger than average in those 
years. The releases of substances with gamma ac-
tivity into the sea from Olkiluoto have decreased in 
recent years.
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A.I.5c Population exposure
Interpretation of the indicator
In 2012, the doses of the most exposed individual 
in the vicinity, calculated on the basis of releases 
from the plant, were below the set limit both at 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto. At Loviisa, the dose of the 
most exposed individual in the vicinity was aver-
age. At Olkiluoto, it was lower than average. As a 
result of the planned release of low-level evapo-
ration waste into the sea at Loviisa, the dose of 
the most exposed individual in the vicinity of the 
Loviisa power plant was higher than usual in 2009.
For both plants, the calculated doses of the most 
exposed individual in the vicinity were less than 
0.1% of the 100-microsievert limit established in 
the Government Decree (733/2008).
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A.I.6 Investments in facilities
Definition
Investments in plant maintenance and modifica-
tions in the current value of money adjusted by the 
building cost index.
Source of data
The licensee submits the necessary data directly to 
the person responsible for the indicator.
The indicator demonstrates the relative fluc-
tuation of investments. The amounts given in euro 
are the confidential information of the utilities in-
volved, and not to be published here. Furthermore, 
the scales of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto power 
plants’ investment and modernisation diagrams 
are not mutually comparable.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the amount of in-
vestments in plant maintenance and their fluctua-
tions.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Suvi Ristonmaa
Interpretation of the indicator
The variation in the indicator distinctly shows the 
investments related to the power upgrades and 
modernisation projects of the plants. Both plants 
have paid great attention to life-cycle manage-
ment, which also shows as continuous long-term 
investment plans. The renewal of the operating li-
cence of the Loviisa plant in 2007 and the interme-
diate assessment carried out at Olkiluoto in 2008 
have also had an effect on the investment plans.
Loviisa
The increase in investments, starting from 2007, 
is caused by the modernisation of I&C systems at 
Loviisa. Other major investments in 2012 include 
the construction of a new emergency diesel power 
plant, a modification of the pressure equalisation 
system, replacement of service water system pipes, 
modernisation of turbines and the development of 
a maintenance information system. Many modifi-
cation projects span over many years, which means 
that their total cost is also divided between several 
years.
Olkiluoto
Fewer investments took place in 2012 than in the 
previous years. 
TVO has carried out extensive modifications in 
periods, which becomes evident in the trend. For 
example, the major modifications mainly imple-
mented during the 2010 annual outage of Olkiluoto 
1 and the 2011 annual outage of Olkiluoto 2 show 
in the investment figures for 2010 and 2011. 
These modifications included the replacement of 
inner isolation valves of the main steam lines, 
the replacement of low-pressure turbines and the 
replacement of main seawater pumps. Some of 
the work included in the project continued in 2012 
and showed in the investment figures for the year. 
These included the replacement of low voltage 
switchgear, upgrading the condensate processing 
I&C, and the replacement of the main generators. 
Other major investments in 2012 included the pur-
chases related to the new radiation measurement 
system, and the replacement and overhaul of the 
plant transformers.
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A.II Operational events
A.II.1 Number of events
Definition
As the indicators, the numbers of events reported 
in accordance with Guide YVL 1.5 are monitored. 
(Events warranting a special report, reactor trips 
and reports on operational events.)
Source of data
Data for the indicators is obtained from STUK’s 
document administration system (SAHA).
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the number of 
safety-significant events.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Niko Mononen (Loviisa)
Suvi Ristonmaa (Olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
Two reactor trips occurred at the Loviisa power 
plant. Loviisa  1 operators shut down the reactor 
by initiating a reactor trip during the start-up af-
ter annual outage as a feed water pump stopped. 
At Loviisa 2, operators initiated a reactor trip as 
a result of a turbine trip that occurred at both 
turbines. The turbine trips were due to a faulty 
protection signal. During the events, the plant op-
erated in the planned manner, and the events had 
no impact on the safety of the plant or its envi-
ronment. The number of reactor trips has always 
been low at Loviisa. The previous reactor trips took 
place in 2004 and 2010. 
The number of reported operational transients 
increased from the previous years, but remained 
reasonably good over the long term. Seven op-
erational transients occurred during the year. The 
transients of Loviisa 1 concerned the drop of one 
control rod due to damage, the spurious opening of 
a relief valve, and the halting of a main feed water 
pump during start-up. At Loviisa 2, the transients 
concerned faulty operation of a feed water pump, 
spurious protective trip of a steam line isolation 
valve, as well as turbine trips due to a controller 
error and a faulty protection signal.
Based on the results of the last ten years, events 
warranting a special report occur three times a 
year on average. In 2012, the number of events 
warranting a special report (ten) was clearly above 
the average. The number is explained by the fact 
that the power company must produce a special 
report on all events involving a non-compliance 
with the OLC. The frequency of such events was 
considerably higher in 2012 than in the previous 
years (see section A.I.2). Other events warranting 
a special report included the excess fire load at 
Loviisa 1, the erroneous configuration of the ther-
mal relays of the 0.4 kV pump motors at Loviisa 
2, and the inconsistencies found in the periodic 
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preventive maintenance intervals specified in the 
procedures and the OLC. 
When considering the indicators, it must be 
noted that the number of reports does not give 
the correct picture of the division of events by 
plant unit, since, for system technical reasons, the 
reports that concern both plant units have been 
entered for Loviisa 1.
Olkiluoto
No reactor trips took place at the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant in 2012. Based on the results of the 
last ten years, an average of zero to one reactor 
trips take place each year. During the previous 
decade (1993–2001), an average of almost three to 
four reactor trips occurred per year. The number 
is explained by the fact that it also includes reac-
tor trips during annual outages that occurred, for 
example, in connection with testing the reactor 
protection system. 
Based on data from the last ten years, the 
average annual number of events warranting a 
special report or a transient report is five. In 2012, 
the number of events warranting a special report 
(six) was nearly at the average. The number of 
events warranting a transient report (three) was 
below the average. Four events for which special 
reports were produced concerned an error during 
the design or implementation of a modification. In 
one case, an error was observed in the calculation 
method used to assess the efficiency of control rods 
during plant start-up. All the events are described 
in more detail in Appendix 3 to the report. One 
transient report concerns the planned dropping 
of one Olkiluoto  2 main coolant pump to lower 
revolutions due to a disturbance in the external 
power supply. Another report describes a genera-
tor failure at Olkiluoto 1. As a result of the failure, 
TVO decided to launch the annual outage nearly 
a month earlier than planned. The third transient 
report describes a failure of the protective relay of 
a switch in the Olkiluoto 2 electrical system (660 V 
network). 
When considering the indicators concerning 
special and transient reports, it must be noted 
that the number of reports does not give the cor-
rect picture of the division of events by plant unit, 
since, for system technical reasons, the reports that 
concern both plant units have been entered for 
Olkiluoto 1. In 2012, two events warranting a spe-
cial report concerned both plant units. It must also 
be noted for 2012 that a joint special report was 
produced for two separate events in Olkiluoto  1 
and Olkiluoto  2, as this was sensible considering 
the similarity of the events and, therefore, the 
clarification of events and the definition of correc-
tive measures. Because the events were separate, 
here they are considered as two events warranting 
a special report.
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A.II.3 Risk-significance of events
Definition
As the indicator, the risk-significance of events 
caused by component unavailability is monitored. 
As the measure of risk, an increase in the con-
ditional core damage probability (CCDP) associ-
ated with each event is employed. CCDP takes 
the duration of each event into consideration. 
Events are divided into three categories: 1)  un-
availability due to component failures, 2) planned 
unavailability, and 3)  initiating events. In addi-
tion, events are grouped into three categories ac-
cording to their risk-significance (CCDP): the 
most risk-significant events (CCDP>1E-7), other 
significant events (1E-8≤CCDP<1E-7) and other 
events (CCDP<1E-8). The indicator is the number 
of events in each category.
Unavailability caused by work for which STUK 
has granted an exemption is included in category 2. 
Possible non-compliances with the operational lim-
its and conditions (OLC) are in category 1, if they 
can be utilised for this indicator. Non-compliances 
with the OLC are also dealt with under indicator 
A.I.2.
N.B.! The calculations concerning the Olkiluoto 
plant were performed using FinPSA software 
and those concerning the Loviisa plant using 
RiskSpectrum software. For the Loviisa power 
plant, calculations of simultaneous failure of sev-
eral components are solely based on the power op-
eration model, meaning that the results are not as 
exact as for single failures which have been calcu-
lated for all operating modes. The modelling of si-
multaneous failures across all operating modes (17 
of them) would be possible, but the calculation time 
would be too long compared to the benefits. This 
year, no simultaneous failures of several compo-
nents with the highest risk-significance occurred.
Source of data
Data for the calculation of the indicators is collect-
ed from power companies’ reports and applications 
for exemptions.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the risk-significance 
of component unavailability and to assess risk-sig-
nificant initiating events and planned unavailabil-
ity. Special attention is paid to recurring events, 
common cause failures, simultaneously occurring 
failures and human errors. Another objective of the 
event analysis is to systematically search for any 
signs of a deteriorating organisational and safety 
culture.
Responsible unit/person
Risk assessment (RIS), Jorma Rantakivi  
(PRA computation)
Operational safety (KÄY) 
(failure data)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
A brief description of the most significant events 
regarding risk is given below:
Loviisa 1:
1. 12 May 2012. Generator excitation fault in 
emergency diesel EY01. Unavailable for 114.6 
h. CCDP: 1.111E-07. 
2. 30 May 2012. Generator excitation fault in 
emergency diesel EY01. Unavailable for 158.3 
h. CCDP: 1.535E-07. 
3. 30 July 2012. Abnormal operation of emergency 
diesel EY01. Unavailable for 83.18 h.   
CCDP: 1.001E-07. 
4. 16 November 2012. Repair of a safety injection 
pump 12TJ52D0001 due to vibration. Unavail-
able for 165.0 h. CCDP: 1.08E-07 
5. 16 July 2012. Generator excitation fault in 
emergency diesel EY01. Unavailable for 432 h. 
CCDP: 5.194E-07. 
6. 29 September 2012. Leaking coolant in auxil-
iary emergency feed water pump RL94D001. 
Unavailable for 472 h. CCDP: 3.237E-07. 
7. 24 September 2012. Initial event: loss of main 
feed water in part-load operation (17%) during 
start-up. CCDP: 1.297E-07. 
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Loviisa 2:
1. 3 August 2012. Failure and replacement of the 
oil pump in the second A circuit compressor 
of the special air conditioning system’s water 
cooling equipment 22UV46B0002 (Eltie circuit). 
Unavailable for 170 h. CCDP: 1.641E-07. 
2. 15 November 2012. Erroneous configuration of 
the thermal relays of 0.4 kV pump motors in 
several emergency systems. Unavailable for 37 
days. CCDP: 1.80E-07.
Of these faults, the four faults of the LO1 diesel 
generator EY01 had the highest safety significance. 
STUK required that Fortum produce an account of 
the diesel generator’s excitation and voltage con-
trol problems by 28 February 2013.
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A brief description of the significant events is given 
below:
Olkiluoto 1:
1. Preventive maintenance of a diesel generator in 
subsystem C took 110 h. CCDP: 1.09E-07.
Olkiluoto 2:
1. Preventive maintenance of a diesel generator in 
subsystem A took 115 h. CCDP: 1.02E-07.
2. Preventive maintenance of a diesel generator in 
subsystem C took 104 h. CCDP: 1.02E-07.
3. 29–31 July 2012. Pumps 721P4 and 721 P2 
isolated due to a leak in a suction line mea-
surement nozzle. Pump P4 was unavailable for 
48 hours. During this time, pump P2 was in a 
failed state for 8 hours. CCDP: 3.3E-06.
The combined total CCDP of all three categories di-
vided by the probability of a severe accident gives 
an overview of the risk-significance of operational 
events. To facilitate analysis, risk calculation is 
based on conservative assumptions and simplifica-
tions, which materially weakens the applicability 
of the results for trend monitoring. If the risk-sig-
nificance remains at the same average level year 
after year, the annual fluctuation does not warrant 
particular attention.
In 2012, the risk arising from operational ac-
STUK-B 162
131
APPENDIX 1 STUK’S SafeTy performance indicaTorS for nppS in 2012
Risk contribution of the safety system unavailability at Loviisa NPP
Persentage of the average annual core damage risk
 LO1
 LO2
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14%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 7.20 11.21 9.20 3.15 3.10 0.90 1.50 4.30 9.70 5.30 3.80
 3.30 10.90 3.70 4.14 1.60 1.95 2.40 3.00 5.20 8.60 1.80
Risk contribution of the safety system unavailability at Olkiluoto NPP
Persentage of the average annual core damage risk
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10.90 4.68 5.10 9.64 7.60 6.00 26.10 4.00 171.4 13.10 5.90
 3.50 7.39 8.60 10.95 5.00 6.00 1.30 5.40 6.30 5.40 29.00
tivities decreased slightly at the Loviisa plant com-
pared to previous years. The simultaneous unavail-
ability of two secondary cooling system pumps (721 
P4 and P2) increased the annual risk for Olkiluoto 
2 by 29%. Such an increase proves the importance 
of the secondary cooling system for plant safety. 
The dependence of safety of the secondary cooling 
circuit will be decreased in the next annual outage, 
when the 327 auxiliary feed water system will be 
modified to function independently of the second-
ary cooling circuit. (The project has been active 
for years, and is not a result of the event described 
above.)
A.II.4 Accident risk at nuclear facilities
Definition
As the indicator, the annual probability of an 
accident leading to severe damage to nuclear fuel 
(core damage frequency) is followed. The accident 
risk is presented per nuclear power plant unit.
Source of data
The data is obtained as the result of probabilistic 
risk analyses (PRA) of the nuclear power plants. 
The risk analysis is based on detailed calculation 
models, continuously developed and complement-
ed. A total of 200 man-years have been used at 
Finnish nuclear power plants to develop the mod-
els. The basic data of the risk analyses includes 
globally collected reliability information of compo-
nents and operator activities as well as operating 
experience from Finnish power plants.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the development of 
the nuclear power plant’s accident risk. The objec-
tive is to operate and maintain the nuclear power 
plant so that the accident risk decreases or re-
mains stable. Risk analyses can help detect a need 
to make modifications to the plant or change oper-
ating methods.
Responsible unit/person
Risk assessment (RIS), Jorma Rantakivi  
(PRA computation)
Operational safety (KÄY) (failure data)
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Interpretation of the indicator
When assessing the indicator, it must be remem-
bered that it is affected by both the development 
of the power plant and the development of the 
calculation model. Plant modifications and changes 
in methods, carried out to remove risk factors, will 
decrease the indicator value. An increase of the 
indicator value may be due to the model being 
extended to new event groups, or the identification 
of new risk factors. In addition, developing more 
detailed models or obtaining more detailed basic 
data may change risk estimates in either direction. 
For example, the increase in the Loviisa indicator 
in 2003 was due to the analysis being extended to 
cover exceptionally harsh weather conditions and 
oil accidents at sea during a refuelling outage. In 
the following year, the indicator value decreased, 
partly as a result of a more detailed analysis of 
these factors.
Loviisa power plant’s accident risk has contin-
ued to decrease over the last ten years, and new 
risk factors, discovered as the scope of the risk 
analysis has been extended, have been efficiently 
removed. The indicator decreased in 2007 due to 
the new seawater line completed during the period. 
The new line allows for the alternative intake of 
seawater from the outlet channel to cool the plant 
in shutdown operation. The change will decrease 
risks in situations where algae, frazil ice or an 
oil release endanger the availability of seawater 
through the conventional route. The decrease of 
the indicator in 2008 and in the following years 
results from more detailed analyses performed in 
conjunction with the renewal of the operating li-
cence, as well as changes at the plant planned to be 
carried out earlier or in connection with the licence 
renewal. Such changes include: the I&C upgrade 
LARA; the decrease in the probability of a critical-
ity accident using, for example, boron analysers; 
modernisation of the refuelling machine and the 
decrease in the probability of an external leak.
For the Loviisa power plant, the most important 
factors affecting the overall accident risk include 
internal plant events during outages (such as the 
falling of heavy loads or a power surge caused by 
the sudden dilution of the boron used to adjust 
reactor operation), fire, a high level of seawater 
during power operation and oil releases during a 
refuelling outage.
The annual probability of a severe reactor ac-
cident calculated for the Loviisa plant units was 
approximately 3.05 × 10-5 in 2012. The value has 
decreased by about 27% from the previous year. 
The decrease of the risk was a result of several 
small plant changes, changes in the model, and the 
revision of reliability data. 
The indicator for the Olkiluoto plant decreased 
approximately 30% in 2008 compared to previous 
years’ relatively stable value. The decrease was 
mainly due to the more detailed modelling of earth-
quake events and the plant changes carried out to 
improve seismic qualification. The increase in 2009 
was due to the fact that the heat exchanger of the 
screening system cannot be used for residual heat 
removal after all, contrary to earlier assessments. 
The decrease of risk in 2010 was due to changes in 
the modelling of DC systems 672 and 679 (inclusion 
of battery diversity), while the increase in 2011 re-
sulted from reassessment of fire frequencies. For the 
Olkiluoto power plant, internal events during power 
operation (component failures and pipe ruptures 
leading to an operational transient) are the most 
important factors affecting the overall accident risk.
The annual probability of a severe reactor ac-
cident calculated for the Olkiluoto plant units was 
approximately 1.34 × 10-5 in 2012. The value has 
remained at the same level compared to the previ-
ous year.
Fluctuation of the calculated annual core damage frequency 
for Loviisa plant units during 2003–2012
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A.II.5 Number of fire alarms
Definition
As indicators, the number of fire alarms and actual 
fires are followed.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the power 
companies. The licensees submit the data needed 
for the indicator to the person responsible for the 
indicator at STUK.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicator is used to follow the effectiveness of 
fire protection at the nuclear power plants.
Responsible unit/person
Civil Engineering and Fire Protection (RAK)
Pekka Välikangas
Interpretation of the indicator
There were no events classified as fires at the 
Loviisa power plant or outside the plant area in 
2012. In 2012, the number of faults in the Loviisa 
power plant’s fire detection system remained at the 
same level compared to the previous years. Actual 
alarms of the detectors continued at the 2011 level.
No events classified as fires occurred in the 
Olkiluoto plant area (OL1/2) in 2012. Five events 
classified as fires occurred outside the plant area: 
three at the OL3 site (an outdoor power trans-
former burned, and insulation sheets and protec-
tive plastic sheets ignited); smoking oil in a broken 
gearbox in Posiva’s Onkalo facilities; and an out-
door fire starting from a barbecue in the accommo-
dation village. The fires were minor and could be 
put out using first aid extinguishers. No fire detec-
tion system failures were observed at the Olkiluoto 
power plant (OL1/2) in 2012. The situation was the 
same in 2011. The number of correct fire alarms 
was of the same order in 2012 as in 2011.
The automatic fire detectors were upgraded at 
the Loviisa power plant in 2000 and at Olkiluoto 
in 2001. The number of alarms increased at both 
units after that because of the more sensitive 
detectors. The distinct reduction in alarms at the 
Loviisa plant since 2003 and at the Olkiluoto plant 
since 2004 is due to pre-alarms no longer being 
included in the calculations.
On average, fire safety at the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto plants has remained at the earlier level, 
as no events classified as fires have occurred in 
the plant area. Alarms from fire alarm systems 
have also been at a relatively low level. Most of the 
alarms were caused by dust, smoke or humidity. 
Fire alarm systems are not always disconnected 
in a wide enough area for maintenance work. The 
number of alarms from the fire alarm system is 
also affected by the amount of maintenance and 
repair work performed at the plants.
Number of fire alarms, Loviisa NPP
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Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration level of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) in power operation, Loviisa NPP
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 4.32E+02 5.01E+02 3.89E+02 3.91E+02 1.90E+02 2.00E+02 2.60E+02 3.80+02 3.90E+02 3.70E+02
 3.22E+02 3.39E+02 2.91E+02 2.72E+02 2.10E+02 4.90E+04 2.40E+04 1.20+03 8.50E+02 4.71E+03
LO1
LO2
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) related to shutdowns, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 1.40E+02 4.80E+02 5.60E+04 6.70E+02 7.06E+02
 4.30E+02 6.40E+06 4.10E+02 1.40E+03 4.10E+03 
1.00E+03
1.00E+07
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) in power operation, Loviisa NPP
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 2.30E+03 2.10E+03 2.20E+03 1.90E+03 8.10E+02 1.20E+03 1.54E+03 4.97E+04 1.49E+03 2.80E+03
6.00E+02 5.80E+02 5.90E+02 5.20E+02 5.00E+02 1.30E+05 3.85E+06 3.20E+03 6.64E+03 1.27E+04
LO1
LO2
1.00E+07
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
OLC limit 7E+05 kBq/m3
A.III Structural integrity
A.III.1 Fuel integrity
Definition
As indicators, the plant unit-specific maximum 
level and the highest maximum activity value of 
the iodine-131 activity concentration (I-131 activ-
ity concentration) in the primary coolant in steady-
state operation (start-up operation or power opera-
tion for Loviisa and power operation for Olkiluoto) 
are followed. The change in activity concentration 
of I-131 in primary coolant due to depressurisation 
during shutdowns or reactor trips, as well as the 
number of leaking fuel bundles removed from the 
reactor, are followed as indicators.
Source of data
The licensees submit the indicator values directly 
to the person in charge of the indicator at STUK. 
The maximum activity levels are also available in 
the quarterly reports submitted by the utilities.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicators describe fuel integrity and the fuel 
leakage volume during the operating cycle. The in-
dicators for the shutdown situations also describe 
the success of the shutdown concerning radiation 
protection.
Responsible unit/person
Reactor and Safety Systems (REA),
Kari Mäkelä
A.III.1a Primary coolant activity
Interpretation of indicators (Loviisa)
In 2012, the reactor of Loviisa 1 had no leaking 
fuel. The previous leaking fuel assembly was re-
moved from the Loviisa 1 reactor in 2010, which 
reduced the maximum activity (I-131) of the pri-
mary coolant. After removal of the leaking fuel 
assemblies, the maximum activity values associ-
ated with shutdowns have also returned to the 
level before the leaks. Increased iodine content 
at Loviisa 2 was detected in a routine laboratory 
test in December. Noble gas measurements of the 
primary coolant confirmed that a fuel leak existed. 
The leak was, however, minor and the fuel assem-
bly will be removed in the next annual outage. 
The number of minor fuel leaks has increased in 
Loviisa in recent years. The actual reason for this 
is unknown, as examination of the damaged fuel 
assemblies has not been possible due to problems 
with the pool inspection equipment.
In 2012, fuel integrity at both Loviisa plant 
units was good.
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Interpretation of indicators (Olkiluoto)
Olkiluoto 1 did not have any leaking fuel in 2012, 
which decreased the iodine-131 activity of the 
plant unit’s primary coolant. A fuel leak in the 
Olkiluoto  2 reactor began in 2011 and continued 
until the leaking fuel assembly was removed in the 
2012 annual outage. The impact of the leak showed 
in the maximum activity (I-131) of Olkiluoto  2 
primary coolant associated with shutdown. The 
reason for the damage could not be revealed in 
preliminary inspections, which is why further in-
vestigations will take place when the fuel assembly 
will be repaired. On the basis of inspections carried 
out during annual outage, the fuel types at both 
plant units have behaved in the normal manner. 
Several fuel leaks have occurred in the 2000s at 
the Olkiluoto plant units, particularly at Olkiluoto 
2. The main reason for the leaks has been small 
foreign objects entering the reactor during main-
tenance operations and getting caught in the fuel 
assembly structures. The coolant flow may make 
the loose objects vibrate and break the fuel clad-
ding. To minimise the problem, new Triple Wave+ 
foreign object sieves have been adopted for the fuel 
at Olkiluoto 2 in 2012. The sieve profiling has been 
changed to make the grid denser.
Interpretation of indicators (Olkiluoto)
Olkiluoto 1 had no leaking fuel in 2012. A fuel as-
sembly that had been leaking since 2011 was re-
moved from Olkiluoto 2 during the annual outage.
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³), Olkiluoto NPP
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 4.30E+02 1.90E+02 5.90E+01 6.90E+02 3.50E+01 3.70E+01 3.60E+01 3.12E+04 1.40E+02 6.76E+01
9.10E+01 3.12E+03 6.52E+03 7.03E+03 9.99E+02 2.30E+02 1.00E+02 2.01+04 4.84E+03 9.45E+02
OL1
OL2
1.00E+07
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Tech Spec limit 2.2 MBq/l
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) related to shutdowns, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
OL2
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.03E+04 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
 2.52E+02 0.00E+00 1.61E+05 3.93E+03 6.19E+04
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration level of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) in power operation, Olkiluoto NPP
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
4.30E+02 8.20E+01 5.80E+01 2.00E+02 2.70E+01 3.00E+01 3.50E+01 2.45E+03 5.50E+01 5.58E+01
9.00E+01 1.49E+03 4.00E+03 4.00E+03 2.30E+02 2.10E+02 9.10E+01 1.87E+03 1.46E+03 3.03E+02
OL1
OL2
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Number of leaking fuel bundles removed from the reactor, 
Loviisa NPP
 LO1
 LO2
0
1
2
3
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Number of leaking fuel bundles removed from the reactor, 
Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
0
1
2
3
 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
A.III.1b Number of leaking fuel assemblies
Interpretation of indicators (Loviisa)
Loviisa  1 had no leaking fuel during the period 
under review. A minor fuel leak was observed at 
Loviisa 2 in December 2012. The leaking fuel as-
sembly will be removed in the annual outage 2013.
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A.III.2 Reactor coolant system integrity
A.III.2a Water chemistry conditions
Definition
As indicators, the water chemistry conditions for 
each plant unit are followed.
The water chemistry indicators are:
•	 Chemistry	 performance	 indices	 used	 by	 the	
licensees, depicting the effectiveness of water 
chemistry control in the secondary circuits of 
PWRs and in the reactor circuits of BWRs. The 
chemical conditions in the secondary circuit of 
a pressurized water reactor affect the integ-
rity of the interface between the reactor coolant 
system and the secondary circuit. The current 
index describes the water chemistry conditions 
in the secondary circuit at Loviisa with a higher 
degree of sensitivity than the corresponding 
international index for VVER plants. This index 
observes corrosive factors and the concentra-
tions of corrosion products in the steam gen-
erator blowdown and the feed water. For steam 
generator blowdown, the calculation includes 
the chloride, sulphate and sodium concentra-
tions and acid conductivity. For feed water, it 
includes the iron, copper and oxygen concentra-
tions. The indicator for Olkiluoto is the inter-
national index used by the plant. It consists of 
the chloride and sulphate concentrations of the 
reactor water and the iron concentration in the 
feed water. The indices for both plants only cov-
er the aforementioned parameter values during 
power operation.
•	 The	 maximum	 chloride	 concentration	 of	 the	
steam generator blowdown at the Loviisa plant 
units and the reactor water at the Olkiluoto 
plant units during operation compared with 
the OLC limit in the monitoring period. At the 
Olkiluoto plant, the maximum sulphate content 
of reactor water during steady-state operation 
is also followed.
•	 Corrosion	 products	 released	 from	 the	 surfaces	
of the reactor coolant system and the secondary 
circuit into the coolant. For the Loviisa plant, 
the iron concentration of the reactor coolant 
and the secondary circuit feed water (maximum 
values for the monitoring period) are followed. 
For the Olkiluoto plant, the iron concentration 
of feed water (maximum value for the monitor-
ing period) is followed. In addition, the maxi-
mum Co-60 activity concentration in the reactor 
coolant while bringing the plant to a cold shut-
down or after a reactor trip is followed for both 
plants.
Source of data
The licensees submit indicators describing water 
chemistry control to the respective responsible per-
son at STUK. The approximate concentration lev-
els of corrosive substances and corrosion products 
can also be obtained from quarterly reports sub-
mitted by the licensees.
Purpose of the indicator
The water chemistry indicators are used to monitor 
and control the integrity of the reactor coolant sys-
tem and the secondary circuit. The monitoring is 
done by indices depicting water chemistry control 
and by following selected corrosive impurities and 
corrosion products. The water chemistry indices 
combine a number of water chemistry parameters 
and thus give a good overview of the water chem-
istry conditions. STUK indicators are also used to 
monitor the fluctuation of certain parameters in 
more detail. The corrosive substances monitored 
include chloride and sulphate. The corrosive prod-
ucts followed are iron and radioactive Co-60. The 
activity concentration of Co-60 isotope while bring-
ing the plant to cold shutdown is used to describe 
the access of cobalt-containing structural materials 
into the reactor coolant system, the success of the 
water chemistry control, and the shutdown pro-
cedures. In addition to the parameters described 
here, the licensees use several other parameters 
to monitor the plant units’ water chemistry condi-
tions.
Responsible units/persons
Reactor and Safety Systems (REA)  
Kari Mäkelä
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Interpretation of indicators (Loviisa)
In 2012, the impurity and corrosion product lev-
els in the reactor coolant system and the second-
ary circuit, followed in STUK’s indicator scheme, 
were within the OLC limits. In recent years, the 
chemistry index of both Loviisa plant units has 
remained at almost the best possible value. The 
higher-than-normal value for Loviisa  2 in 2012 
was due to impurities in steam generators. The 
impurities resulted from the inability to purify the 
secondary circuit water efficiently enough after 
start-up. To lower the impurity content, an excep-
tionally high quantity of water was let out from 
the bottom of the steam generators throughout the 
autumn. In addition, the secondary circuit pow-
der resin coating was carried out more frequently, 
water was changed with increased efficiency, and 
ion exchange resins were regenerated and used 
for water purification. Despite these measures, the 
chemistry index was clearly higher than in the pre-
vious years. The water chemistry of the Loviisa 2 
secondary circuit remained at the good level of the 
previous years. The exceptional value of the index 
for Loviisa 2 in 2004 was caused by a seawater leak 
in the condenser, which had caused the chloride 
concentration of the steam generator blowdown, 
affecting the index, to become greater than nor-
mal. The maximum Co-60 activity levels associated 
with shutdowns were measured during shutdowns 
for annual outages. In 2012, the concentrations did 
not deviate from previous years’ values. The indica-
tor shows that the integrity of the reactor coolant 
system has been good at the Loviisa plant units in 
2012.
0
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Integrity of the secondary circuit: 
Chemistry index, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
 LO2
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 1.18 1.11 1.08 1.03 1.06 1.03 1.05 1.02 1.13
 3.93 1.05 1.18 1.11 1.07 1.01 1.02 1.00 1.02
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosive impurities; 
Maximum chloride concentration of a steam generator blow-down 
(µg/kg) in power operation, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 3.64E+01 2.90E+01 7.80E+00 1.93E+01 1.98E+01
 2.10E+02 1.14E+01 9.10E+00 1.10E+01 3.19E+01
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
OLC limit ≤ 100 µg/kg
OLC limit after the annual maintenance outages 2008 100 µg/kg; 
before them 500 µg/kg
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products; 
Maximum iron concentration in the feed water (µg/l) 
(RL30 / RL70) in power operation, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 11.4 15.1 17.0 8.1 8.4
 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.4 7.7
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Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products; 
Maximum iron concentration in primary coolant (Fe-tot µg/l) 
in power operation, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 11.0 19.4 6.5 9.1 13.8
 13.6 16.1 7.5 15.7 23.4
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Integrity of primary circuit: 
Maximum cobalt-60 activity concentration (kBq/m³) in 
primary coolant related to shutdowns, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 1.29E+04 1.03E+04 8.21E+03 5.26E+03 7.48E+03
 2.40E+04 1.71E+04 8.60E+03 9.88E+03 7.90E+03
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
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Interpretation of indicators (Olkiluoto)
The impurity and corrosion product levels in reac-
tor water and feed water, followed in STUK’s indi-
cator scheme, were below the OLC limits at both 
plant units. The chemistry index was the best pos-
sible, 1, at both plant units in 2012. Iron, sulphate 
and chloride concentrations of the reactor coolant 
did not deviate from their regular values, which is 
also shown by the achieved chemistry index value. 
The monitoring and optimisation of Olkiluoto  2 
water chemistry was successful in 2012. All the 
results presented in this report are at a normal 
good level. The higher-than-usual chloride content 
in 2011 was caused by a seawater leak in the con-
denser. The leak was rectified within two weeks of 
detecting it, after which the chloride content has 
been in line with the target value. Similar leaks 
did not take place in 2012. At both plant units, 
the Co-60 activity content maximum associated 
with shutdown occurred during shutdown for an-
nual outage. There were no essential changes in 
the Co-60 activity content compared to previous 
years. The indicator shows that reactor coolant 
system integrity has been good at the Olkiluoto 
plant units in 2012.
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A.III.2b Reactor coolant system 
leakages (Olkiluoto)
Definition
The indicators below are used to follow identified 
and unidentified reactor coolant system leakages 
at the Olkiluoto plant units:
•	 Total	 volume	 (m3)	 of	 identified	 (from	 contain-
ment to collection tank 352 T1 of the controlled 
leakage drain system) and unidentified (total 
volume of leakages into the sump of the con-
trolled floor drainage system, 345 T33) internal 
leakages in the containment during the operat-
ing cycle.
•	 Highest	 daily	 internal	 leakage	 volume	 in	 the	
containment during the operating cycle in rela-
tion to the leakage volume allowed in the OLC 
(outflow water volume of water condensing in 
the air coolers of the containment cooling sys-
tem 725/OLC limit).
Source of data
The licensee submits data on reactor coolant sys-
tem leakages at the Olkiluoto power plant to the 
responsible person at STUK.
Purpose of the indicator
The indicators describing reactor coolant system 
leakages are used to follow and monitor the leak 
rate of the reactor coolant system within the con-
tainment.
Responsible units/persons
Projects (PRO), Jukka Kallionpää
Interpretation of the indicator, 
operating cycle 2011–2012
One of the purposes of controlled leakage k352 is 
to collect leakages from valves, pumps and other 
such components. The drains from the seal boxes 
of the valves within the containment are equipped 
with temperature sensors to locate any leaks. 
Temperature sensors installed on the drains above 
the main lines will detect any leakage in the spe-
cific line. Other methods must then be used to 
locate the actual leaking object. Identified leakages 
within the containment increased to some extent 
at OL1 in 2009, 2010 and 2011. In 2012, they 
went down. At OL2, the identified leakages have 
remained almost constant. The leakage volumes do 
not include the drainage of process systems during 
annual outages and other outages. The identified 
leakages include sampling flows of approximately 
100–1,500 m³ from the reactor building.
At the lowest point of the containment drywell, 
there is the drain water pit T33, which collects the 
drain water from the containment drywell floor 
drains and any leakage from the control rod ac-
tuator seals. The volumes of unidentified reactor 
coolant system leakages during the operating cycle 
2010–2011 decreased at both plant units. In 2012, 
they went slightly up from the 2011 level at both 
plant units.
One of the purposes of containment gas cooling 
system 725 is to remove moisture from the contain-
ment atmosphere. Moisture may originate from 
steam leaking from the reactor coolant system. 
In the operating cycle of 2010–2011, the contain-
ment’s largest internal daily leak volume’s ratio to 
the maximum allowable volume, as specified in the 
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The maximum unidentified leakage in ratio to the OLC limit, 
Olkiluoto NPP
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operational limits and conditions, was low for both 
plant units. 
The reactor coolant system has been relatively 
leak-proof in the 2011–2012 operating cycle.
A.III.3 Containment integrity
Definition
As indicators, the parameters below are followed: 
the total as-found leakage of outer isolation valves 
following the first integrity tests, compared with 
the highest allowed total leakage from the outer 
isolation valves; the percentage of isolation valves 
tested during the year in question at each plant 
unit that passed the leakage test on the first at-
tempt (i.e. as-found leakage smaller than the ac-
ceptance criteria of a valve and no exceeding of 
the so-called attention criteria of a valve without 
repair in consecutive years) and the combined as-
found leakage rate of containment penetrations 
and airlocks in relation to their highest allowed to-
tal leakage. The combined leakage rate at Olkiluoto 
includes leakages from personnel airlocks, the 
maintenance dome and the containment dome. At 
Loviisa, the combined leakage rate is comprised of 
the leakage test results from personnel airlocks, 
the material airlock, the cable penetrations of in-
spection equipment, the containment maintenance 
ventilation systems (TL23), the main steam piping 
(RA) and the feed water system (RL) penetrations; 
the seals of blind-flanged penetrations of ice-filling 
pipes are also included.
Source of data
Data is extracted from the utilities’ leak-tightness 
test reports submitted by the licensee to STUK for 
information within three months of the completion 
of annual maintenance. STUK calculates the total 
as-found leakages, since the reports give total leak-
ages as they are at the end of the annual outage 
(i.e. after the completion of repairs and re-testing).
Purpose of the indicator
This indicator is used to follow the integrity of 
the containment isolation valves, penetrations and 
airlocks.
Responsible unit/person
Reactor and Safety Systems (REA)
Päivi Salo
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
The overall as-found leakage of the outer isolation 
valves of Loviisa 1 has decreased. At Loviisa 2, the 
overall as-found leakage increased, and based on 
the first tests, exceeded the limit set for overall 
leakage. Two outer isolation valves with plenty of 
leakage formed 85% of the overall as-found leak-
age. Both lines also have inner isolation valves. 
After the repair of the valves, the overall as-found 
leakage was again below the set limit.
The percentage of isolation valves that passed 
the leak test at the first attempt has remained 
high.
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The overall as-found leakage of outer isolation valves compared 
with the highest allowed overall leakage of outer isolation valves, 
Loviisa NPP
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Isolation valves passing the leakage test at the first attempt, 
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Combined leak rate of containment penetrations and air locks 
compared to the leak limit, Loviisa NPP
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The overall as-found leakage of containment 
penetrations, which at Loviisa includes the 
leakage test results for the personnel airlock, 
the emergency personnel airlock, the material 
airlock, the reactor pit, inward relief valves, cable 
penetrations and bellow seals (RA, RL, TL23), was 
small at both plant units.
Olkiluoto
The overall as-found leakage of the outer isolation 
valves of Olkiluoto 1 increased when compared to 
the previous year, but remained clearly below the 
limit set in the operating limits and conditions 
(OLC).
The overall as-found leakage of the outer isola-
tion valves of Olkiluoto 2 decreased from the previ-
ous year, and was below the limit set in the OLC. 
The percentage of isolation valves that passed 
the leak test at first attempt has remained high for 
both plant units.
The total as-found leakage rate of containment 
penetrations, in which TVO includes leakages in 
the upper and lower personnel airlocks, the main-
tenance dome and the containment dome, has re-
mained small for both plant units.
The overall as-found leakage of outer isolation valves compared 
with the highest allowed overall leakage of outer isolation valves, 
Olkiluoto NPP 
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APPENDIX 2 Occupational radiation dose distribution 
at Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants in 2012
According to the Radiation Decree, the annual ef-
fective dose from radiation work for a worker must 
not exceed 50 mSv while the average over any pe-
riod of five years must remain below 20 mSv.
The highest individual dose incurred at Finnish 
nuclear power plants was 14.3 mSv. This dose was 
accumulated from work at the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant. The highest individual dose for a 
Finnish nuclear power plant worker in the five-
year period from 2008 to 2012 was 54.5 mSv. The 
dose was accumulated at Swedish nuclear power 
plants.
dose range 
(mSv)
number of persons by dose
Loviisa Olkiluoto total*
< 0,1 817 1512 2229
0.1–0.49 194 397 555
0.5–0.99 129 186 288
1.00–1.99 132 131 253
2.00–2.99 84 39 113
3.00–3.99 38 22 62
4.00–4.99 37 3 40
5.00–5.99 29 12 41
6.00–6.99 10 3 20
7.00–7.99 19 0 17
8.00–8.99 13 3 19
9.00–9.99 8 1 9
10.00–10.99 5 0 8
11.00–11.99 3 0 6
12.00–12.99 2 0 2
13.00–13.99 6 0 7
14.00–14.99 7 0 7
15.00–20 0 0 0
> 20 0 0 0
* The data in this column include Finnish workers who have 
received doses also at Swedish nuclear power plants. The same 
person may have worked at both Finnish nuclear power plants 
and in Sweden.
 Source: STUK’s dose register
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APPENDIX 3 Significant operational 
events at nuclear power plants in 2012
Loviisa NPP
Suction valve of the boron injection 
system erroneously closed at Loviisa 2
It was observed at Loviisa 2 on 10 April 2012 that 
the suction line valve of one of the boron tanks of 
the plant unit was erroneously in the closed posi-
tion. The boron injection system includes two boron 
tanks from which water with high boron content 
can be pumped into the reactor in various opera-
tional, transient and emergency situations using 
six pumps. The function most important to safety 
is the injection of boron into the reactor to shut it 
down when shutdown with control rods fails. When 
repair of the boron injection system began at the 
plant unit, the suction line valve was found to be 
closed.
The closed position of the hand-operated suc-
tion valve prevented the use of three boron injec-
tion pumps. In addition, a fourth pump was discon-
nected for repairs. If the boron injection system 
had been required to shut down the reactor, only 
two pumps would have been available: one high-
pressure pump and one low-pressure pump with 
low capacity. On the basis of analyses, one high-
pressure pump is adequate in situations where the 
reactor shutdown by control rods fails.
The closed suction valve was opened imme-
diately after the error was found, and the three 
pumps served by it were operational again. The 
closed valve was noticed due to an alarm that ac-
tivated in the control room. The alarm would also 
have functioned in an emergency, and adequate 
boron injection into the reactor could have been 
speedily restored. It is also possible to change the 
pump suction to another tank using valves.
The boron injection system had been used ap-
proximately one week prior to the event, at which 
time the valve now erroneously closed had been 
open. According to the Loviisa power plant, the bo-
ron tank suction valve was most likely closed due 
to a human error occurring in connection with the 
testing of the boron pump. Due to the event, the 
Loviisa power plant will add further details to the 
boron pump periodic testing procedure to include 
checking and acknowledging the state of the boron 
tank suction valves at the end of the tests.
For the safe shutdown of the plant, it was es-
sential that the control rod system was operational 
at the time of the event. The event was classified as 
category 0 on the INES scale, and it caused no risk 
to the environment or the personnel.
Deficiencies in the testing of 
radiation monitors at Loviisa 2
In May 2012, the Loviisa power plant informed 
STUK that it had found deficiencies in the test-
ing procedure of certain radiation monitors at the 
plant. The monitors in question are used to mea-
sure the radioactivity of the water let out of the 
secondary circuit and discharged into the sea. The 
procedures had not been fully observed when test-
ing the monitors, resulting in the process control 
function being left untested in some tests. In ad-
dition, some periodic tests had been completely 
ignored.
The testing requirements of radiation monitors 
are recorded in the operational limits and condi-
tions (OLC) that the power plant must comply 
with. According to the OLC, a general inspection of 
the monitors must be performed every two weeks, 
a functional test every month, and a calibration 
check every six months. Based on the investiga-
tions of Fortum, there have been deficiencies in all 
these.
After the detection of the deficiencies, the ra-
diation monitors and the related process control 
functions were tested in accordance with the proce-
dures. The tests showed that the equipment func-
tioned in the normal manner. Radiation monitors 
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have a self-diagnostics function in case of failures 
and, in addition to periodic testing, the operation 
of the monitors is followed in the process computer 
trend displays. As the equipment functions in the 
normal manner, deficient testing had no immedi-
ate importance to the safety of the plant or the 
environment.
The preliminary classification of the event on 
the INES scale is 0. Fortum delivered a special re-
port of the event to STUK, describing the reasons 
and corrective measures for the event. As the event 
involved deficient quality management and unjus-
tified ignoring of procedures, STUK rated the event 
as an anomaly belonging to INES category 1.
Deficient testing of recombiners at Loviisa 2
It was observed at Loviisa 2 on 16 May 2012 that 
the containment recombiner test required by 
the plant procedures had not been carried out in 
March 2012.
Hydrogen is released from the reactor into the 
containment in a potential severe reactor accident. 
The recombiners remove the hydrogen by means of 
a catalytic reaction to prevent the creation of high 
hydrogen concentrations. If the recombiners are 
unavailable, hydrogen can be removed using igni-
tion plugs.
The normal testing interval of recombiners is 
two months, but if testing shows that one third 
of the recombiners do not meet the operability re-
quirements set for them, the testing interval must 
be reduced to one month. According to the proce-
dures, the normal testing interval can be restored 
if the results of two consecutive tests are accept-
able.
New recombiner sheets that met the criteria 
in the performed tests have been installed at both 
plant units in January and February 2012. These 
tests were interpreted as two accepted tests at 
Loviisa 2. Due to the erroneous interpretation, the 
plant unit restored the two-month testing interval 
after one accepted test. The following testing of the 
Loviisa 2 recombiners took place in April 2012. The 
equipment met the testing criteria. A similar er-
roneous interpretation was not made at Loviisa 1.
The event is classified as 0 on the INES scale, 
i.e. it has no significance for radiation or nuclear 
safety.
Stopping of cooling system pumps 
during Loviisa 1 annual outage
An annual outage was in progress at Loviisa 1 on 
8 August 2012 when two secondary cooling system 
pumps stopped due to a human error. The situation 
constituted non-compliance with the operational 
limits and conditions (OLC), as both pumps of the 
secondary cooling system train should have been 
operational. The other train and its pumps had 
been isolated for maintenance.
The secondary cooling system cools seal water 
and feeds it into the auxiliary systems of the re-
actor coolant system, including the fuel pool cool-
ing system and the related heat exchangers and 
pumps.
The events were initiated when an isolation 
valve included in the system to separate the 
subsystems was tested. The other isolation valve 
should be closed during the test, but due to a 
human error, the valve was open and let water 
through to the empty side of the system. As the 
water volume decreased, two pumps of the avail-
able clean secondary cooling system train stopped. 
Flow in the system stopped, and a moment later, 
two fuel pool cooling pumps also stopped.
Fuel pool cooling was only disconnected for 12 
minutes, and it had no effect on the pool tempera-
ture. This was also due to the large water volume 
in the tanks and the fact that the fuel from the 
reactor had not yet been transferred into the pools, 
and only little residual heat was being generated 
as a result. The reactor and its fuel were being 
cooled by the residual heat removal system inde-
pendent from the secondary cooling system.
The event did not put radiation or nuclear 
safety at risk. Operators noticed the event quickly 
based on alarms activating in the control room, 
and normal operation of the pumps could be speed-
ily restored.
Reactor trip at Loviisa 2
Switchboard maintenance was carried out in the 
Loviisa 1 annual outage, and the switchboard was 
cut off for the purpose. This resulted in power sup-
ply being also cut off from the control cubicle of the 
back-up excitation system of turbine generators. 
This caused faulty protection signals in the back-
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up excitation system, and resulted in the isolation 
of Loviisa  2 turbine generators from the power 
grid. At this point, the reactor operator of Loviisa 2 
initiated a reactor trip.
During the announcements given in the plant 
area during the event, an ‘all clear’ signal was er-
roneously sounded. This created confusion not only 
at the plant, but also in the vicinity of it.
As an immediate measure, the protections from 
the back-up excitation machine were disconnected 
and will only be reconnected when back-up exci-
tation is taken into use. Similarly, the alarm and 
announcement procedures concerning transients 
were further specified.
Excess fire load at Loviisa 1
On STUK’s oversight rounds during the annual 
outage on 7 September 2012, ten one-litre plastic 
bottles containing flammable solvent were found in 
a plastic bag at the shoe boundary of a reactor pit 
access opening located in the containment’s reac-
tor coolant pump room. The solvent was intended 
for the washing of the reactor pit’s steel lining. 
According to the plant procedure, three litres of 
flammable solvents may be kept in the open at 
once. Other tools meant for the cleaning of the 
reactor pit, including cleaning cloths, were also 
stored at the same location.
The reactor coolant pump room has plenty of 
fixed fire load, such as 5,000 kg of cable insulation. 
Washing agents do not essentially increase the fire 
load but together with flammable materials, they 
create the preconditions for a rapidly progressing 
fire that ignites cables. When PVC cables burn, the 
temperature in the containment can increase to 
200 times the normal value, and high quantities of 
hydrogen chloride would be released.
The fire safety of the Loviisa power plant’s con-
tainment is partially based on keeping fire loads as 
low as possible and minimising the ignition poten-
tial. This is particularly important in spaces which 
have no fixed fire extinguishing systems, such as 
the containment’s reactor coolant pump room, and 
where the success of first aid extinguishing is un-
certain.
STUK also observed a similar event at Loviisa 
1 during the 2010 annual outage, with a consider-
ably higher quantity of connectors being stored. 
Since the 2010 event, the power plant has im-
proved the procedures and supervision of the work.
Due to the repeated nature of the event, STUK 
rated it as a category 1 event on the seven-step ra-
diation and nuclear safety scale (INES).
Reactor trip at Loviisa 1
During the start-up of Loviisa 1 after the annual 
outage, one feed water pump was feeding water 
into the steam generators. The pump stopped, and 
the feed water system could not be started up de-
spite the efforts due to low pressure on the supply 
side. As a result, a manual reactor trip was per-
formed while the reactor power was still at a low 
level.
The event caused no risk to the plant, people 
or the environment. The plant’s safety back-up 
systems functioned as planned. The event was 
caused by inadequate feed water pumping capacity 
considering the operating mode. After the event, 
confirmation of adequate pumping capacity had 
been added to the updated start-up procedure of 
the plant units.
Uncertainties in the operationality 
of replaced pressure equalisation 
system valves at Loviisa 1
The start-up of Loviisa 1 after annual outage was 
interrupted on 20 September 2012 due to uncer-
tainties found in the commissioning testing of a 
pressurizer blowdown line valve and the pressur-
izer spray valves.
Modifications were made to the reactor pres-
sure equalisation system during the annual outage 
of Loviisa  1. According to the operational limits 
and conditions (OLC) updated due to the modifi-
cations, the valves must be operational when the 
plant is taken into the hot standby state during 
start-up. STUK estimates that there was no basis 
for confirming the operationality of the valves, as 
no certainty existed of the success of tests included 
in the test operation programme.
At STUK’s request, the plant was cooled down 
to hot shutdown, as no operationality requirement 
existed for the valves in that state. The power com-
pany performed the necessary testing again, and 
after acceptable testing results, the valves could be 
confirmed as operational.
The event caused no risk to the plant, people 
or the environment. On the International Nuclear 
Event Scale (INES), the event was rated as cat-
egory 0.
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Two serious accident management 
measurements unavailable at Loviisa 1
After the annual outage on 4 October 2012, it was 
observed at Loviisa 1 that two measurements re-
lated to serious accident management would not 
have functioned reliably in an emergency. The 
measurements in question are used during serious 
reactor accidents to provide plant operators with 
information on whether the water volume used for 
external cooling of the reactor pressure vessel is 
adequate. Two other similar measurements were 
available and would have provided information on 
the water volume.
The reason behind the event was a valve left 
in the wrong position during annual outage. After 
installation, the valve had been left on the line in a 
closed position, which was why the measurements 
did not work. According to the OLC, the measure-
ments must be available during plant start-up. 
As the valve had been left in the wrong position 
already during the annual outage, the plant had 
been non-compliant with the OLC during start-up.
The Loviisa nuclear power plant has identified 
the inspection procedure after valve installation 
and deficiencies in the verification of availabil-
ity as the causes of the event. Due to the event, 
the Loviisa power plant will identify the valves 
which have an impact on the measurements and 
which have deficient inspection procedures, and 
will make the necessary changes to the procedures.
The event caused no risk to the plant, people 
or the environment. On the International Nuclear 
Event Scale (INES), the event was rated as cat-
egory 0.
A residual heat removal subsystem 
briefly unavailable at Loviisa 2
One subsystem of the residual heat removal sys-
tem of the Loviisa  2 reactor coolant system was 
unavailable for a brief time after the annual out-
age, creating non-compliance with the OLC. The 
power plant observed the fault on 8 October 2012 
when the start-up of Loviisa 2 after annual outage 
had begun. The subsystem should have been opera-
tional before the beginning of start-up.
The purpose of the residual heat removal sys-
tem is to cool down the reactor and to transfer the 
residual heat from the reactor to seawater. The sys-
tem has two subsystems, each of which is capable 
of managing the residual heat removal alone. The 
other subsystem and the independent back-up sys-
tem were operational.
According to the OLC, both subsystems must 
be operational when the plant unit is taken into 
cold shutdown during start-up. Before going into 
cold shutdown, repairs had been started in one of 
the subsystems. The repair work was not known 
to cause inoperability that prevents the change of 
the operating mode. As a result, the plant unit was 
non-compliant with the OLC during the change of 
the operating condition.
The Loviisa nuclear power plant has identified 
flawed awareness of the situation at the beginning 
of plant start-up as the cause of the event, and 
is assessing its potential to develop its operating 
mode change procedures before the 2013 annual 
outage.
The event caused no risk to the plant, people 
or the environment. On the International Nuclear 
Event Scale (INES), the event was rated as cat-
egory 0.
Erroneous settings of protective 
relays of motors at Loviisa 2
At Loviisa 2, thermal relays (overload protections) 
were replaced in the electrical motors of pumps 
important to safety in the annual outage in au-
tumn 2012. Approximately one month after the 
completion of the annual outage, Fortum observed 
that wrong settings had been entered for the re-
lays, potentially resulting in the pumps stopping in 
the case of low motor supply voltage. The thermal 
relays are used as overload protection for the elec-
trical motor, meant to protect the motor and to cut 
the motor’s power supply if the motor overheats.
STUK’s inspection in November revealed irregu-
larities in the protections of the electrical motors of 
certain pumps important to safety. Further investi-
gations by Fortum showed that erroneous settings 
existed in the new thermal relays installed into 
motors during the 2012 annual outage at Loviisa 2. 
There were erroneous thermal relay settings in a 
total of ten different pump motors in the emergency 
cooling and feed water circuits, with the normal 
supply voltage values used instead of undervoltage 
values. The erroneous relay settings could have led 
to stopping of the pumps in undervoltage situations.
The safety significance of the event was low, and 
the event caused no immediate risk for the safety 
of the plant unit or the personnel. The pumps 
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were operational in normal voltage conditions, 
but could have stopped in undervoltage situations. 
Undervoltages and pump malfunctions are indi-
cated in the control room, which allows operators 
to take the necessary measures following the pro-
cedures. The plant unit is designed to cope with un-
dervoltage of the external 400/110 kV power grids 
using its four emergency diesel generators.
According to Fortum, the root cause behind the 
event was a design error in the definition of ther-
mal relay settings. The plant documentation used 
as a basis of design work does not include under-
voltage information for the pump motors in ques-
tion. The design error was not observed in connec-
tion with the modification work or the inspection.
After the erroneous thermal relay settings had 
been detected, Fortum informed the control room 
personnel of the proper procedures in undervoltage 
situations. As an immediate corrective measure, 
Fortum implemented the appropriate thermal re-
lay settings. The power company will also add 
further details to the setting and testing proce-
dure, develop the plant information system and 
documentation, and make additional checks to 
ensure that the thermal relay settings used in the 
plant unit’s electrical motors are correct. Fortum 
also inspected the corresponding thermal relays of 
pump motors at Loviisa  1, and no erroneous set-
tings were found.
The event was rated as category 1 on the inter-
national INES scale, because the erroneous relay 
settings simultaneously affected the reliable un-
dervoltage operation of several systems important 
to safety.
Inconsistencies in testing procedures 
observed at the Loviisa power plant
The Loviisa nuclear power plant has changed the 
periodic testing intervals of some systems and 
equipment so that the practice has become non-
compliant with the operational limits and condi-
tions (OLC) that guide the plant operations. The 
matter was revealed in an extensive review of pro-
cedures at the Loviisa power plant.
The power plant started the review of proce-
dures after the events that took place early in 
2012. At the time, some periodic testing defined in 
the OLC was not carried out at the correct time, 
because the testing interval specified in the pro-
cedure was different from that in the OLC. In the 
extensive review, new differences in testing inter-
vals were found between certain procedures and 
the OLC.
The condition of safety-significant systems and 
equipment is monitored with periodic testing and 
inspections. The requirements for the periodic test-
ing intervals are defined in the OLC. Differences 
between procedures and the OLC have been caused 
by reasons such as modifications being carried out 
at the nuclear power plant, resulting in changed 
testing intervals. The testing intervals presented 
in the OLC should also have been updated and 
subjected to STUK for approval after the modifica-
tions.
According to the Loviisa power plant, the ob-
served differences in testing intervals were minor, 
and no safety-critical tests would have been ne-
glected. The causes of the event were identified as 
the procedure update process being in conflict with 
the plant’s own procedures, and the fact that the 
role of the OLC in the procedure and regulation 
hierarchy had not been recognised to the adequate 
extent. The Loviisa power plant will continue the 
comparisons between OLC and the procedures and 
make the necessary changes to the procedures or 
the OLC to remove any conflicting information.
The event belongs to category 0 of the 
International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), mean-
ing that it had no impact on nuclear safety.
Problems with the Loviisa emergency diesel 
generators’ connecting rod bearings
An overhauled emergency diesel generator was in-
stalled at Loviisa  2 in the 2012 annual outage. 
During the overhaul, the motor received a new 
type of bearing at the lower end of the connecting 
rod. Deficiencies had been observed in the reliabil-
ity of the same manufacturer’s previous bearing 
type when used in similar emergency diesel gen-
erators in other countries. The unreliable bearing 
type is not being used at the Loviisa power plant at 
the moment. The manufacture of the original bear-
ing type ended in 2001.
The motor manufacturer tested the new bear-
ing type, and the preliminary testing report states 
that it functions well. As there is no operating 
experience in addition to type testing, STUK ap-
proved the new bearing type for use, but presented 
requirements of visual inspections of the bearings 
during test operation, and analysis of lubrica-
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tion oil at fixed intervals. At the end of 2012, the 
Loviisa power plant delivered to STUK the inspec-
tion records, analysis results, final type testing 
report and proposal for further measures to ensure 
the availability and reliability of the diesel motor. 
STUK will decide on the required long-term mea-
sures based on Fortum’s proposal.
Olkiluoto NPP
Error in the calculation of control rod 
efficiency at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2
TVO reported that during the spring it had found 
an error in the calculation method used to assess 
the efficiency of control rods during plant start-up. 
According to STUK’s assessment, the error found 
in the calculation method has no significance for 
the safety of the plant or the plant environment.
The reactors of Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 both 
have 121 control rods that can be moved inside the 
reactor core to adjust the reactor power, and that 
can be used to shut down the reactor when neces-
sary. A control rod drop accident is a postulated 
accident used in nuclear power plant design with 
the probability of less than one for every thousand 
years of operation.
The error in the calculation method is associ-
ated with a situation where the reactor is operated 
at only a few per cent of full power during start-up 
after an annual outage. At the beginning of the 
start-up procedure, the control rods are inserted 
into the reactor core and are gradually pulled out 
according to the procedure to increase reactor 
power. Due to the error in the calculation, control 
rod efficiency was considered much too low at low 
reactor power. If a control rod had become stuck 
when being pulled out, and later dropped out of the 
core all at once, the resulting power increase in the 
reactor would have been higher than the estimated 
increase. Preliminary estimates show, however, 
that the error did not cause any risk to fuel integ-
rity or plant safety.
The temperature of the fuel in the reactor must 
not increase so high that fuel integrity is lost. 
Therefore, safety analyses will be carried out for a 
control rod drop accident to confirm that the drop 
of any control rod at any stage of start-up cannot 
put safety at risk. Data of control rod efficiency is 
required for the analyses.
The event was rated as INES category 0.
Deficiencies found in the operation 
of main steam isolation valves at 
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2
During the 2012 annual outage of Olkiluoto 1, TVO 
found that one of the reactor’s main steam isola-
tion valves would not have closed as planned when 
required. A missing valve control conductor was re-
vealed as the cause of the deficiency. The conductor 
had been removed when four inner main steam 
isolation valves had been replaced in the 2010 an-
nual outage. The conductor had not been replaced 
due to a modification design error. TVO carried out 
additional checks and tests at both plant units after 
the observation, and found the same deficiency also 
at Olkiluoto 2. In a turbine automation renewal car-
ried out in 2005, a conductor had been unnecessar-
ily removed. As a result, the same isolation valve as 
at Olkiluoto 1, and another isolation valve beside it, 
would not have closed automatically when required.
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 both have four 
steam lines for conveying the steam generated in 
the reactor to the turbine plant. Each steam line 
has two isolation valves, one inside the contain-
ment wall and one on the outside. Their purpose is 
to close the steam lines in certain transient and ac-
cident situations, thus isolating the reactor and its 
containment in order to retain radioactivity within 
the containment. The missing control conductors 
did not belong to these main valves. Instead, the 
concerned isolation valves were located side by 
side outside the containment on a pipeline that is 
used to let the steam released from under the valve 
piston of closing pressure-operated isolation valves 
into the containment condensation pool. These two 
external isolation valves are located on a closed 
circuit, which means that steam and radioactive 
substances carried by the steam could not have 
been released outside the containment even if the 
valves had been left open.
The events did not put the safety of the plant 
or the environment at risk, but revealed deficien-
cies in modification planning and the coverage of 
testing. TVO installed the missing conductors im-
mediately after the events were detected. TVO will 
also investigate the coverage of testing more exten-
sively and improve the process used to ensure that 
modifications are ready to be implemented.
The events of both plant units were rated as 
INES category 1. The classification is based on a 
modification error.
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Corrosion indications in Olkiluoto 1 
main steam isolation valves
During the annual outage, TVO carried out a war-
ranty inspection on an inner main steam isola-
tion valve of Olkiluoto  1 replaced two years ear-
lier. Small pitting or selective corrosion indications 
were found in the valve’s sealing surfaces. The 
size of the pits found in the sealing surface one 
centimetre wide was approximately one tenth of 
a millimetre, and TVO stated that they were not 
considered to affect the valve’s tightness or oper-
ability. However, STUK required that three other 
similar valves be inspected at Olkiluoto 1 and that 
an account be given of the root cause and correc-
tive measures used to avoid corrosion of the sealing 
surfaces in the future. In additional inspections, 
similar indications were found in the other three 
valves. According to the immediate assessment of 
TVO and the valve manufacturer, the root cause 
is the imperfect melting of filler material during 
surfacing. The condition of the sealing surfaces is 
followed by surface inspections in accordance with 
the preventive maintenance programme.
Human error in a job related to the 
Olkiluoto 1 reactor protection system
During the annual outage of Olkiluoto  1, some 
of the control room pushbuttons belonging to the 
reactor protection system were replaced. Due to a 
human error, the replacement of pushbuttons was 
started in the wrong order. The necessary prepara-
tions had not yet been completed for the pushbut-
tons in question, and the work triggered a plant 
protection function. When the protection function 
had activated, two pumps contributing to the cool-
ing of the reactor core would not have started up 
when required.
At the same time, a pump impeller of a reactor 
coolant pump at the bottom of the reactor pressure 
vessel was being installed in place. At this stage 
of the work, precautions are taken for a situation 
where the plugging of the pump connection fails 
and water leaks out of the reactor pressure ves-
sel. The precautions include keeping at least four 
pumps that contribute to the cooling of the reactor 
core in working order and ready to be started up 
quickly to pump more water into the reactor pres-
sure vessel. The protection function triggered due 
to the human error reduced the number of avail-
able pumps to two. This created a non-compliance 
with the operational limits and conditions (OLC).
TVO interrupted the replacement of the push-
buttons and restored the disabled pumps in less 
than half an hour. The event did not create a risk 
to the safety of the plant or the environment, be-
cause two pumps could have kept the water level in 
the reactor core above the fuel assemblies even if 
water had leaked out of the reactor pressure vessel 
through the reactor coolant pump connection.
The event was rated as INES category 0.
Failed protective relay in the 
electrical system of Olkiluoto 2
A protective relay of a breaker in the Olkiluoto 2 
electrical system failed on 3 September 2012. This 
resulted in the loss of power to one subsystem’s 6.6 
kV busbar and the busbars belonging to it. One of 
the six reactor coolant pumps lost its power supply 
and stopped. Reactor power went down to 91 per 
cent. As a result, the emergency diesel generator 
for the subsystem in question started up. This en-
sured steady power supply to equipment important 
to safety. The failure of the protective relay did not 
affect the power of the three other 6.6 kV busbars 
or the busbars belonging to them, and the equip-
ment connected to these received uninterrupted 
power.
The cause of the failure has not yet been found, 
and investigations are ongoing. Olkiluoto  1 and 
Olkiluoto 2 also have other protective relays of the 
same type in various installations. TVO will define 
new corrective measures if required by the results 
of the investigation.
A failed control room emergency 
ventilation fan at Olkiluoto 2
In testing carried out on 18 September 2012, 
TVO observed that the Olkiluoto  2 control room 
emergency ventilation system did not function as 
planned. One of the two fans feeding overpressure 
into the control room in accident conditions failed 
to launch. TVO investigated the issue and found 
that the fan had been unavailable for two weeks. 
The fan was immediately restored to working or-
der.
TVO carried out modifications to the control 
room ventilation at the beginning of September. 
The preparations included electrical isolation of 
equipment. These ensure safety of the workers and 
the plant during the work. During the planning of 
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the work, it was not observed that a change in the 
position of one circuit breaker also affects the con-
trol room emergency ventilation fan, preventing it 
from starting when required.
The control room emergency ventilation system 
maintains safe working conditions in the control 
room during accidents. The system creates over-
pressure to the control room to prevent any radio-
active releases into the air from entering the room. 
TVO conducted measurements to confirm that the 
other fan that remained operational was able to 
produce an adequate pressure difference, and that 
the system thus met the functional requirements 
set for it throughout the event. The situation in-
volved non-compliance with the operational limits 
and conditions (OLC), as the OLC requires that 
both fans be available.
The event belongs to category 0 of the Inter-
national Nuclear Event Scale (INES), meaning 
that it had no impact on nuclear safety.
Deficiencies in the testing of protection 
system at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2
During the annual outage, TVO found deficiencies 
in the Olkiluoto  1 and Olkiluoto  2 main steam 
isolation valves. The deficiencies had not been 
revealed during valve testing. As a result of the 
event, TVO launched more extensive investiga-
tions into the scope of the testing of reactor protec-
tion systems.
The purpose of the tests, carried out at fixed 
intervals, is to confirm the correct operation of 
the reactor protection function when required, 
and to make sure that the operators of the plant 
unit receive the necessary alarms. The investiga-
tion revealed that the scope of the tests has not 
been adequate. The electrical circuits between the 
measuring equipment and the protection system 
have had untested contactors, meaning that their 
possible problems would not have been revealed 
in the tests carried out. As a result, tests have not 
managed to produce certainty of the progress of 
the protection signal throughout the chain, or the 
correct operation of the protection function in an 
emergency. However, certainty has been achieved 
for the forwarding of alarms. The operators would 
have received the appropriate alarms and could 
have carried out the necessary measures manually.
TVO immediately launched the testing of the 
functions that had remained untested. All contac-
tors were found to function appropriately in the 
tests completed by the end of 2012. The last of the 
tests will be carried out in the annual outage in 
spring 2013.
The event caused no risk to the plant, people or 
the environment. On the INES scale, the event is 
rated at level 0.
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APPENDIX 4 Licences and approvals in accordance 
with the Nuclear Energy Act in 2012
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
•	 2/C42214/2012,	23	February	2012.	Amendment	
to import and transport licence and transport 
plan for radioactive waste created during the 
scrapping process of decommissioned reheaters. 
Last date of validity 31 December 2015.
•	 3/C42214/2012,	 23	 February	 2012.	 Import	 of	
CR99 control rods from Sweden. Last date of 
validity 30 June 2012.
•	 9/C42214/2012,	 27	 August	 2012.	 Import	 and	
possession of a model fuel assembly and its 
channel from the United States. Last date of 
validity for import 28 February 2013 and for 
possession 31 December 2022.
•	 10/C42214/2012,	 27	 August	 2012.	 Import	 and	
possession of a model fuel assembly and its 
channel from Sweden. Last date of validity for 
import 28 February 2013 and for possession 31 
December 2022.
•	 11/C42214/2012,	14	November	2012.	 Import	of	
nuclear fuel with Euratom obligation code “C” 
from Germany (OL1 E34). Last date of validity 
31 December 2013.
•	 12/C42214/2012,	14	November	2012.	 Import	of	
nuclear fuel with Euratom obligation code “C” 
from Sweden (OL2 E33). Last date of validity 31 
December 2013.
•	 13/C42214/2012,	14	November	2012.	 Import	of	
nuclear fuel with Euratom obligation code “P” 
from Sweden (OL2 E33). Last date of validity 31 
December 2013.
•	 14/C42214/2012,	14	November	2012.	 Import	of	
rods made of zirconium alloy from Sweden. Last 
date of validity 31 March 2013.
•	 16/C42214/2012,	18/C42214/2012,	16	November	
2012. Export of decommissioned turbines and 
heat exchangers to Sweden for scrapping. Last 
date of validity 31 December 2012.
•	 19/C42214/2012,	18	December	2012,	OL1/2.	Im-
port and possession of nuclear information con-
cerning HGNE reactor coolant pumps from the 
United States and Sweden. Last date of validity 
31 December 2013.
•	 1/G42214/2012,	23	February	2012,	OL3.	Import	
of a boron concentration measuring system 
from Germany and import of neutron source 
elements from France. Last date of validity 31 
December 2014.
•	 2/G42214/2012,	 23	 February	 2012,	 OL3.	 Pos-
session of components for spent nuclear fuel 
handling equipment at Olkiluoto harbour. Last 
date of validity 30 June 2012.
•	 3/G42214/2012,	 14	 November	 2012,	 OL3.	 Im-
port of a thermal shield from France. Last date 
of validity 31 December 2014.
•	 1/M42214/2012,	 26.4.2012,	 OL4.	 Import	 and	
possession of nuclear information concerning 
the EU-ABWR plant type from Sweden. Last 
date of validity 31 December 2030.
•	 2/M42214/2012,	 5	 July	 2012,	OL4.	Transfer	 of	
nuclear information concerning the EU-ABWR 
plant type to Fortum Power and Heat Oy. Last 
date of validity 31 December 2030.
•	 4/M42214/2012,	 27	August	 2012,	 OL4.	 Import	
and possession of nuclear information concern-
ing the EU-ABWR plant type from Japan. Last 
date of validity 31 December 2030.
•	 5/M42214/2012,	 27	August	 2012,	 OL4.	 Import	
and possession of nuclear information concern-
ing the EU-APWR plant type from Japan. Last 
date of validity 31 December 2030.
•	 7/M42214/2012,	5	October	2012,	OL4.	Transfer	
of nuclear information concerning the ABWR 
plant type to Fortum Power and Heat Oy, VTT, 
ETU-Consult Oy and Kvaerner Finland Oy. 
Last date of validity 31 December 2030.
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•	 8/M42214/2012,	5	October	2012,	OL4.	Transfer	
of nuclear information concerning the APWR 
plant type to Fortum Power and Heat Oy. Last 
date of validity 31 December 2030.
Fortum Power and Heat Oy
•	 2/A42214/2012,	24	February	2012.	 Import	 of	a	
boron measurement device from the Czech Re-
public. Last date of validity 31 December 2012.
•	 4/A42214/2012,	 5	 July	 2012,	 OL4.	 Possession	
and transfer of nuclear information concern-
ing the EU-ABWR plant type to Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy. Last date of validity 31 December 
2030.
•	 9/A42214/2012,	5	October	2012,	OL4.	Possession	
and transfer of nuclear information concerning 
the EU-ABWR plant type to Teollisuuden Voi-
ma Oy. Last date of validity 31 December 2030.
•	 10/A42214/2012,	 5	October	 2012,	OL4.	Posses-
sion and transfer of nuclear information con-
cerning the APWR plant type to Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy. Last date of validity 31 December 
2030.
•	 12/A42214/2012,	21	November	2012.	Export	of	
contaminated scrap metal to Sweden for scrap-
ping. Last date of validity 31 March 2013.
Fennovoima Oy
•	 1/J42214/2012,	12	June	2012.	 Import	and	pos-
session of nuclear information from Japan. Last 
date of validity 31 December 2022.
•	 2/J42214/2012,	12	June	2012.	 Import	and	pos-
session of nuclear information from Sweden. 
Last date of validity 31 December 2022.
Others
•	 3/Y4214/2012,	 15	July	 2012,	Studsvik	Nuclear	
AB. Transport of radioactive waste from Swe-
den to Spain via Finland. Last date of validity 
31 May 2015.
•	 7/Y42214/2012,	5	October	2012,	Kvaerner	Fin-
land Oy. OL4. Possession and transfer of nucle-
ar information concerning the EU-ABWR plant 
type to Teollisuuden Voima Oy. Last date of 
validity 31 December 2030.
•	 8/Y42214/2012,	 5	 October	 2012,	 ETU-Consult	
Oy. OL4. Possession and transfer of nuclear in-
formation concerning the EU-ABWR plant type 
to Teollisuuden Voima Oy. Last date of validity 
31 December 2030.
•	 9/Y42214/2012,	 5	 October	 2012,	 Platom	 Oy.	
Transfer of nuclear information for the design 
of sampling autoclaves to GAV-Group Oy. Last 
date of validity 31 December 2021.
•	 10/Y42214/2012,	 5	 October	 2012,	 GAV-Group	
Oy. Possession of nuclear information for the 
design of sampling autoclaves. Last date of va-
lidity 31 December 2022.
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APPENDIX 5 Periodic inspection 
programme of NPPs in 2012
Inspections included in the periodic inspection programme focus on safety 
management, operational main processes and procedures, as well as the 
technical acceptability of systems. The compliance of safety assessments, 
operations, maintenance and protection activities (radiation protection, fire 
protection and security) with the requirements of nuclear safety regulations 
are verified by the inspections.
Periodic inspection 
programme 2012, Loviisa
Management, management 
system and personnel
A1 Management and safety 
culture, 21–22 November 2012
The management and safety culture inspection fo-
cused on the assessment of safety culture at the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant, utilisation of mea-
surements in decision-making, allocation of HR 
resources from the management’s point of view, 
and the periodic assessment of the functionality 
and scope of the management system carried out 
by the licensee. Based on the inspection, it was 
stated that the Loviisa power plant has improved 
its safety culture assessment operations, but that 
the procedure still needs to be further specified and 
updated. The power plant has no unified methods 
or tools for HR resourcing, and it could not be veri-
fied during the inspection that HR planning was 
systematically carried out in all units. The licensee 
is currently evaluating the functionality and scope 
of the management system, and will deliver the 
results of the analysis to STUK by 15 August 2013. 
STUK also stated that the requirements issued 
in the 2011 inspection on procurement operations 
and the related management system and quality 
management competence remain valid, as the cor-
rective measures at the plant are still incomplete.
A2 Personnel resources and 
competence, 6 and 8 June 2012
In the personnel resources and competence inspec-
tion, STUK evaluated the management and devel-
opment of competencies. Particular attention was 
paid to the definition of the required competence of 
personnel working in positions important to safe-
ty, and to the verification of their competencies. 
The inspection also concerned the organisational 
change in the power plant’s safety unit, and the re-
lated safety assessment delivered to STUK. STUK 
required that the Loviisa power plant update the 
safety assessment of the organisational change 
with the information concerning the period during 
which certain tasks and responsibilities are being 
transferred, and to ensure that the related pro-
cedures and management code are unambiguous. 
STUK also required that the power plant’s training 
procedure shall be updated. Competence manage-
ment at the Loviisa power plant mainly meets 
the requirements of the regulations, but there is 
still room for improvement in matters such as the 
definition of the required competencies and the 
monitoring of actual training and its effectiveness.
A3 Functionality of the management 
system, 30 March and 3 April 2012
At the management system inspection, STUK eval-
uated the functionality and continuous improve-
ment of the Loviisa power plant management sys-
tem. STUK has previously found deficiencies with 
the procurement operations and supplier evaluation 
of the power plant, and now paid particular atten-
tion to these issues. The inspection also dealt with 
the procedures used in the assessment of the ef-
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fectiveness of deviation management and corrective 
measures, as well as document management. Based 
on the inspection, STUK required that the Loviisa 
power plant produce a summary of the measures 
used to ensure the fulfilment of all the require-
ments	of	Guide	YVL	1.4	in	procurement	operations	
and supplier evaluation. The power plant must also 
deliver an account of how the qualifications of the 
persons involved in audits are verified, as well as 
of any further training and refresher programmes. 
The Loviisa power plant must develop procedures 
to ensure the fulfilment of requirements concern-
ing deviation management, the assessment of the 
effectiveness of corrective measures, and continu-
ous improvement of the management system. The 
Loviisa power plant must also manage the validity 
of procedures in a systematic manner, and identify 
the	related	YVL	guides	in	the	documents.
Plant safety and its improvement
B1 Assessment and improvement 
of safety, 3 May 2012
The safety assessment and improvement inspec-
tion was targeted at the Loviisa power plant’s 
nuclear safety team and its tasks as well as the 
maintenance and documentation of the plant’s de-
sign basis. The inspection also concerned a minor 
pipe modification of the secondary circuit, which 
had revealed deficiencies in the operations of the 
Loviisa power plant. A change of the pipework’s 
safety classification, made during the design of the 
modification, had not been subjected to advance 
approval	by	STUK	as	required	by	YVL	Guide	2.1.	
Based on the inspection, it was stated that the 
documentation of the design basis of the plant’s 
systems in the final safety analysis report does 
not	 fully	 meet	 the	 requirements	 set	 out	 in	 YVL	
Guide 2.0. For example, the analyses used to de-
fine the capacity of the shutdown safety valve of 
the pressurizer are not included in the final safety 
analysis report. STUK required that the Loviisa 
power plant update the final safety analysis report 
to	comply	with	the	YVL	Guide	2.0	before	the	next	
periodic safety review in 2015. It was also stated 
during the inspection that, at the moment, the 
procedure concerning the preparation of modifica-
tion documentation leaves too much room for inter-
pretations of the necessary scope of the materials 
sent for approval. STUK required that the Loviisa 
power plant add further detail to the procedures 
concerning the matter.
B2 Plant safety functions 6 
and 20 November 2012
In 2012, the plant safety function inspection was 
targeted at the emergency cooling and residual 
heat removal systems. The inspection included an 
assessment of the methods and resources that the 
power company uses to manage the state, oper-
ability and availability of systems over the short 
and long term. Based on the inspection, Fortum 
manages the operability and state of emergency 
cooling and residual heat removal systems with 
well-functioning procedures that meet the require-
ments. The power plant is operated in a systematic 
manner based on appropriate procedures, and the 
responsibilities have been clearly defined. The pow-
er plant systematically develops the procedures 
and the safety systems being inspected also over 
the long term, and no lack of available resources 
was observed. The power plant has improved the 
management of the operability of systems and also 
appointed persons in charge for non-safety classi-
fied ventilation systems. The development of the 
final safety analysis report (FSAR) update process 
will continue due to delays in the update process 
observed in the previous years.
B3 PRA and safety management
The main subjects of the inspection concerning 
the use of Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) in 
safety management were the available resources, 
up-to-dateness of the procedures, monitoring and 
analysis of critical faults in emergency generators, 
and the HR plan and deviation processing asso-
ciated with the PRA production and application 
organisation. Fortum’s PRA resources decreased 
slightly during 2012. Fortum has updated the criti-
cal fault analysis of emergency generators, proving 
that unavailability has remained at the same level. 
STUK required that, in future, Fortum must add to 
the PRA report’s covering letter a statement con-
cerning the compliance of the report and proposed 
measures	with	YVL	Guide	1.2.	Fortum	must	also	
plan the licensee’s PRA model acceptance proce-
dures, and update the written procedures with the 
new plan. Fortum must include further utilisation 
of PRA to the training contents of various person-
nel groups.
154
STUK-B 162 Periodic insPection Programme of nPPs in 2012 APPENDIX 5
B4 International operating experience 
feedback, 22 November 2012
In the operating experience feedback review, STUK 
verified instructions, procedures and practices re-
lated to the feedback operations. A new operating 
experience and safety culture team has been estab-
lished at the safety unit of the Loviisa power plant, 
responsible for the maintenance and development 
of the power plant’s operating experience feedback 
process. The new team has increased the resources 
available for operating experience feedback opera-
tions, and they were found to be well organised 
and instructed and to have adequate resources. 
The implementation of corrective measures for the 
plant’s own operating events was verified based on 
example cases. STUK found that there was room 
for improvement in the follow-up of corrective ac-
tions decided on the basis of operational events at 
the plant as well as in the assessment of the effec-
tiveness of corrective actions.
Operational safety
C1 Operation, 28 March 2012
The inspection of the operation of the Loviisa pow-
er plant focused on the long-term resources and 
HR planning of the operating organisation sup-
port group. The inspection targets also included 
the practicality and results of the evaluations car-
ried out by the operating organisation for testing 
programmes and procedures at fixed intervals. The 
inspection revealed no deviations. The corrective 
measures resulting from requirements issued in 
the course of STUK’s earlier inspections were also 
considered to be appropriately implemented.
C2 Plant maintenance, 23–25 October 2012
The plant maintenance inspection contained a re-
view of the ageing management and maintenance 
development project launched at the Loviisa pow-
er plant due to the inspection observations made 
in 2011. Based on the inspection, increased at-
tention is now paid at the Loviisa power plant 
to the equipment that is important to safety but 
has no crucial significance for the plant’s operat-
ing life. Effectiveness is assessed by equipment 
type,	and	the	requirements	of	the	new	Guide	YVL	
A.8 of STUK can be fulfilled. Several component 
replacements, post-Fukushima improvements, and 
research projects on subjects such as the impact 
of radiation on materials are in progress. The tech-
nical procurement procedures of components and 
services were reviewed in more detail, focusing on 
examples such as the replacement of the pressur-
izer safety valves and the motor of an emergency 
cooling pump. STUK required an additional ac-
count of whether adequate attention is paid to 
tested or otherwise carefully researched design so-
lutions in the procurement of functional equipment 
important to safety.
C3 Electrical and I&C systems, 
13–14 November 2012
In the electrical and I&C system inspection, the 
first part focused on issues such as the HR plan-
ning for electrical engineering and maintenance, 
relay protections, cabling principles, monitoring of 
the ageing of electrical devices, and periodic in-
spections. Based on the inspection, STUK issued 
requirements concerning, for example, the delivery 
of documentation required from the power compa-
nies, and the implementation and reporting of in-
spection and modification measures. STUK also re-
quired that the power company deliver an account 
of the excitation and voltage control problems of 
the emergency diesel generators, and the lubrica-
tion grease used in the valve actuators needed in 
accident conditions.
The I&C inspection focused on the repair of I&C 
equipment to be used as spare parts, competence 
development required by the new I&C technology, 
the development of the I&C engineering and instal-
lation process, confirmation of the consistency of 
the changes with the related plant documentation, 
ageing management, the scope of periodic testing, 
and the construction inspection requirements set 
for I&C equipment. As a result of the inspection, 
the power company must, for example, survey the 
construction inspection procedures of load-bearing 
I&C equipment, produce a description of the scope 
of periodic testing, and improve the verification of 
circuit diagrams against the actual installations.
C4 Mechanical engineering
In the Loviisa power plant’s mechanical engineering 
inspection, the maintenance and ageing manage-
ment of steam generators during the plant’s entire 
operating history were assessed. The most impor-
tant inspection targets were the heat exchanger 
tubes located inside the steam generator. The tubes 
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belong to the reactor coolant system, and their outer 
surface is exposed to corrosion. Fractures on the 
outer surface of the tubes have been detected using 
special inspection techniques, and the tubes have 
then been disabled by plugging. At Loviisa, plug-
gings have been considerably less common than in 
other VVER 440 plants, but their number increased 
significantly in 2012. Stress corrosion cracking of 
certain dissimilar material joints of the steam gen-
erator, which has been a serious ageing mechanism 
in other VVER 440 plants, has not yet been observed 
at the Loviisa plant. This is most likely due to suc-
cessful water chemistry control. STUK did, however, 
require that the power company assess the safety 
risk caused by this mechanism, as it was not includ-
ed in the original design basis. STUK also stated 
that the power company has produced an acceptable 
account of interrupted start-ups which should have 
been recorded for the reactor coolant system fatigue 
monitoring but have been neglected throughout the 
entire operating life of the plant units.
C5 Structures and buildings, 31 
October–1 November 2012
In the construction engineering inspection of the 
Loviisa power plant, STUK assessed the mainte-
nance procedures for the steel constructions, steel 
containment, spent fuel storage and processing 
pools, emergency water tanks, fuel racks and pipe 
supports. The inspection included a review of pro-
cedures and reports related to the power company’s 
organisation, periodic inspections, investigations 
and surveys, repair, modification and maintenance 
measures, operating experience feedback and age-
ing management. Personnel were also interviewed. 
The execution and results of the power company’s 
own inspections were also verified. Based on the 
inspection, STUK issued a requirement concerning 
the reporting of pipe support maintenance.
C6 Information management 
and security, 7–8 June 2012
The information security inspection mainly focused 
on the I&C systems of the Loviisa power plant. The 
power plant has conducted a cyber risk assessment 
with external experts. This assessment reflects a 
good security practice. Inspection identified need 
for development on asset management, updates 
for information security plan and for information 
security training.
C7 Chemistry, 8–9 February 2012
The chemistry inspection was mainly targeted at 
the organisational change carried out in the task 
area, HR planning, ageing management associated 
with the chemical conditions, and the maintenance 
of continuously operated analysers and continu-
ously operated radionuclide specific activity mea-
surement equipment. The evaluation of the activ-
ity measurement uncertainty budget continued. 
Plant visits concerned the continuously operated 
analysers of the reactor coolant and the radioactive 
source storage. The requirements issued based on 
the inspection applied to the production of an un-
certainty budget for alpha and beta measurements, 
the completion of the organisation’s administrative 
procedure update, and the confirmation of compe-
tence requirements and appropriate qualifications 
in the chemistry organisation. The maintenance 
responsibilities of the continuously operated chem-
istry analysers have been rearranged, and the pro-
duction of the related written procedures is being 
started. STUK required that the plan and schedule 
for the production of procedures be delivered to 
STUK for information. New continuously operated 
analysers are being procured for the analysis of 
the reactor coolant’s water chemistry. To ensure 
the adequacy of their operation and maintenance 
training, the licensee was required to deliver the 
training plan to STUK for information.
C8 Annual outage, 5 August – 13 October 2012
STUK’s inspection of outage operations, performed 
in accordance with the periodic inspection pro-
gramme, was targeted at the power plant opera-
tions that maintain safety and lead and manage 
actions during the annual outage. The inspection 
observations of various significance levels were 
mostly related to the work of the Loviisa power 
plant organisation. Among other things, STUK re-
quired that the Loviisa power plant update certain 
maintenance and radiation protection procedures 
and assess whether current procedures are ad-
equate to prevent the access of loose parts and 
impurities into the opened drains in the reactor 
hall. The Loviisa power plant must also further de-
velop its procedures in order to prevent items that 
contain activating substances from unnecessarily 
accessing the controlled area and to prevent such 
items and other loose parts from accessing the pro-
cess systems of the reactor coolant system.
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Personal and plant protection
D1 Radiation protection, 
27–28 November 2012
The radiation protection inspection was targeted 
at the Loviisa power plant’s radiation protection, 
radiation measurements and the environmental 
and emission monitoring. Personal dosimetry was 
a particular area of focus. Based on the inspection, 
STUK required that the power plant prepare a de-
tailed summary of how the practical determination 
of radiation exposure is carried out in various ex-
ceptional conditions. Such conditions could include, 
for example, long-term loss of power supply to the 
equipment used to measure radiation exposure, or 
the contamination of facilities and equipment used 
to measure radiation exposure. The power compa-
ny needs to add some further detail to the dosim-
etry procedures and practices. New reactor water 
boron content measurement devices including a 
neutron source have been acquired by the Loviisa 
power plant. The power company must carry out 
additional measurements to ensure that the meth-
ods used to determine the employees’ neutron dose 
are also appropriate for use around these measure-
ment devices. The Loviisa power plant has ongoing 
development projects to ensure that the methods 
used to measure emissions into the air function in 
an optimal manner in various conditions.
D2 Fire protection, 20 March 2012
The fire protection inspection focused on structur-
al fire protection, fire detection and extinguishing 
systems, and operative fire protection. The plant 
visit included the Loviisa power plant’s new diesel-
operated back-up power plant, the turbine island’s 
sprinkler triggering centres and smoke vents, and 
one emergency diesel room. STUK’s inspection ob-
servations and issued requirements applied to the 
entering of fire detection system’s functional test 
records into the power plant’s work management 
system, deficient testing of smoke vents during the 
winter, and the postponement of the extinguishing 
system inspection by an inspection institute by a 
year. The planning of training was found to be good.
D3 Emergency response, 
25 October – 6 November 2012
Loviisa power plant’s emergency response inspec-
tion concerned all the areas of the emergency re-
sponse operations. Particular areas of focus were 
HR planning and communications. Emergency 
response-related HR planning concerns both the 
regular organisation and the emergency response 
organisation. After the inspection of 2011, more 
people have been added to the emergency response 
organisation, particularly to the technical support 
team based in Keilaniemi. STUK required that 
the power company improve the communications 
concerning the updated emergency response pro-
cedures. The 2V telephone network dismantled in 
September has been replaced with a satellite tele-
phone connection, and a communication solution 
based on the 3G mobile network and satellite data 
transmission is currently being built. The plant’s 
emergency information system was planned to be 
completed by the end of September, but during the 
inspection, the equipment was still being tested. 
STUK issued a requirement of the completion of 
the information system.
D4 Security, 2 May 2012
STUK inspected the Loviisa power plant’s security 
arrangements, which are deemed to include struc-
tural, technical, operational and organisational ar-
rangements for detecting, delaying and preventing 
illegal activities in the nuclear power plant. The 
inspection was targeted at the training processes 
of the security organisation as well as personal and 
position-specific training plans. The maintenance 
and fault reporting procedures of security surveil-
lance systems, which now have improved work or-
der practices, were assessed. Other targets of as-
sessments included the implementation of security 
arrangements and the drills conducted within the 
security organisation and in cooperation with vari-
ous authorities.
Nuclear waste and its storage
E1 Operating waste, 4–5 June 2012
The operating waste inspection included a review 
of the targets for development in waste manage-
ment, status and schedules of projects, waste re-
cords and reporting, HR planning and communica-
tions. No significant deficiencies or needs for de-
velopment were detected in the review. During the 
review, STUK requested that an account of the op-
erating strategy of the operating waste repository 
currently being built be attached to the operating 
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licence application for the maintenance waste tun-
nel 3 of the Loviisa power plant’s VLJ repository.
E2 Final disposal facilities
Not performed in 2012.
Special items
F1 LARA, 3 October 2012
The inspection of the Loviisa power plant I&C up-
grade project (LARA) included the assessment of 
the training and resourcing of personnel during 
project implementation, installations and the mon-
itoring of installations. Based on the inspection, 
STUK stated that matters have been carefully con-
sidered and that planning is at a good stage. No ap-
proved plans or documents exist at this stage of the 
project, but a considerable amount of preparations 
have been completed. The content of the unoffi-
cial documents and plans presented for review was 
quite good. Task descriptions have been prepared 
and training and competence requirements identi-
fied based on them. Preliminary appointment of 
members of the organisation into the positions has 
also begun. The organisation will be complemented 
with external workforce when necessary. The re-
sources have been defined based on the installa-
tion and implementation resources established by 
the system supplier. Key personnel mainly include 
persons working in the LARA project full time. In 
addition to the project manager, there are six per-
sons responsible for the I&C systems, and their ap-
pointed back-ups. The persons responsible for the 
systems begin their training at the test field stage, 
and continue with the training and practice during 
installation and commissioning of the systems. The 
persons responsible for the systems will also train 
their own personnel at the Loviisa power plant. 
Since some procedure updates, for example, did not 
have all the required content, the requests issued 
at the previous inspection largely remained valid.
F2 Inspection with no advance notification 
/ plant operation, 4 December 2012
In the inspection carried out for the Loviisa power 
plant without an advance notification, STUK veri-
fied the power plant’s operating processes. STUK 
found that shift changes, the work of the on-call 
safety engineer, and the procedures for the work 
observed during the inspection met the require-
ments. A few deviations from the power plant’s 
own instructions were observed during the inspec-
tion. STUK’s requirements applied to the operating 
personnel’s shift change procedures, the training 
requirement of the on-call safety engineer, and the 
cleanliness and maintenance of the plant.
Periodic inspection 
programme 2012, Olkiluoto
Management, management 
system and personnel
A1 Management and safety culture, 
13 and 20 August 2012
The management and safety culture inspection 
particularly focused on the management’s respon-
sibilities and work concerning the integration of 
the Olkiluoto  3 project to the organisation of the 
existing plant units, the functionality of the modi-
fication work process, and the planning of per-
sonnel resources. Based on the inspection, STUK 
required that TVO assess the safety implications 
of the organisational change associated with the 
integration of the Olkiluoto  3 project, and also 
evaluate the procedures and practices related to 
organisational changes. Several good development 
measures are currently in progress concerning the 
modification work processes, but TVO must also 
ensure that the effectiveness of the development 
measures is assessed. STUK also required that 
TVO take immediate measures to fulfil the new re-
quirements of the Nuclear Energy Act, valid since 
August 2012, concerning the back-up personnel for 
emergency response and security arrangements.
A2 Personnel resources and 
competence, 5–7 September 2012
In 2012, the personnel resources and competence 
inspection focused on resource assessment and 
planning concerning the preparations for the op-
erating phase of the Olkiluoto 3 project. Particular 
areas of interest included the functionality of 
TVO›s HR management process and its sub-pro-
cesses, with attention on the operating phase of 
Olkiluoto 3 and the controlled disassembly of the 
project organisation. General verbal descriptions 
exist of the HR processes. The descriptions do not, 
however, list the process stages, interfaces or all of 
the operators, and the processes are not repeated 
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in a systematic manner throughout the organisa-
tion. A more detailed description of HR processes 
only began in summer 2012, and the work will con-
tinue assisted with the newly established business 
planning section. The development of the HR plan-
ning procedure thus remains unfinished. The com-
petence management process seems to have ad-
vanced most at the moment. TVO has not carried 
out a separate process functionality assessment 
concerning the operating phase of Olkiluoto  3. 
Preparations for the Olkiluoto  3 operating phase 
have, however, been made by producing organisa-
tion charts and by defining the necessary compe-
tence resources by office.
A3 Functionality of the management 
system, 7–9 November 2012
The inspection of the functionality of the manage-
ment system was targeted at the modifications’ 
quality management, quality management com-
petencies, audit operations, and the creation and 
evaluation of a joint management system of the 
existing plant units and Olkiluoto 3. During the in-
spection, STUK verified the modification work pro-
cess descriptions produced by TVO. TVO has not 
included	 the	 requirements	 of	YVL	Guide	1.4	 into	
the modification quality management training. 
STUK required that TVO present the development 
of the modification work process and the related 
training to STUK in March 2013. TVO must also 
review and update its logistics and procurement 
procedures	 to	 comply	with	YVL	Guide	 1.4,	 detail	
its instructions concerning the supplier auditor 
qualification requirements and the maintenance 
of the qualification, and deliver an account of the 
completed audits of suppliers of safety class 1 and 
2 equipment in 2011 and 2012. TVO must also de-
liver the project plan for the management system 
integration to STUK for information.
Plant safety and its improvement
B1 Assessment and improvement 
of safety, 24 October 2012
The inspection of the assessment and improvement 
of safety was targeted at the tasks and resources 
of the reactor safety department, and the docu-
mentation and maintenance of the design basis 
for the Olkiluoto  1 and Olkiluoto  2 plant units 
and their systems and equipment. Based on the 
inspection, the reactor safety department seems 
to have adequate personnel resources considering 
the department›s tasks, and instructions have been 
prepared for the training and induction of new 
team members. The design basis of the plant units 
is documented in the final safety analysis report 
(FSAR). Instructions exist for the maintenance of 
the report. For a few years, TVO has used a design 
basis database for storing design basis documents 
when modifications, for example, are being carried 
out. STUK proposed that TVO consider the system-
atic processing of old modification work materials 
to complement the design basis database.
B2 Plant safety functions, 
14–15 November 2012
In 2012, the safety function inspection was tar-
geted at the emergency cooling and residual heat 
removal systems. The inspection included an as-
sessment of the methods and resources (includ-
ing information systems and human resources) 
that the power company uses to manage the state, 
operability and availability of systems over the 
short and long term. Based on the inspection, TVO 
manages the operability and state of emergency 
cooling and residual heat removal systems with 
well-functioning procedures that meet the require-
ments. The power plant is operated in a systematic 
manner based on appropriate procedures, and the 
responsibilities have been clearly defined. The pow-
er plant systematically develops the procedures 
and the safety systems being inspected over the 
long term, and no lack of available resources was 
observed. TVO continues to develop the roles of 
the persons responsible for the systems and plant 
functions and, in particular, the reporting included 
in the tasks of these persons.
B3 PRA and safety management, 
13 September 2012
The inspection concerning the use of probabilistic 
risk analyses (PRA) in safety management was 
targeted at issues such as the PRA update status 
and the following applications of the PRA: risk-
informed development of the operational limits 
and conditions (OLC), risk-informed testing pro-
grammes, and risk-informed planning of preven-
tive maintenance programmes. HR planning and 
deviation processing of the PRA team were also 
processed. Based on the inspection, it was stated 
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that the PRA is used in many different ways to 
support safety, and that no deviations were ob-
served in the inspected area. HR planning docu-
mentation was found to require further develop-
ment in the area of recruitment planning.
B4 International operating experience 
feedback 26–27 September 2012
In the operating experience feedback review, STUK 
verified instructions, procedures and new practices 
related to the feedback operations. Despite person-
nel changes, operations were found to be well or-
ganised and instructed, and had adequate resourc-
es. Twice a year, the team meets together with the 
representatives of the management. Expertise has 
been added to the team by including a simulator 
trainer from Olkiluoto  3 and the project’s safety 
engineer.
Operational safety
C1 Operation, 15–16 February 2012
The inspection of plant operation focused on the 
periodic testing performed by the Operations 
Office, the reactions of the main control room oper-
ators to alarms during annual outages, and the HR 
planning of the operating engineering department. 
The plant rounds were targeted at the fire fighting 
pump stations. No significant needs for develop-
ment were detected in the inspection. Based on the 
inspection, STUK issued requirements related to 
the periodic test result acceptance procedures and 
minor update needs found in the periodic testing 
procedures.
C2 Plant maintenance, 30–31 August 2012
The plant maintenance inspection continued the 
investigation of the increasing failure trends ob-
served at the plant in 2011. The trend for failures 
that caused an immediate operating restriction has 
been stable until 2011, but has then started to in-
crease. The power plant has revised the preventive 
maintenance programmes of its components within 
a development project carried out at STUK’s re-
quest. However, the diesel motors planned to be 
replaced have not been included in the project, 
for which STUK expects to receive justification. 
The extended inspections during annual outages 
did not reveal new problems. STUK required that 
annual reporting of equipment responsibilities be 
developed so that the causes of fault messages 
and operating restrictions are classified accord-
ing to whether an actual fault exists or whether 
the unavailability is a result of a planned pre-
ventive maintenance measure. STUK has also re-
quired better prediction and traceability of various 
fault types in the ageing management programme. 
TVO’s technical procedures in the procurement of 
important components and services were also re-
viewed. STUK found no cause for remarks in these.
C3 Electrical and I&C systems / 
electricity, 13–14 March 2012
The inspection of electrical engineering was target-
ed at the HR planning in the electrical engineer-
ing office, electro-technical servicing of spare parts, 
evaluation and approval of suppliers of electrical 
components, and ageing monitoring and manage-
ment of electrical devices and cables. No signifi-
cant needs for development were detected in the 
inspection. Based on the inspection, STUK issued 
requirements related to the fault history of the 
gas turbine plant, intermediate assessment of sup-
pliers of electro-technical equipment, and minor 
update needs in the annual electrical equipment 
ageing report.
C3 Electrical and I&C systems 
/ I&C, 13–14 March 2012
In the I&C section of the electrical and I&C system 
inspection, STUK evaluated the maintenance of 
measuring accuracy, the I&C design and imple-
mentation process, qualification monitoring, ageing 
management, the HR management in the I&C of-
fice, and participation in processes and operations. 
Needs for development were found in the I&C 
modification planning and implementation process, 
and in the scope of qualification management.
C4 Mechanical engineering, 
28–29 February 2012
The mechanical engineering inspection was tar-
geted at the operation, maintenance and ageing 
management of Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 isola-
tion and safety valves and lifting equipment. The 
adequate allocation of personnel resources and 
competencies was also verified. During the inspec-
tion, a systematic procedure to identify the most 
typical failure mechanisms of valves and to learn 
from this information for ageing management pur-
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poses could not be found. The maintenance inter-
val of some valves is unnecessarily long, and the 
early stages of a failure may therefore be left un-
observed. STUK found that there was scope for 
improvement in the division of responsibility for 
the work carried out for lifting devices, as well as 
in the use of operating experience and fault histo-
ries in the definition of maintenance programmes. 
The power company must also clarify the respon-
sibilities for safety classified lifting aids used to 
fix loads, and establish a clear periodic inspection 
practice.
C5 Structures and buildings, 
5–6 September 2012
The construction engineering inspection at the 
Olkiluoto power plant comprised a review of the 
maintenance procedures of the spent fuel storage 
and processing pools, condensation pools, fuel racks 
and pipe supports. The inspection also included in-
terviews and a review of procedures and reports 
related to the organisation of the power company, 
periodic inspections carried out by the power com-
pany, surveys, repairs, modifications, maintenance 
operations, operating experience feedback and age-
ing management. The execution and results of the 
power company’s own inspections were also veri-
fied. STUK required that the responsibility for the 
containment condenser pools be defined in more 
detail, that the pool inspection procedure be updat-
ed and that an account be given of the execution of 
periodic inspections of the fuel pools.
C6 Information management and security, 
31 May–1 June 2012, 9–10 October 2012
The information security inspection at Olkiluoto 
was carried out in two parts in 2012. The first part, 
carried out at the turn of May to June, focused on 
the technical information security solutions of the 
existing plant units. The second part, carried out in 
October, focused on the organisation of information 
security, competence development, and administra-
tion. Inspections identified a need for development 
on continuity management, network security and 
related documentation.
C7 Chemistry, 21–22 November 2012
The chemistry inspection mainly focused on the 
personnel changes in the chemistry and radio-
chemistry organisation, HR planning and commu-
nications, the impact of chemical conditions on age-
ing management, possible deviations from chem-
istry target values, and the quality management 
of technical laboratory operations. The inspection 
also included a visit to the laboratories and the 
spent fuel storage. Based on the inspection, STUK 
required that conflicting information be removed 
from the procedures that concern the reporting of 
restrictions in measurements subject to the opera-
tional limits and conditions (OLC) and the launch 
of further corrective measures. TVO must also de-
velop procedures to more efficiently ensure compli-
ance with the maximum impurity levels specified 
in the procedures. TVO must possess proper proce-
dures to ensure the effectiveness of the corrective 
measure in case of a situation where the values are 
exceeded. The production of an uncertainty budget 
for all gamma detectors was also required.
C8 Annual outage, 28 April–5 June 2012
The annual outages for Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 
took place from 24 April to 6 June 2012. During the 
annual outages, STUK carried out an inspection to 
verify TVO’s procedures in 13 areas. The inspection 
was targeted at hot work locations, shoe boundar-
ies, fuel transfers, security arrangements, mainte-
nance procedures and the training of employees, 
among other things. TVO›s operations in these ar-
eas were for the most part appropriate, and there 
was little cause for remarks. The requirements 
that STUK issues based on the inspection mainly 
concerned the further specification of procedures.
Personal and plant protection
D1 Radiation protection, 20–21 March 2012
The radiation protection inspection was mainly tar-
geted at dosimetry. The inspection also dealt with 
the training of employees involved in radiation 
protection operations. The radiation protection pro-
cedures of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant have 
been developed in recent years to cover practically 
all measures associated with radiation protection. 
The spare part situation of the fixed radiation mea-
surement equipment installed in the spent nuclear 
fuel storage must be improved. STUK required 
that TVO deliver a conceptual design plan of the 
corrective measures for approval. TVO must also 
produce a detailed summary of how radiation expo-
sure is to be determined in various exceptional con-
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ditions. Such conditions may involve the long-term 
loss of power supply to dose monitoring devices, or 
the contamination of the facilities and equipment 
that are used for dose monitoring.
D2 Fire protection, 23 August 2012
The fire protection inspection focused on structur-
al fire protection, fire detection and extinguishing 
systems, and operative fire protection. The main 
emphasis was on the organisation and HR plan-
ning, as well as deviations and their processing. 
The plant visit carried out in connection with the 
inspection included fire water pump stations, the 
control room and relay rooms of Olkiluoto 1, the ca-
ble space below the relay rooms, and the workshop 
above the control room of Olkiluoto 1. During the 
inspection, STUK found that there is no certainty 
of the regulatory compliance of the cable penetra-
tion type (gypsum board, rock wool, gunning) be-
tween the relay rooms and the cable spaces. STUK 
required an account of whether the penetrations 
meet the one-hour fire compartmentalisation re-
quirement. In its response dated on 25 September 
2012, TVO stated that according to its interpreta-
tion, the penetration meets the requirement. TVO 
has, however, initiated a project to replace the pen-
etrations of this type. It was also stated during the 
inspection that there are deficiencies in the record-
ing and monitoring of the observations made in fire 
inspections carried out by TVO or a third party. 
Records are kept using many methods for which no 
instructions exist. STUK required that the power 
company produce a unified recording and moni-
toring method together with instructions. Of fire 
technical modifications, targets such as the oper-
ability of fire water pumps and system as well as 
the observed leaks were inspected. No preventive 
maintenance is carried out for fire water pumping 
station valves, and the oldest valves are from 1975. 
TVO has established a valve replacement project 
that is to be completed in 2013.
D3 Emergency response, 5–6 June 2012
In the Olkiluoto emergency response inspection, 
STUK reviewed the updating procedure of the 
emergency response plan, resources of the op-
erations, and the necessary information transfer. 
Based on the inspection, STUK required that TVO 
manage better the updating of procedures included 
in the emergency response plan and their timely 
delivery to STUK to make sure that both parties 
use the same procedures. STUK required that TVO 
add the necessary personnel to ensure adequate 
resources for the emergency response planning, or-
ganisation and training operations. TVO must also 
ensure that the technical personnel who carry out 
repairs are included in the emergency response or-
ganisation and participate in the necessary train-
ing, including alarm drills.
D4 Security, 8 October 2012
STUK inspected the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant’s security arrangements, which are deemed 
to include structural, technical, operational and 
organisational arrangements for detecting, delay-
ing and preventing illegal activities in the nuclear 
power plant. The inspection included verification 
of security arrangement development measures, 
which TVO has carried out based on an extensive 
assessment of security arrangements carried out 
by a third party evaluation team in 2010. The op-
erative response of the licensee’s security organ-
isation and the related details were also assessed 
during the inspection. In 2012, TVO increased the 
number of drug and alcohol tests carried out by the 
security personnel, and implemented structural 
improvements to security arrangements.
Nuclear waste and its storage
E1 Operating waste, 15–16 October 2012
The operating waste inspection included a review 
of the targets for development in waste manage-
ment, status and schedules of projects, exemption 
of operating waste from monitoring, HR planning 
and communications. No significant deficiencies or 
needs for development were detected in the review.
E2 Final disposal facilities, 
10–11 October 2012
The inspection of the final disposal facilities was 
targeted at the organisation, communications and 
procedures of the Olkiluoto power plant’s operating 
waste repository (VLJ repository), as well as the 
inspections carried out in the repository by TVO, 
the status of ongoing research, and the mainte-
nance procedures of the VLJ repository’s concrete 
and rock structures. An inspection visit to the VLJ 
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repository was also included. No deficiencies were 
detected in the inspection. STUK recorded sugges-
tions for developing the content of the VLJ reposi-
tory’s monitoring research reports.
Special items
F1 Inspection with no advance notification 
/ plant operation, 27 March 2012
During the period under review, STUK carried out 
one inspection without prior notification to verify 
operating procedures. STUK found that the proce-
dures concerning shift changes, the on-call system 
and monitored work were in compliance with the 
regulations and written procedures. Major needs 
for development were not found. The requirements 
issued in connection with the inspection applied 
to cleanliness, proper marking practices and ar-
chiving procedures.
B2 Additional inspection / the 
procurement and monitoring of 
nuclear fuel, 11 December 2012
STUK performed an additional inspection of the 
power company’s nuclear fuel procurement and 
monitoring processes, as well as the procedures 
and resources. Based on the inspection, STUK 
stated that TVO’s fuel procurement and monitor-
ing practices are functional and fulfil the require-
ments. Operations are systematic and they are 
based on appropriate procedures, and the respon-
sibilities have been clearly defined. Monitoring of 
the behaviour of the fuel is systematic, and pro-
duces valuable operating experience information. 
International operating experience feedback is also 
widely utilised. No deficiencies were observed in 
the resources and induction training. Based on the 
inspection, STUK required that minor updates be 
made to the procedures.
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Table 1. Period inspections during construction in 2012.
Subject of inspection Time of inspection
Main functions
Inspection of the nuclear island’s readiness for commissioning 7–9 February 2012
EDG investigation 14–15 May 2012
Project management and the management of safety 29–30 May 2012
Personnel and resources (combined A2 – reported as periodic inspection during 
operation)
5–7 September 2012
Quality management 1–2 November 2012
Work processes
Additional quality management review: Areva’s on-site quality management 18 January 2012
Commissioning: training of operators and preparations for operation 7–8 March 2012
TVO’s mechanical equipment commissioning procedures 11 April 2012
Radiation safety 11–12 April 2012
I&C 25–26 April 2012
Commissioning inspection procedures for structures, buildings and fire protection 31 August 2012
Equipment installation control process, electrical systems 4–5 October 2012
Processing of deterministic safety analyses at TVO 17 October 2012
Installation inspections and pressure tests of mechanical equipment and pipes 27–28 November 2012
Utilisation of PRA 4 December 2012
APPENDIX 6 Periodic inspection programme 
during the construction of Olkiluoto 3, 2012
The objective of the Olkiluoto 3 construction-time 
inspection programme is to verify that the oper-
ations required by the construction of the plant 
ensure a high quality implementation according 
to the approved plans and are compliant with of-
ficial regulations, without endangering the plant 
units already operational within the plant site. 
The inspection programme assesses and oversees 
the licensee’s operations in building the plant unit, 
implementation procedures in various technical ar-
eas, the licensee’s expertise and use of that exper-
tise, the handling of safety issues and the quality 
management and control. The Olkiluoto 3 inspec-
tion programme was launched in 2005 when the 
construction of the plant began, and the milestone 
of one hundred inspections was reached in autumn 
2012. The annual number of inspections has varied 
between 10 and 15.
In 2012, 14 inspections included in the periodic 
inspection programme during construction were 
carried out, four of which were targeted at the 
main operations of the Olkiluoto  3 project, and 
ten at practical work processes (Table 1). Areas 
of focus included the quality management of the 
Olkiluoto  3 project, monitoring and inspections 
in various technical fields carried out by TVO and 
the plant supplier, commissioning procedures and 
TVO’s commissioning inspection procedures, and, 
at the end of the Olkiluoto 3 project, TVO’s operat-
ing organisation’s preparations for the long-term 
operation of the plant. The following is a brief 
description of inspection findings for which STUK 
required improvements from TVO. On the whole, 
the inspections have led to the conclusion that the 
procedures, practical operations and resources of 
TVO’s organisation are adequate.
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Additional quality management review: 
Areva’s on-site quality management
In the management system review in 2011, STUK 
stated that the plant supplier did not have on-site 
lead auditors required for the auditing of quality 
management systems, which meant that the plant 
supplier had not been able to audit the contrac-
tors working at the plant site after summer 2011. 
In January 2012, STUK carried out an inspection 
of the plant supplier’s on-site project organisation 
with no prior notice with the purpose of identify-
ing the plant supplier’s quality management or-
ganisation’s resources and tasks, as well as the 
situation and plans of supplier auditors. As a re-
sult of the inspection, it was stated that the plant 
supplier was in the process of building stronger 
quality management resources for the particular 
purpose of carrying out supplier audits in early 
2012. STUK required that TVO ensures that the 
plant supplier’s plans to increase resources are 
realised and that the 2012 auditing programme is 
finalised. The plant supplier and TVO finalised the 
auditing programme during January, and launched 
the audits of the organisations active at the plant 
site accordingly. AREVA has increased its supplier 
audit personnel resources.
Inspection of the nuclear island’s 
readiness for commissioning
In the inspection of the nuclear island’s readiness 
for commissioning, STUK evaluated the readiness 
of TVO and the plant supplier to begin pre-opera-
tional test runs at the nuclear island. As a result 
of the inspection, STUK stated that the parties 
have adequate organisational resources to begin 
pre-operational tests. STUK issued some detailed 
requirements concerning the commissioning proce-
dures and reporting, but these did not prevent the 
beginning of pre-operational testing.
Commissioning: training of operators 
and preparations for operation
STUK continued commissioning inspections by 
inspecting TVO’s procedures related to operator 
training and preparations for the operating phase. 
Based on the inspection, TVO’s production prepa-
ration sub-project (TUVA) is not working according 
to its task definitions included in the sub-project 
plan. STUK required that TVO evaluate the func-
tioning of the TUVA sub-project and make sure 
that the monitoring, control and coordination tasks 
set for the sub-project are carried out as document-
ed. TVO must also assess the practical Olkiluoto 3 
operator training process planned and executed 
by the plant supplier to ensure that the training 
complies with the plans. TVO must also prepare a 
plan for how TVO will approve the plant simulator 
for operator training.
TVO’s mechanical equipment 
commissioning procedures
The inspection concerning the commissioning 
organisation of mechanical equipment evalu-
ated TVO’s readiness to start inspections. Com-
missioning inspections are carried out by STUK or 
an inspection institution authorised by it, but be-
fore the inspection by authority, TVO must ensure 
that the target complies with the requirements 
and is ready to be inspected, and present the target 
to STUK at the inspection. At the inspection, ten 
detailed requirements concerning the inspection 
process were issued, but the licensee’s overall prep-
arations for the launch of commissioning inspec-
tions were considered adequate.
Radiation safety
The radiation safety inspection focused on com-
missioning and test operation issues. STUK re-
quired that TVO prepare a technical description of 
portable radiation measurement equipment. TVO 
must also prepare a plan for the training and task-
specific induction of the temporary radiation pro-
tection personnel needed during commissioning. In 
addition, TVO needs to identify the additions into 
the radiation protection manual required due to 
the commissioning of Olkiluoto 3.
I&C
In the I&C inspection, STUK surveyed the I&C 
installation supervision practices, arrangements in 
the temporary control rooms, monitoring of open 
issues, and TVO’s audits that concern the I&C sup-
plier and subcontractors. STUK found no cause for 
remarks in TVO’s installation supervision of the 
first I&C cubicles of the nuclear island. The ar-
rangements in temporary control rooms were also 
appropriate. However, STUK required that TVO 
define the procedures for the estimation of dead-
lines for open issues presented by the plant suppli-
er. The procedures must take into account the open 
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issue’s potential impact on nuclear and radiation 
safety, and on the performance of official inspec-
tions. The inspection revealed that TVO had not 
performed sufficient audits of safety class 2 I&C 
device suppliers despite the fact that the suppli-
ers have been known. STUK issued a requirement 
concerning the matter, and required that audits be 
performed in time so that they can be used as a ba-
sis for controlling the device supplier’s operations 
when necessary.
EDG investigation
In 2011, STUK investigated the procurement of 
emergency diesel generators and their auxiliary 
systems and equipment. The investigation team 
issued a report with observations and recommen-
dations, on the basis of which STUK required that 
TVO produces a plan of the necessary measures. 
STUK assessed the adequacy of the completed 
measures in an inspection. At the inspection, it 
was observed that TVO had carried out measures 
based on the investigation, but the results of the 
investigation had not been efficiently utilised in 
the development of the project’s processes and pro-
cedures. STUK required that TVO produces a new 
assessment of the matter.
Project management and the 
management of safety
The project and safety management inspection was 
comprised of individual interviews on the man-
agement’s procedures to lead the organisation in 
a safety-oriented manner. The inspection targets 
included the project management’s measures to 
assess and utilise the investigation results con-
cerning Olkiluoto  3 emergency diesel generators. 
Based on the inspection, STUK required that TVO 
produces a deeper analysis of significant devia-
tions to prevent the reoccurrence of similar events, 
and communicates and discusses interdisciplinary 
safety-related matters more extensively within the 
project organisation. TVO must also investigate 
how to make the processing of functional devia-
tions within the Olkiluoto 3 project more efficient.
Commissioning inspection procedures for 
structures, buildings and fire protection
The inspection aimed to assess TVO’s ability to 
perform the commissioning inspections of the 
structures, buildings and fire protection systems of 
the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit. Based on the inspection, 
TVO needs to investigate which fire protection ar-
rangements	required	by	YVL	guides	are	to	be	 in-
spected at the building’s commissioning inspection, 
and which after the commissioning inspection. The 
approval procedures for potential changes to be 
made after the commissioning inspections must 
also be defined. TVO must audit the plant sup-
plier’s construction engineering and fire protection 
commissioning inspection methods to assess their 
appropriateness.
Personnel and resources
The project’s personnel and resource inspection 
focused on TVO’s measures to operate the Olki-
luoto 3 plant unit using an operating organisation 
shared by all plant units. The inspection covered 
the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units currently in op-
eration, and the Olkiluoto 3 unit under construc-
tion. No requirements concerning Olkiluoto 3 were 
issued at the inspection. Inspection findings have 
been discussed in detail in Appendix 5.
Equipment installation control 
process, electrical systems
The inspection was targeted at the licensee’s pro-
cedures and measures to ensure the compliance of 
the electrical systems with the requirements at the 
system installation stage. The inspection focused 
on TVO’s installation inspection procedures, the 
management of modifications during installations 
and commissioning, and the modifications required 
by the update of the plant’s cabling concept. Based 
on the inspection, STUK issued four requirements 
to TVO. A description of the licensee’s installation 
inspection process must be delivered to STUK, in-
cluding the inspection procedure for post-installa-
tion modifications as well as a description of the 
site modification handling process. The approved 
cabling concept has not been fully observed in the 
installation of cable trays, and some cable trays 
have been installed too close to pipes. TVO must 
ensure that the distance requirements are com-
plied with. In addition, TVO must ensure the ad-
equate scope of the processing of cabling division 
separation structures within the TVO organisa-
tion to ensure that the various threats receive the 
proper attention.
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Processing of deterministic 
safety analyses at TVO
The inspection was targeted at the processing of 
deterministic transient and accident analyses as 
well as emission and radiation dose analyses at 
TVO. TVO’s procedures and personnel resources 
within the inspected area were verified. As a re-
sult, it was stated that TVO has evaluated the ini-
tial analysis data and ordered comparative analy-
ses to confirm the analysis results. TVO has also 
assessed the impact of plant design modifications 
on the analyses. No requirements were imposed 
following the inspections.
Quality management
The quality management inspection included a re-
view of the management system’s functionality and 
scope assessment produced by TVO as well as the 
utilisation of the assessment, TVO’s and the plant 
supplier’s supplier auditor operations, and the pro-
cedures that TVO uses to review design materials. 
The inspection also included a section for which no 
prior notice had been given. This section concerned 
AREVA’s resources to supervise pipe installations 
and welding. STUK found AREVA’s supervisory 
resources to be very limited. According to STUK’s 
opinion, the operations did not comply with the 
welding supervision plan delivered to STUK in 
2011, and STUK required that an account of the 
matter be produced. In the same connection, STUK 
required that AREVA produce a plan of the super-
vision and inspections of the replacement of formed 
parts of small bore pipes being started at the time. 
Concerning the assessment report of the manage-
ment system’s conformity, performance and effec-
tiveness, it was stated that the scope of the report 
is limited in places despite STUK’s earlier require-
ments to supplement the report. TVO must analyse 
the report in more detail and define measures with 
schedules and responsible parties to ensure proper 
supervision. Concerning the reviewing of docu-
ments, STUK had stated in the construction-time 
quality management inspection carried out at the 
end of 2011 that TVO had knowingly delivered to 
STUK materials with deficiencies that prevented 
STUK from granting them official approval. At the 
time, STUK required that the materials’ compli-
ance with requirements be clearly stated in the 
covering letters and materials delivered to STUK, 
and that incomplete materials must not be deliv-
ered to STUK for review. As TVO has not changed 
its procedures, STUK repeated the requirements.
Installation inspections and pressure tests 
of mechanical equipment and pipes
The construction-time inspection of the installa-
tion inspections and pressure tests of mechanical 
equipment and pipes was targeted at TVO’s mea-
sures, supervision and control in the area in ques-
tion. The inspection particularly focused on the 
confirmation of the equipment and pipes’ compli-
ance with requirements, TVO’s personnel resources 
available for the work, welding supervision proce-
dures, tracking of open issues, and the processing 
of changes to work plans. Based on the inspection, 
it was stated that during the construction inspec-
tion of pipes, TVO does not systematically present 
the quality assurance materials for the valves in-
stalled to the pipes. STUK required that, in future, 
the quality assurance materials must be presented 
to be reviewed by STUK or an inspection organ-
isation approved by STUK. An account of these 
inspection procedures must be delivered to STUK 
for information. TVO must also produce an account 
of how non-standard piping supports are taken 
into account in construction inspections, and of the 
replacement of missing piping components with 
dummies at pressure testing.
Utilisation of PRA
The inspection of PRA utilisation was targeted at 
the status of the probabilistic risk analyses that 
were being prepared, TVO’s methods to ensure the 
correctness of the analyses, and TVO’s and the 
plant supplier’s personnel resources for the pro-
duction and review of the analyses. Current issues 
processed at the inspection also included how the 
plant supplier and TVO intend to assess the over-
all reliability of the I&C systems or utilise PRA 
for the changes to be made into the design of the 
Olkiluoto 3 plant unit. As a result of the inspection, 
STUK stated that TVO has the proper procedures 
in place to review PRA and its reference materials 
and to document the work, and no requirements 
for improvements were issued to TVO.
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Subject of inspection Time of inspection
Management system
ONP-A1 Johtamisjärjestelmä –
Planning and management
ONP-B1 Project management and control 20–21 September 2012
ONP-B2 Safety management –
ONP-B3 Project quality management –
ONP-B4 Planning and management of the research and monitoring programme –
ONP-B5 Design of Onkalo –
Implementation
ONP-C1 Site inspection and monitoring procedures –
ONP-C2 Drilling and modelling 6–7 June 2012
ONP-C3 Foreign substances 20–21 December 2012
ONP-C4 Excavation and EDZ –
ONP-C5 Onkalo in-flows 28–29 November 2012
ONP-C6 Monitoring and research methods –
”–” means that the inpection was not carried out in 2012, as planned in ONP programme
APPENDIX 7 Inspection programme during 
the construction phase of Onkalo in 2012
The objective of the construction-time inspection 
programme is to verify that high-quality imple-
mentation of approved plans is ensured in the con-
struction of the underground research facility, with 
compliance with official regulations and without 
jeopardizing safe final disposal. The inspection pro-
gramme includes assessment and monitoring of 
Posiva’s operations in building Onkalo, the pro-
cedures applied to various parts of the construc-
tion work, the management of Onkalo research 
and monitoring, the management of safety and the 
quality assurance of the implementation. STUK 
prepares annual plans for Onkalo inspections.
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APPENDIX 8 Assignments funded by STUK in 2012
Safety of nuclear power plants
The subjects of assignments presented in the 
2012 plan for technical support assignments were 
mainly inspection and assessment tasks regard-
ing the regulatory oversight of Olkiluoto 3 as part 
of STUK’s decision-making. Due to the delays in 
the Olkiluoto 3 construction project, some of the 
assignments proposed for 2012 were postponed to 
2013.
Of the assignment proposals for 2012, 33 were 
related to the project of overseeing the construc-
tion of Olkiluoto 3 (FIN5/OL3), six to the existing 
Olkiluoto plant units, nine to Loviisa plant units 
and two to new NPP projects. The most significant 
framework agreements related to overseeing the 
construction of Olkiluoto 3 in 2012 were:
•	 FIN5/OL3,	 Oversight	 and	 inspection	 of	 the	
manufacture of pipeline prefabricates of safety 
classes 1 and 2 (Quality Factory Oy, EUR 
260,700)
•	 FIN5/OL3,	 Strength	 analyses	 of	 nuclear	 pres-
sure vessels (VTT, EUR 49,500)
•	 FIN5/OL3,	 Strength	 analyses	 of	 construction	
plans (Inspecta Nuclear AB, EUR 120,000)
Safety of nuclear waste disposal
In 2012, the technical support programme for the 
oversight of nuclear waste management (VATU) 
included assignments to oversee the construction 
of the underground research facility (Onkalo) as 
well as assignments related to the preliminary re-
view of the construction licence for the final dis-
posal facility. In 2012, the total cost for the VATU 
assignments amounted to EUR 165,000. The as-
signments included:
•	 Third	 party	 specialist	 consultation	 concerning	
the Onkalo excavation and rock construction.
•	 Spent	fuel	safety	analyses	concerning	the	sorp-
tion properties of the bedrock and the migration 
of radionuclides.
•	 An	overview	of	the	microbe	models	being	used	
by Posiva.
•	 The	”Prospects	for	coupled	modelling	of	the	buf-
fer and backfill” presentation in an internation-
al buffer material convention in Montpellier.
•	 Production	 of	 an	 analysis	 tool	 for	 the	 impact	
matrix needed in the evaluation of scenarios, 
with the purpose of identifying key factors.
•	 Comparison	 of	 the	 Olkiluoto	 and	 Forsmark	
(Sweden) plant sites and the related presenta-
tion in the autumn convention of the American 
Geophysical Union in San Francisco in Decem-
ber 2012.
•	 Possibilities	for	site-scale	hydrogeological	mod-
elling – a state-of-the-art overview.
•	 Evaluation	 of	 Posiva’s	 rock	 mechanical	 back-
ground reports.
•	 Final	 reporting	 of	 the	 “Replaceability	 of	 ben-
tonite” and ”The potential of coupled models” 
projects.
•	 State-of-the-art	overview	of	microbe	activity	in	
the buffer and backfill.
•	 Safety	 analysis	 consultation	 including	 uncer-
tainty management training directed at STUK’s 
inspectors.
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ITDB
Illicit Trafficking Data Base, an IAEA database 
to which member states deliver data on de-
viations observed as regards nuclear substances 
and radiation sources.
KYT
Finnish nuclear waste management research 
programme
LARA
I&C renewal project at the Loviisa power plant
MDEP
Multinational Design Evaluation Programme; 
a multinational cooperation programme evalu-
ating the practices and requirements of au-
thorities related to the licensing of new nuclear 
power plants
NKS (Nordisk kärnsäkerhetsforskning)
Nordic safety research programme
OECD/NEA
OECD Nuclear Energy Association
OLC
Operational Limits and Conditions (previously 
Technical Specifications)
Onkalo
underground research facility for the final dis-
posal of spent nuclear fuel
PRA
Probabilistic Risk Analysis 
APPENDIX 9 Glossary and abbreviations
ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable)
radiation protection optimisation principle, ac-
cording to which exposure must be limited to 
being as low as reasonably achievable
BWR
boiling water reactor
CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear)
chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear 
weapons or hazards, for example: ”protective 
measures taken against CBRN weapons or 
hazards”
Euratom
for nuclear material safeguards, Euratom refers 
to the European Commission units responsible 
for nuclear material safeguards: Directorate 
General for Energy and Transport, Directorates 
H and I
FSAR
Final Safety Analysis Report
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
INSAG
International Nuclear Safety Group; organisa-
tion called by the Director General of IAEA
IRS
Incident Reporting System; nuclear power plant 
operating experience reporting system main-
tained by the IAEA and NEA
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PWR
pressurised water reactor
SAFIR
Safety of nuclear power plants; Finnish publicly 
funded national nuclear power plant research 
programme
SAGSI
Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards 
Implementation; an international team of nu-
clear material safeguard experts called by the 
Director General of the IAEA
STUK-YVL Guides
Working title for the new restructured regula-
tory guides on nuclear safety during the renew-
ing process in 2006–2009
WANO
World Association of Nuclear Operators
WENRA
Western European Nuclear Regulators’ 
Association
VVER (Vodo-Vodyanoi Energetichesky 
Reactor)
Russian pressurised water reactor; Loviisa 1 
and Loviisa 2 are VVER-440 reactors
nuclear material 
special fissionable material suitable for the 
creation of nuclear energy, such as uranium, 
thorium or plutonium
nuclear commodity (or: nuclear material)
nuclear material referred to above or another 
material referred to in Section 2, Paragraphs 4 
and 5 of the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act (deu-
terium or graphite), device, system and infor-
mation (Section 1, paragraph 8 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree). 
nuclear material accounting and control 
manual
manual to be used by an organisation in pos-
session of nuclear commodities, describing the 
nuclear commodity safeguards and accounting 
system
nuclear non-proliferation manual
manual to be used by a future possessor of nu-
clear commodities, describing the measures to 
secure the requirements of nuclear safeguards
regulatory control of nuclear non-
proliferation
monitoring operations to prevent the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons; operations consist of 
nuclear safeguards and the monitoring of the 
nuclear test ban
EIA procedure
Enviromental Safety Assessment
YVL Guides
STUK guides containing detailed requirements 
set for the safety of nuclear power plants. 
There’s a large restructuring project going on, 
the	new	YVL	Guides	should	replace	old	ones	by	
the	end	of	2012.	The	last	old	style	YVL	Guides	
with number-only id’s were issued in 2008.
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